Opinion of the Court.

that the full relief sought in this suit could be obtained in the state courts in an action at law, it does not follow that the Federal court, sitting as a court of equity, is without jurisdiction. The inquiry rather is, whether by the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in this and the mother country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the relief here sought was one obtainable in a court of law, or one which only a court of equity was fully competent to give.

In order to determine this question, a further statement is necessary of the facts disclosed in and the exact relief sought by these bills. After the allegations in respect to the judg ments, the bills aver that in 1879 and 1880 the defendants entered into a conspiracy to defraud and despoil the creditors of Simon Cohn; that he proceeded to carry out this scheme by purchasing from plaintiffs and others a large amount of goods, on credit, and selling them for cash at a great sacrifice, and these moneys he had so placed as to be beyond the reach of his creditors. The means by which these goods were received and disposed of are stated at some length. Further, and, as is alleged, in carrying out this scheme, he fraudulently procured his wife to institute a suit for moneys, when none was due from him to her, and he not defending, to recover a judgment for $4000 as her separate estate, by which any property in his name could be sold and the title transferred to his wife. Also, he executed a mortgage for $5800 on certain real estate, to wit, six lots in the town of Providence and a fine brick storehouse thereon, in favor of his brother, a mortgage which was in fact without any consideration. Thereafter, his brother foreclosed such mortgage, and on foreclosure the property was purchased in the name of Mrs. Steinhardt, Simon Cohn's mother-in-law. Other property described was purchased in the name of Mrs. Steinhardt, although the money paid therefor was furnished by Cohn, and was part of that realized from the cash sales heretofore mentioned. All his property had in fact been placed in the name of Mrs. Steinhardt, and he was carrying on business ostensibly in her name, though all the while the real owner. The prayer of the bills is, that

Opinion of the Court.

the judgment in favor of the wife be set aside as fraudulent; that the defendant, Simon Cohn, be declared the real owner of the properties described; and that they be taken possession of by a receiver, and sold to satisfy the judgments.

It will be seen from this statement that these bills were substantially creditors' bills, to subject property-in fact, the property of the defendant, but fraudulently standing in the name of a third party to the payment of those judgments, and to remove a fraudulent judgment which might stand as a cloud upon the title of the debtor. Such suits have always been recognized as within the jurisdiction of equity. In 2 Beach on Modern Equity Jurisprudence, § 883, it is said: "A court of equity will aid a judgment creditor to reach the property of his debtor by removing fraudulent judgments or conveyances or transfers which defeat his legal remedy at law." See also 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., § 1415; Dockray v. Mason, 48 Maine, 178; Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atk. 352, 357; Burroughs v. Elton, 11 Ves. 29, 33; Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283; Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige, 637; Beck v. Burdett, 1 Paige, 305; Cuyler v. Moreland, 6 Paige, 273; Feldenheimer v. Tressel, 6 Dakota, 265. It follows from these considerations that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing these bills for want of jurisdiction.

It was further held by the Circuit Court, as appears from the opinion referred to, that Wood and Lee were not entitled to relief by reason of the Newman judgment, on the further ground that Newman and Stockman, being citizens of Louisiana, could not have sued in the Federal court; and that Wood and Lee, their assignees, were equally disabled. This, by reason of that clause in the first section of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts, (which statute was in force at the time of the commencement of this suit,) which reads as follows: "Nor shall any Circuit or District court have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in cases of promissory notes negotiable by the law merchant and bills of exchange."

Opinion of the Court.

This question has been settled adversely to the appellants, and in accord with the ruling of the Circuit Court, by the case of Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 248. That case arose under the same section. That presented as this, a suit by the assignee of a judgment to set aside, as fraudulent, certain sales and conveyances of real estate made by the judgment debtor, and to subject it to the payment of the judgment. There were two judgments, and after disposing of one Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, said, as to the other: "In reference to the judgment in favor of Chester, on which, as his assignee, Whittemore asks relief, it is urged as ground of demurrer, that Chester being a citizen of the same State with Stewart, his assignee is incapable of prosecuting this suit in a Federal court. It was brought in 1876, and the question here raised must be decided by a construction of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470. That judgment is, then, the foundation of his suit in the Circuit Court. It is a cause of action which he holds by assignment from a party who cannot sue in that court. Without this cause of action he has no standing in court, and has no right to ask the court to inquire into the other matters alleged in the bill. It is as much the foundation of his right to bring the present suit as if it were a bond and mortgage on which he was asking a decree of foreclosure. See Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441. The Circuit Court, if the judgment of Chester had been there recovered, might have jurisdiction of the case to remove obstructions to the enforcement of its own judgment, no matter who for the time being was its owner. But where

a party comes for the first time in a court of the United States to obtain its aid in enforcing the judgment of a state court, he must have a case on which the former court can entertain original jurisdiction. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290."

It may be that, when the appellants obtain the relief they seek in respect to the judgments rendered in their own favor in the Federal court, and the property of the defendants has been sold by a receiver or otherwise, the owners of this Newman judgment may intervene in the case and apply for a share of the funds. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 432. But

Statement of the Case.

that is a question which need not now be considered, and is very different from the question here presented, of the right of the assignees of this state judgment to maintain in the Federal courts an independent suit for its enforcement.

The act of February 25, 1889, which gives this court jurisdiction, 25 Stat. 693, c. 236, provides that "in cases where the decree or judgment does not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, the Supreme Court shall not review any question. raised upon the record, except such question of jurisdiction." It follows, therefore, that in this case our inquiry must stop with that question of jurisdiction, which we have thus determined.

The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing these bills for want of jurisdiction must be reversed, and the consolidated case will be remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

McDAID v. OKLAHOMA TERRITORY, ex rel. SMITH.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY
OF OKLAHOMA.

No. 785. Submitted October 20, 1893.- Decided November 20, 1893.

Under the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by the act of May 14, 1890, 26 Stat. 109, c. 207, entitled "an act to provide for town site entries of lands in what is known as · Oklahoma,' and for other purposes," it was entirely competent for the Secretary to provide for an appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land Office in case of contest.

When an appeal from a decision of the trustees appointed by the Secretary under the provisions of that act was duly taken, it became the duty of the trustees to decline to issue a deed to the appellee until the appeal was disposed of.

THIS was a proceeding in mandamus brought in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Logan County, in the Territory of Oklahoma, April 27, 1891, to compel Daniel J.

VOL. CL-14

Statement of the Case.

McDaid, William H. Merriweather, and John H. Shanklin, as trustees of the town site of Guthrie, Oklahoma Territory, appointed by the Secretary of the Interior under the act of May 14, 1890, 26 Stat. 109, c. 207, entitled "An act to provide for town site entries of lands in what is known as 'Oklahoma,' and for other purposes," to execute deeds for certain lots in said town site. The relators, Smith and Bradley, claimed to have entered two lots on the site, and one John Galloway claimed a prior right thereto.

On September 23, 1890, the relators applied to the town site trustees for a deed to the lots, and on the same day Galloway also made his application therefor. The trustees heard the controversy of the two claimants, and on April 6, 1891, rendered their decision in favor of the relators, finding that they were entitled to the lots in dispute and to a conveyance from the trustees, and they ordered that a deed be executed accordingly. Galloway having died, his heirs were substituted for him, and they filed their appeal from the decision to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. In consequence of the appeal the trustees refused to issue the deed, and thereupon the relators instituted this suit.

The complaint alleged that the sole ground of refusal was the appeal; that there was no authority for such appeal, and that it furnished no excuse to the trustees for their refusal. The defendants answered, setting up that Galloway's heirs "duly filed their appeal from the decision of this board to the Commissioner of the General Land Office pursuant to the instructions under the act of Congress under which this board was appointed, such instructions having been made by the Secretary of the Interior authorizing appeals by claimants to lots in cases where such claimants feel themselves aggrieved by the decisions of this board.

"And these defendants, further answering, say that there is a right of appeal given by the instructions of the Secretary of the Interior and recognized by this board, and that appeals in similar cases have been taken by other persons from other decisions of this board both before and after the appeal taken in this case.