Opinion of the Court.

That the Empire Coal and Mining Company, as a corporation of Kentucky, was a party defendant to the bill as originally framed, cannot be doubted.

An amended bill, filed October 26, 1886, alleged that "the Empire Coal and Mining Company is but the creature of" the individual defendants, "who own all its pretended stock, rights, and franchises," and "was brought into existence by them as a part of the fraudulent scheme heretofore set out," and "is insolvent, and has nothing more than the nominal possession of" the plaintiff's property, and that all the profits thereof had been appropriated by the individual defendants; and prayed that they, "all citizens of Davidson County and within the jurisdiction of this court, and the said so-called Empire Coal and Mining Company, having its principal office and officers in Davidson County, Tennessee, and within the jurisdiction of this court, be made defendants, and be served with process, and be required to answer," and that "the pretended conveyance" of the plaintiff's property from one of them "to the so-called Empire Coal and Mining Company be declared held in trust for complainant, and that said Empire Coal and Mining Company be declared to be invested with such title as it may have in trust for the complainant," and for other specific and general relief against all the defendants. The bill, as thus amended, still treated the Empire Coal and Mining Company as an existing corporation of Kentucky, and as a party defendant.

On November 24, 1887, a demurrer of the individual defendants was sustained, and the bill ordered to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, unless the plaintiff should so amend "as to dismiss as to all defendants who are citizens of the same State with itself."

The second amended bill, filed by leave of court on January 5, 1888, repeats the allegations of the first amended bill as to the Empire Coal and Mining Company; and further states and charges that the individual defendants, in further pursuance of their fraudulent scheme, and for the purpose of better concealing their frauds and wrong doings, "pretended to procure from the State of Kentucky a charter under the name and

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Opinion of the Court.

style of the Empire Coal and Mining Company, which is the same corporation mentioned and referred to in the original and amended bills; and said defendants conveyed to said pretended corporation all the properties belonging to complainant and mentioned in said bills and converted by said defendants, as stated, to their own use and benefit;" "that no organization was ever had or attempted to be had in the State of Kentucky, which is required by the laws of that State; but that all the meetings of the so-called directors of said pretended corporation were held in the city of Nashville, Tennessee, and the principal office located in said city;" and "therefore charges that in no sense is said corporation legally and validly organized, but that said five defendants still hold and possess all complainant's property, rights, and privileges, as set out in said. bills, and that said corporation is nothing more than a partnership owned and controlled by said five defendants, who are all citizens of Tennessee, and are doing business under the name and style of the Empire Coal and Mining Company." In this last bill, the plaintiff prays "that the party defendants to its original and amended bills, heretofore filed in this cause, be made defendants to this amended bill," and that the five individuals aforesaid "be made defendants as partners doing business under the name and style of the Empire Coal and Mining Company, and that proper and necessary process issue to this end;" and that "they be made to account personally and individually, as prayed in this and the original and amended bills; and that the title to said properties be declared to be held by said defendants, whether in their own name or under the name of the Empire Coal and Mining Company, for the use and benefit of complainant, and that the title to said property be divested, and vested in complainant;" "and for such other and further relief as to equity may belong."

Moreover, which is significant and decisive, each of the amended bills not only recites the substance of the original bill, but expressly "refers to said original bill, its prayer and exhibits thereto, and makes the same a part hereof, as if set out herein in hæc verba." The original bill, as has been seen, made the Empire Coal and Mining Company, as a corporation

Opinion of the Court.

organized under the laws of Kentucky, a party defendant, in the description of the parties, in the body of the bill, and in the prayer for relief.

The conclusion is irresistible, that the bill, as finally amended, is so framed as to hold this company, and all the members thereof, whether it is a corporation or only a partnership; and, therefore, that this company, as a Kentucky corporation, is a party defendant to the second amended bill of the plaintiff (likewise a Kentucky corporation) as well as to each of its former bills, and might have been held liable as such, had the suit proceeded to a decree for the plaintiff.

Such being the case, as shown by the record, its decision is not difficult, but it is governed by well-settled rules. By the Constitution and laws of the United States, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, on the ground of the citizenship of the parties, extends only to suits between citizens of different States; and within the meaning of those laws, as construed by this court, a corporation is a citizen of that State only, by which it is created. By the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 1, (in force when the original bill and the first amended bill were filed,) permitting, in "a controversy between citizens of different States," a person to be sued in any district in which he either was an inhabitant or was found, a corporation might indeed be sued in any State in which it did business and had an agent, provided, always, it was not a citizen of the same State with the plaintiff. Under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 1, (in force when the second amended bill was filed,) providing that "where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant," a corporation, incorporated in one State only, cannot be compelled to answer in another State in which it has a usual place of business, and of which the plaintiff is not a citizen. But, under either statute, if the parties are not citizens of different States, there is an entire want of jurisdiction, which cannot be waived by the parties, but will be noticed by the court of its own motion. 18 Stat. 470; 24 Stat. 552; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, and

Syllabus.

cases there collected; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; Wolfe v. Hartford Ins. Co., 148 U. S. 389.

The two corporations on the opposite sides of this case being corporations of the same State, neither of them could maintain an action against the other in a Circuit Court of the United States, whether held in that State or in any other State, even if the defendant had a place of business in the latter. The second amended bill was therefore rightfully dismissed for want of jurisdiction, even if it should be treated as controlled by the act of 1875; and it is unnecessary to consider whether that act or the act of 1887 defines the jurisdiction over this bill, filed after the passage of the latter act. Decree affirmed.

HOWARD v. DETROIT STOVE WORKS.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.

No. 64. Argued November 2, 3, 1893. Decided November 13, 1893.

The alleged invention patented in letters patent No. 123,142, issued January 30, 1872, to Philo D. Beckwith for "an improvement in stoves," was anticipated by prior patents and is void for want of invention in not de scribing how wide the flange should be in order to accomplish the desired result.

Letters patent No. 135,621, issued February 11, 1873, to Philo D. Beckwith for "novel improvements in a stove," are void because the bolting or riveting together of sections of a stove was well known at the time of the alleged invention, and the use of lugs with holes perforated through them was anticipated in other stoves and furnaces manufactured many years prior to the date of the patent.

Letters patent No. 206,074, issued to Philo D. Beckwith, July 16, 1878, for a "new and useful improvement in stove grates," is void because the claims in it were clearly anticipated, and because it involved no invention to cast in one piece an article which had formerly been cast in two pieces and put together, nor to make the shape of the grate correspond with that of the fire-pot.

Opinion of the Court.

In equity, for the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which complainants appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. W. G. Howard for appellants.

Mr. George H. Lothrop for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by appellants' testator, Philo D. Beckwith, against the appellee for the alleged infringement of three letters patent, viz.: No. 123,142, issued January 30, 1872; No. 135,621, issued February 11, 1873; and No. 206,074, issued July 16, 1878, all for improvements in heating stoves. The defences set up and interposed were that the patents were all void for want of novelty and patentable invention. Pending the suit the patentee died, and the cause was revived and proceeded in the name of his executors. The court below dismissed the bill and complainants appeal to this court to reverse that decree.

The first patent, issued January 30, 1872, relates to an improvement in stoves, wherein an exposed fire-pot section, cylindrical in shape and tapering downwardly, is fitted into the upper end of a hollow ash-pit section. This fire-pot has formed on the inner side of its lower end an annular flange on which the grate rests. The theory of the patent is that this flange, which may be cast on, or made separate from, the fire-pot and riveted or otherwise fastened to it, is made of such a width that it will collect upon it a bank of ashes, which will have the effect of preventing undue expansion of the firepot at the point of junction with the ash-pit. Or, in other words, the collection of ashes on the flange will prevent such an expansion of the lower end of the fire-pot as would cause it to leave its seat on the ash-pit and expose an open joint at this point. The inventor stated in his application that he had found that the expansion of the fire-pot is so great without the flange that the stove proves a failure; but with the flange