Opinion of the Court. July 1, 1891, an appeal might have been taken either to this court or the Circuit Court of Appeals, a point suggested, but upon which it is unnecessary to pass. 2. The decree dismissing complainants' bill was entered on October 20, 1890, but an application for a rehearing was made shortly thereafter and during the same term, but not disposed of until May 5, 1891. The rule is that if a motion or a petition for rehearing is made or presented in season and entertained by the court, the time limited for a writ of error or appeal does not begin to run until the motion or petition is disposed of. Until then the judgment or decree does not take final effect for the purposes of the writ of error or appeal. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238, 249; Texas & Pacific Railway v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 488; Memphis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 715. If this case falls within that category, then the six months within which the appeal had to be taken under section 11 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, did not commence to run until May 5, 1891, and the appeal was in time. It is true that equity rule 88 provides that "no rehearing shall be granted after the term at which the final decree of the court shall have been entered and recorded, if an appeal lies to the Supreme Court;" but if this petition for rehearing was filed in season and entertained by the court, then the decree, although entered in form, did not discharge the parties from their attendance in the cause, and they were bound to follow the petition thus pending to the next term. The suit was thereby prolonged until the application was disposed of in the regular course of proceeding. This is expressly so ruled in Goddard v. Ordway, supra. In Giant Powder Co. v. California Vigorit Powder Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 197; S. C. 6 Sawyer, 508, it was said by Mr. Justice Field that equity rule 88 applies only where no petition is presented during the term, and the numerous cases in which it has been held that the time limited for an appeal does not begin to run until a petition for a rehearing properly presented has been disposed of, sustain that view. The decree does not in legal effect remain final while the petition is pending, and Opinion of the Court. the prescription of rule 88 must be construed to mean that a rehearing cannot be granted after the lapse of the term unless application is made therefor during the term, and being entertained, the decree is thereby prevented from passing beyond the control of the court. The entertaining of the petition keeps the jurisdiction alive, and the granting of the rehearing may be made absolute, or denied thereafter, as the court may determine. But it is said this cannot be the result, under either statute or rule, of the mere filing of a motion or petition for rehearing, and that it does not affirmatively appear in this case that the motion or petition was entertained by the court. But we should be inclined to hold, if a decision in that regard were called for, that, since the application was passed upon as having been duly made, the presumption must be indulged that it was entertained by the court in the first instance and during the term at which the decree was pronounced. 3. Apart from these considerations, however, this is an appeal from a decree entered by the Circuit Court in conformity with the mandate from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court took jurisdiction, passed upon the case, and determined by its judgment that the appeal had been properly taken. If error was committed in so doing, it is not for the Circuit Court to pass upon that question. The Circuit Court could not do otherwise than carry out the mandate from the Court of Appeals, and could not refuse to do so on the ground of want of jurisdiction in itself or in the appellate court. Skillern's Executors v. May's Executors, 6 Cranch, 267; In re Washington & Georgetown Railroad, 140 U. S. 91; Gaines v. Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 241. And no rule is better settled than that an appeal from a decree entered by the court below in accordance with the mandate of the appellate court, cannot be maintained. Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U. S. 361; Humphrey v. Baker, 103 U. S. 736; Texas & Pacific Railway v. Anderson, 149 U. S. 237. If the Circuit Court of Appeals erred, or if, for any reason, its judgment could be held void, the appropriate remedy lay in a certiorari from this court to that court. American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville &c. Opinion of the Court. Railway, 148 U. S. 372. And we judicially know from our own records, Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 240, 243, that the present appellants applied to this court for that writ, and that the application was denied. Appeal dismissed. CORBIN CABINET LOCK LOCK COMPANY v. EAGLE LOCK COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT. No. 42. Argued October 18, 19, 1893. Decided October 30, 1893. The first claim under the reissued letters patent No. 10,361, issued to Henry L. Spiegel, July 31, 1883, for improvements in cabinet locks, is void because it broadens and expands the claims in the original patent, and it does not appear that there was any accident, inadvertence, or mistake in the specification and claim of the original, or that it was void or inoperative for any reason which would entitle the patentee to have a reissue. When an applicant for letters patent makes a broad claim which is rejected, and he acquiesces in the decision and substitutes a narrower claim therefor, he cannot insist upon a construction of the narrowed claim which would cover what was so rejected. To warrant new and broader claims in a reissue, they must not only be suggested or indicated in the original specification, drawings, or models, but it must appear that they constitute part of the invention intended to be covered by the original patent. In applications for reissue the patentee cannot incorporate claims covering what had been rejected on the original application. Letters patent No. 316,411, granted April 21, 1885, to Henry L. Spiegel for improvements in cabinet locks are void for want of patentable invention. IN equity, to prevent the infringement of letters patent. Decree below dismissing the bill, from which the complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John P. Bartlett (with whom was Mr. Charles E. Mitchell on the brief,) for appellant. Mr. Wilmarth H. Thurston and Mr. Benjamin Price for appellee. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the court. Opinion of the Court. The appellant brought this suit against the appellee for the infringement of two letters patent granted to Henry L. Spiegel, for improvements in cabinet-locks - one being reissue letters patent No. 10,361, dated July 31, 1883, and the other No. 316,411, dated April 21, 1885, both of which were assigned by Spiegel to Frank W. Mix, and by Mix to the appellant. They relate to what are known in the trade as "machine" locks, so called from the fact that they are adapted for insertion in mortises cut entirely by machinery or routing-tools, and thus distinguished from the "old-style" lock previously used, which was adapted only for mortises cut or chiselled by hand. The locks covered by the patents are used chiefly on furniture. It is alleged that the defendant's lock, which is substantially that covered by the Morris L. Orum patent of August 22, 1882, infringes the first claim of the reissue, and the three claims of the patent of 1885. The defences set up as to the reissue are: That the first claim thereof is for a different invention from that described in the original patent; that it is an expansion of the original claim, and is not infringed. As to the patent of 1885, the defences interposed are: That it is anticipated by other persons and patents, and want of patentability. The opinion of the court below dismissing the bill is reported in 37 Fed. Rep. 338. From that decree the present appeal is prosecuted. The history of the art on this subject is so fully set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brown in the case of Duer v. Corbin Cabinet Lock Co., 149 U. S. 216, decided at the last term of this court, that it need not be repeated here. No special consideration was given by the court below to the first claim of the reissue patent, and while it was not seriously insisted in oral argument before this court, that there was error in the judgment of the court below on this branch of the case, counsel for appellant have nevertheless contended in their brief that the first claim of the reissue patent is valid, and was infringed. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the question raised on the reissue patent. The original patent on which the reissue is founded was Opinion of the Court. No. 241,828, dated May 24, 1881. It appears from the file wrapper and contents that in his original application the patentee made three claims, the first being for "cabinet-lock having its rear-plate projecting at each side of the lock-case (at GG), substantially as and for the purpose specified;" the second was for a lock having such projecting rear-plate, and having its front-plate provided with a slit and strip; and the third claim was for a lock having such projecting rear-plate, and having the upper part of such projection bent toward the front-plate (as at G'). Each of these claims was rejected by the Patent Office, the first and broader claim on reference to the Gory patent, No. 138,148, dated April 22, 1873; the second on reference to the Bishop patent, No. 201,219, dated March 12, 1878; and the third on the ground of no invention. In the letter of rejection it was suggested to the applicant that a "single specific claim, limited to its (the lock's) exact construction," might be allowed. This suggestion was accepted; all three claims originally filed were cancelled, and there was substituted and allowed a single claim as follows: "A cabinet-lock having its rear-plate projecting beyond each side of the lock-case as at GG, and having the upper part of each projection bent toward the front-plate D, combined with the front-plate D, said front-plate having a slit n, and strip m, substantially as and for the purposes specified." Having originally sought broader claims, which were rejected, and having acquiesced in such rejection, and having withdrawn such claims and substituted therefor this narrower claim, describing a particular or specific lock, as such, neither the patentee, nor his assignees, can be allowed under the authorities to insist upon such construction of the allowed claim as would cover what had been previously rejected. Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. S. 593; Roemer v. Peddie, 132 U. S. 313; Royer v. Coupe, 146 U. S. 524. Aside from the operation of this estoppel, it is perfectly clear that the action of the Patent Office in rejecting the three original claims was correct, for the "old-style" lock, which was in use long prior to the date of the Spiegel so-called invention, had a projecting front-plate, and a projecting rear-plate, |