and discriminating against it, on the ground that it employed engi- neers who were not members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. An injunction was issued, and a few days later the Lake Shore applied for an order of attachment against some of its employés who had refused to haul cars and perform service for them, thus hindering them from complying with the order of the court in respect to the Toledo and Ann Arbor Company. A rule to show cause was issued, and such proceedings had thereunder that one of the employés was adjudged guilty of contempt, was fined, and was ordered to be committed until payment of the fine. This employé applied to the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus. after setting the facts forth, claimed that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the cause in which the original order of injunction had been issued, for reasons stated, and further, that it had no juris- diction of the petitioner's person, because he was no party to that suit, and had not been served with process. The application was denied and the petition dismissed, from which judgment the peti- tioner appealed to this court. Held, (1) That while the general right of appeal from the judgments of Circuit Courts on habeas corpus directly to this court is taken away by the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, nevertheless, that right still exists in the cases designated in section 5 of that act; (2) That the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court over the petition for habeas corpus was not in issue, and was not decided adversely to the petitioner, and this appeal therefore did not come within the first of the classes named in sec- tion 5 of the act of 1891; (3) That the construction or application of the Constitution was not involved, in the sense of the statute, and that the petition did not proceed on that theory, but on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the prior case over the subject-matter, and in this case over the person of the petitioner; (4) That the appeal must be dismissed. In re Lennon, 393.
17. Findings of fact in an action brought to recover duties on importations paid under protest, which do not show what the collector charged the plaintiff, nor sufficiently describe the articles imported, and a record which fails to show under what provisions of the tariff act the parties claimed respectively, leave this court unable to direct judgment for either party. In such case the opinion of the court below cannot be resorted to to help the findings out. Saltonstall v. Birtwell, 417. 18. This court must determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction under Rev. Stat. § 709, to review the judgment of a state court; and the certificate of the presiding judge of the State that a state of case exists for the interposition of this court cannot, of itself, confer juris- diction upon it to reexamine a judgment of that court. Powell v. Brunswick County, 433.
19. It is essential to the maintenance of the jurisdiction over the judg ment of the state court, upon the ground of erroneous decision as to
the validity of a state statute or a right under the Constitution of the United States, that it should appear from the record that the validity of such statute was drawn in question, as repugnant to the Constitu- tion, and that the decision sustained its validity, or that the right was specially set up or claimed, and denied. Ib.
20. It is well settled that the construction put upon a state statute by the highest court of the. State will generally be followed by this court, unless it conflicts with the Constitution or a Federal statute, or a gen- eral rule of commercial law. Ib.
21. Applying these rules, it was held that the construction put by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia in Taylor v. Super- visors, 86 Virginia, 506, upon the provision in the charter of the Atlan- tie and Danville Railway Company considered in this suit, leaves no Federal question for this court. Ib.
22. When, in a suit in equity for the infringement of letters patent, the court below makes an interlocutory decree in plaintiff's favor, and then entertains a motion for a rehearing and receives affidavits in support of it, and denies the motion, this court does not feel itself at liberty to consider those affidavits. Giles v. Heysinger, 627.
23. The court follows Hammond v. Johnston, 142 U. S. 73, on a substan- tially similar state of facts, and holds that the ruling of the state court was broad enough to maintain the judgment, without consider- ing the Federal question. Hammond v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 633.
24. The appellate jurisdiction of this court over questions national and international in their nature, arising in an action for a maritime tort committed upon navigable waters and within admiralty jurisdiction, cannot be restrained by the mere fact that the party plaintiff has elected to pursue his common law remedy in a state court. Belden v. Chase, 674.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
When the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court is invoked solely on the ground of diverse citizenship, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final, although another ground for jurisdiction in the Circuit Court may be developed in the course of subsequent proceedings in the case. Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck, 138.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
1. When the original jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States is invoked upon the sole ground that the determination of the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must appear, at
the outset, from the pleadings, that the suit is one of that character, of which the Circuit Court could properly take cognizance at the time its jurisdiction is invoked. Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck, 138. 2. A bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States in Tennes- see, by a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Ken- tucky, against another company described as a corporation organized under the laws of that State and having its principal office in the dis- trict in which the suit was brought, and against five individuals, citi- zens of a county within that district, prayed "that the parties named as defendants be made such," and for a reconveyance and an account of property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been fraudulently caused by the individual defendants to be conveyed to the defendant corpora- tion, and to have been wasted and injured by all the defendants. The individual defendants demurred for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, filed an amended bill, which "refers to the original bill and its prayer, and makes the same a part hereof, as if set out herein in hæc verba;" and further alleged that the individual defendants, in pursuance of their fraudulent scheme, pretended to procure from the State of Kentucky a charter under the name of the company "which is the same corporation mentioned in the original bill," and caused the plaintiff's property to be conveyed "to said pretended corporation," but this company was never lawfully organized, and the individual defendants controlled it and were doing business as a partnership under its name; and prayed that the parties defendants to the original bill be made defendants to this amended bill, and that the individual defendants be made defendants as part- ners under the name of the company, and be made to account per- sonally and individually. Held, that this company, as a corporation of Kentucky, was a party defendant to the amended bill of the plain- tiff, likewise a Kentucky corporation; and that the amended bill must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Empire Transporta- tion Co. v. Empire Mining Co., 159.
3. The jurisdiction of Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, cannot be enlarged or diminished by state legislation. Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 202.
4. Whether such a court has jurisdiction in equity over a particular case, will be determined by inquiring whether by the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in this country and in the mother country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the relief sought in the bill was one obtainable in a court of law, or one which only a court of equity was fully competent to give. Ib.
5. A creditors' bill, to subject property of the debtor fraudulently standing in the name of a third party to the payment of judgments against the debtor, is within the jurisdiction of a Federal court, sitting as a court of equity, although, in the courts of the State in which the Federal
court sits, state legislation may have given the creditor a remedy at law. Ib.
6. N. and S., being citizens of Louisiana, obtained a judgment in a court of the State against C., also a citizen of Louisiana, which they assigned to W. and L., citizens of Missouri. The assignees thereupon brought suit against C. in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana, putting the jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship. Held, that under the provisions of § 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, which statute was in force when the suit was commenced, it could not be maintained. Ib.
7. In the act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 1, as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, giving the Circuit Courts of the United States original jurisdiction, "concurrent with the courts of the several States," of all suits of a civil nature, in which the matter in dispute exceeds $2000 in amount or value, " arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States" or in which there is "a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects," the provision that "no civil suit shall be brought against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabi- tant," is inapplicable to an alien or a foreign corporation sued here, and especially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right; and such a person or corporation may be sued by a citizen of a State of the Union in any district in which valid service can be made upon the defendant. In re Hohorst, 653.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. 1. The term "high seas," as used in the provision in Rev. Stat. § 5346, that "every person who, upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty juris- diction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any partic- ular State, on board any vessel belonging in whole or part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, with a dangerous weapon, or with intent to perpetrate any felony, commits an assault upon another shall be punished," etc., is applicable to the open, unenclosed waters of the Great Lakes, between which the Detroit River is a connecting stream. United States v. Rodgers, 249.
2. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under that section of the Revised Statutes, to try a person for an assault with a dangerous weapon, committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, when such vessel is in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the territorial limits of the Domin- ion of Canada. Ib.
3. The limitation of jurisdiction by the qualification that the offences punishable are committed on vessels in any arm of the sea, or in any
river, haven, creek, basin, or bay "without the jurisdiction of any par- ticular State," which means without the jurisdiction of any State of the Union, does not apply to vessels on the "high seas" of the lakes, but only to vessels on the waters designated as connecting with them; and so far as vessels on those seas are concerned, there is no limitation named to the authority of the United States. Ib.
4. A District Court of the United States has jurisdiction over an action to recover a penalty imposed for a violation of the act of February 26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332, c. 164, "to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia." Lees v. United States, 476.
5. As a District Court of the United States has jurisdiction under Rev. Stat. § 563, of all suits to recover forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States, including forfeitures of a bail bond, the question whether the forfeiture should be enforced by scire facias under Rev. Stat. § 716, or by proceedings under a law of the State in which the court is held, goes only to the remedy and not to the jurisdiction, and the action of the District Court is binding in a collateral proceeding. Insley v. United States, 512.
E. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
The Court of Claims was not estopped by the recitals in the act of January 17, 1887, 24 Stat. 358, c. 21, referring this case to it, from considering the question of the title of the claimants to the property whose value is sought to be recovered. Kinkead v. United States, 483.
LACHES.
See MANDAMUS, 3;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 12, (3); SALARY, 2.
See CONTRACT, 4;
RAILROAD, 2.
See CORPORATION, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. This court cannot, by writ of mandamus, compel a court below to decide a matter before it in a particular way. In re Parsons, 150.
« iepriekšējāTurpināt » |