Proceedings on the death of Mr. Justice Blatchford.

and in professional practice, a wide and varied knowledge of the law, a keen and discriminating intellect, and an indomitable patience, he added "the transcendent capacity of taking trouble," the volume and extent of the work he was enabled to accomplish during twenty-six years of judicial life should occasion no surprise.

If his death admonishes us of the swiftness of the passage of time, his example teaches, through the results of the orderly method which regulated his every action, how time may be redeemed.

Mr. Justice Blatchford was at home in every branch of the jurisdiction of the courts in which he sat. It is not easy to distinguish, where all was done so well, but it may be justly said that he displayed uncommon aptitude in the administration of the maritime law and of the law of patents, his grasp upon the original principles of the one and his mastery of details in the other aiding him in largely contributing to the development of both. His experience in adjudication and in affairs bore abundant fruit during his incumbency of a seat upon this bench, and in the domain of constitutional investigation and exposition he won new laurels.

As suggested by the Attorney General, he did not attempt in his judgments to "bestow conclusions on after-generations," yet when the four hundred and thirty opinions, to be precise as he would have been, in which he spoke for the court, contained in the volumes of our reports from the latter part of the one hundred and fifth to the close of the one hundred and forty-ninth, are examined, it will be found that he dealt with large questions, in many of them, with a breadth and luminousness of treatment, and at the same time with a circumspection and sagacity, which entitle them to high rank as judicial compositions, and will make them monuments to be seen hereafter of those concerned in looking about them for guidance in the present by the wisdom of the past.

And, as rightly indicated in the thoughtful tributes paid to him to-day, the memory of this conscientious and faithful public servant will be perpetuated, not through his decisions alone, but in the profound conviction, the contemplation of his career will ever produce, that he kept, to use the language of another, the great picture of the useful and distinguished judge "constantly before his eyes, and to a resemblance of which all his efforts, all his thoughts, all his life were devoted."

Upon the loss to us personally in parting with this beloved friend and helpful fellow-laborer we do not care to dwell. We

Proceedings on the death of Mr. Justice Blatchford.

take up our burdens again, conscious of the absence of the relief his participation would have afforded, but feeling as to him the truthfulness of the thought: "Above all, believe it, the sweetest canticle is Nunc Dimittis, when a man hath obtained worthy ends and expectations."

The minute and resolutions of the bar and the remarks of the Attorney General will be entered on our records, and as a further mark of respect the court will adjourn until to-morrow at the usual hour.

II.

AMENDMENT TO RULES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1893.

It is ordered that clause 6 of Rule 21 be, and it is, amended by substituting therefor the following:

6. When no oral argument is made for one of the parties, only one counsel will be heard for the adverse party.

(Promulgated December 11, 1893.)

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III.

ASSIGNMENT TO CIRCUITS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN VACATION.

It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this court among the circuits, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz.:

For the First Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, HORACE GRAY, Associate Justice.
For the Third Circuit, GEORGE SHIRAS, JR., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, MELVILLE W. FULLER, Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, HOWELL E. JACKSON, Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, HENRY B. BROWN, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, MELVILLE W. Fuller, Chief Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, STEPHEN J. FIELD, Associate Justice.

July 15, 1893.

(Signed) MELVILLE W. FULLER,

Chief Justice of the United States.

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INDEX.

ABATEMENT.

The rule that the death of a party to a suit, either pending the suit or
after judgment and before execution, abates the suit, does not apply
to a case where land has been sold upon execution, but no deed
delivered. Insley v. United States, 512.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

See PLEADING, 2.

ADMIRALTY.

1. This court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the highest court
of a State in an action at common law to recover damages caused by
the collision of two steamers navigating inland waters over which the
United States have admiralty jurisdiction, when that judgment denies
rights claimed by the plaintiff in error under rules established by
statutes of the United States for preventing collisions, or rights regard-
ing the application of such rules. Belden v. Chase, 674.

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2. A steam pleasure-yacht is an ocean-going steamer," and is not a
"coasting vessel.” Ib.

3. A steam pleasure-yacht, on the inland waters of the United States, is
bound, when under way, to carry at the foremast head a bright white
light, on the starboard side a green light, and on the port side a red
light, as prescribed by Rule 3 in Rev. Stat. § 4233; and is not required
to carry
"in addition thereto a central range of two white lights," as
prescribed by Rule 7 of that section for "coasting steam-vessels . . .
navigating the bays, lakes, rivers, or other inland waters of the United
States," that rule not being applicable to a steam pleasure-yacht. Ib.
4. Regulations established by a board of supervising inspectors, under
Rev. Stat. § 4412, "to be observed by all steam-vessels passing each
other," have the force of statutory enactment; are obligatory from the
time when the necessity for caution begins; and continue so while the
means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. Ib.

5. When a vessel, meeting or passing another vessel, departs from the
rules laid down by the supervising inspectors, and a collision results,
the burden of proof is on it to show that the departure was made
necessary by immediate, impending, and alarming danger. Ib.

6. When a vessel has committed a positive breach of statute, she must not
only show that her fault did not probably contribute to a disaster
which followed, but that it could not have done so. Ib.

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