defendant was guilty of the alleged offence is not sufficient reason for
its exclusion, if otherwise competent. Ib.

4. Acting on these principles, the court sustains the ruling of the court
below admitting testimony stated at length in the opinion, to show a
motive for the alleged murder. Ib.

5. An exception to the denial of a motion for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict was not supported by the evidence is untenable under
repeated rulings of this court. Ib.

6. The ruling in Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, that, "upon an
indictment for conspiracy, acts or declarations of one conspirator,
made after the conspiracy has ended, or not in furtherance of the
conspiracy, are not admissible in evidence against the other conspira-
tors," affirmed and followed. Brown v. United States, 93.

7. In an action at law against a bank to recover on a check drawn and
issued by its cashier, if it be admitted that the check was obtained
without consideration, and was invalid in the hands of the immediate
payee, the plaintiff must prove either that he was a bona fide holder,
or that the person from whom he received the paper had taken it for
value without notice of defect in its inception. Thompson v. Sioux
Falls National Bank, 231.

1. The verdict in this case was returned December 16, 1887, and judgment
entered thereon on the same day. On the next day ten days were
granted for filing a bill of exceptions, which time was extended from
time to time, but the last extension expired before April 1, 1889, when
they were settled and signed. Held, that the allowance of this bill of
exceptions was not seasonable. Morse v. Anderson, 156.

2. The exception to the judge's charge does not embrace too large a por-
tion of it, and is not subject to the often sustained objection, of not
being sufficiently precise and pointed to call the attention of the judge
to the particular error complained of. Hicks v. United States, 442.
3. It is well settled that, instead of preparing separate bills for each sepa-
rate matter, all the alleged errors of a trial may be incorporated into
one bill of exceptions; and the exception in this case is specific and
direct to the one error of compelling the defendant to become a witness
against himself, and comes within this rule. Lees v. United States, 476.
4. An express order of court during the judgment term, continuing a
cause for the purpose of settling, allowing, signing, and filing a bill of
exceptions, and the settlement and allowance and filing of the bill
during the term to which the continuance was made, takes the excep-
tions out of the operation of the general rule, that the power to reduce
exceptions to form and have them signed and filed is, under ordinary

circumstances, confined to the term at which the judgment is ren-
dered. Ward v. Cochran, 597.

5. A bill of exceptions which, in so far as it relates to the charge, specifies
with distinctness the parts excepted to, and the legal proposition to
which exceptions are taken, is sufficient. Ib.

See EVIDENCE, 5;
JURISDICTION, A, 3.

EXECUTION.

See ABATEMENT.

EXECUTIVE.

See COURT-MARTIAL.

FEES.

1. A marshal of the United States is not entitled to commissions on dis-
bursements for the support of a penitentiary, made under Rev. Stat.
§ 1892. United States v. Baird, 54.

2. A commissioner of a Circuit Court of the United States is not entitled,
under Rev. Stat. § 847, to compensation for hearing charges made by
complaining witnesses against persons charged with violations of
the laws of the United States, and holding examinations of such com-
plaining witnesses and any other witnesses produced by them in sup-
port of their allegation, and deciding whether a warrant should not
issue upon the complaint made. United States v. Patterson, 65.

3. Although such services are of a judicial nature, and may be required
by the laws of the State in which they are rendered, they cannot be
charged against the United States in the absence of a provision by
Congress for their payment. Ib.

FRAUD.
See BANK.

FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.

1. A person who makes representations of material facts, assuming or
intending to convey the impression that he has actual knowledge of
the existence of such facts, when he is conscious that he has no such
knowledge, is as much responsible for the injurious consequences of
such representations to one who believes and acts upon them, as if he
had actual knowledge of their falsity. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Company
v. Bamford, 665.

2. Deceit may be predicated of a vendor or lessor who makes material,
untrue representations in respect to his own business or property, for
the purpose of their being acted upon, and which are in fact relied
upon by the purchaser or lessee, the truth of which representations
the vendor or lessor is bound, and must be presumed, to know. Ib.

3. General assertions by a vendor or lessor, that the property offered for
sale or to be leased is valuable or very valuable, although such asser-
tions turn out to be untrue, are not misrepresentations, amounting to
deceit, nor are they to be regarded as statements of existing facts,
upon which an action for deceit may be based, but rather as the
expressions of opinions or beliefs. Ib.

4. Fraud upon the part of a vendor or lessor, by means of representations
of existing material facts, is not established, unless it appears such
representations were made for the purpose of influencing the pur-
chaser or lessee, and with knowledge that they were untrue; but
where the representations are material and are made by the vendor or
lessor for the purpose of their being acted upon, and they relate to
matters which he is bound to know, or is presumed to know, his actual
knowledge of their being untrue is not essential. Ib.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. A writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to perform the office of a writ
of error or appeal. In re Swan, Petitioner, 637.

2. When a person is imprisoned under a judgment of a Circuit Court which
had no jurisdiction of the person or of the subject-matter, or authority
to render the judgment, and no writ of error or appeal will lie, then
relief may be accorded by writ of habeas corpus. Ib.

See JURISDICTION, A, 16.

HIGH SEAS.

See JURISDICTION, D, 1, 3.

INDIAN AGENT.

See SALARY, 3.

INSURANCE.

A policy of life insurance, payable in "thirty days after due notice and
satisfactory evidence of death" and excepting this risk: "Suicide.
The self-destruction of the insured, in any form, except upon proof
that the same is the direct result of disease or of accident occurring
without the voluntary act of the insured," covers the case of the
insured's death as the direct result of taking poison when his mind is
so far deranged as to be unable to understand the moral character of
his act, even if he does understand its physical consequences; and it is
sufficient to prove this at the trial, without stating it in the prelimi-
nary proof of death.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Akens,

468.

See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2, 3.

JUDGMENT.

See EQUITY, 4, 6.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COUrt.

1. The question whether an action to foreclose a lien for unpaid assess-
ments for street improvements in San Francisco is in rem or in perso-
nam, is one upon which the decision of the Supreme Court of California
is binding, and its ruling that a plaintiff who was no party to defend-
ants' suits to foreclose, has a right to show by evidence aliunde the
invalidity of the judgments obtained by them, is not a subject for
review here. Wood v. Brady, 18.

2. In order to maintain a writ of error against a judgment of the highest
court of a State, it must appear that the judgment involved a decision
against a right, title, privilege, or immunity claimed by the plaintiff in
error under the Constitution or laws of the United States, which was
specially set up or claimed in the state court at the proper time and in
the proper way; and, as the record in this case does not show such
facts, the writ of error is dismissed without intimating any opinion
upon the questions sought to be raised here. Schuyler National Bank
v. Bollong, 85.

3. A general exception to a charge, which does not direct the attention of
the court to the particular portions of it to which objection is made,
raises no question for review. Holder v. United States, 91.

4. The denial of a motion for a new trial cannot be assigned for error. Ib.
5. In this case the writ of error was dismissed because the judgment

below rested upon a construction by the state court of a statute of the
State, which was sufficiently broad to sustain the judgment. Miller v.
Swann, 132.

6. This court exercises appellate jurisdiction only in accordance with the
acts of Congress on that subject. Colorado Central Mining Co. v.
Turck, 138.

7. In order to bring an appeal from the judgment of a Circuit Court taken
since the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, went
into effect, within the first of the six classes of cases specified in section
5 of that act, viz., " in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is
in issue," the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court below must have been
in issue in the case, and must have been decided against the appellants,
and the question of jurisdiction must have been certified; but the
court does not now say that the absence of a formal certificate would
necessarily be fatal. Carey v. Houston & Texas Central Railway Co.,

170.

8. The fifth section of that act does not authorize a direct appeal to this
court in a suit upon a question involving the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court over another suit previously determined in the same
court. lb.

9. A bill in equity to impeach and set aside a decree of foreclosure of a
railroad mortgage, on the ground of fraud, and to prevent the consum-

mation of a scheme for reorganization, is a separate and distinct case
from the foreclosure suit, and no question of jurisdiction over that
suit, or over the rendition of the decree passed therein, can be availed
of to sustain an appeal to this court from a decree of a Circuit Court
under the provisions of the first class of the six cases specified in
section 5 of the act of March 3, 1891. Ib.

10. In order to hold an appeal from a judgment or decree of a Circuit
Court to this court to be maintainable under the fourth class of said
section 5, viz., “any case that involves the construction or application
of the Constitution of the United States," the construction or applica-
tion of the Constitution must be involved as controlling, although on
the appeal all other questions might be open to determination. Ib.
11. The jurisdiction of this court in this case is limited by the act of Feb-
ruary 25, 1889, 25 Stat. 693, c. 236, to the determination of the ques-
tions as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Mississippi Mills v.
Cohn, 202.

12. The decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that
a creditor of an insolvent debtor, who proves his debt in insolvency,
and accepts the benefit of proceedings under the state statute of
May 13, 1884, entitled "An act to provide for composition with credit-
ors in insolvency," Mass. Stats. 1884, c. 236, and the act amending
the same, thereby waives any right which he might otherwise have
had to object to the validity of the composition statutes, as impairing
the obligation of contracts, presents no Federal question for review
by this court. Eustis v. Bolles, 361.

13. To give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court,
it must appear affirmatively, not only that a Federal question was
presented for decision by the state court, but that its decision was
necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was decided
adversely to the party claiming a right under the Federal laws or
Constitution, or that the judgment, as rendered, could not have been
given without deciding it. Ib.

14. Where the record discloses that, if a question has been raised and
decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of
the Constitution or laws of the United States, another question, not
Federal, has been also raised and decided against such party, and
the decision of the latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the
Federal question, to sustain the judgment, this court will not review
the judgment. Ib.

15. When this court, in a case brought here by writ of error to a state
court, finds it unnecessary to decide any Federal question, its logical
course is to dismiss the writ of error. Ib.

16. The Toledo and Ann Arbor Railway Company, which connected with
the Michigan Southern Railway in the carrying on of interstate
commerce, filed a bill in the Circuit Court to restrain the Michigan
Southern from refusing to receive its cars used in such commerce,