Statement of the Case.

ate proceedings to try title to these offices, it is enough that in our judgment the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to enter them. We cannot by writ of mandamus compel the court below to decide a matter before it in a particular way, nor can we, through the instrumentality of that writ, review its judicial action had in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction. Ex parte Flippin, 94 U. S. 348; Ex parte Burtis, 103 U. S. 238; In re Morrison, 147 U. S. 14, 26; In re Hawkins, Petitioner, 147 U. S. 486, 490; American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa &c. Railway Co., 148 U. S. 372, 379, 386; In re Humes, Petitioner, 149 U. S. 192.

These settled principles control the applications before us, and it follows that they must be

Denied.

MORSE v. ANDERSON.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.

No. 63. Submitted November 2, 1893. Decided November 6, 1893.

The verdict in this case was returned December 16, 1887, and judgment entered thereon on the same day. On the next day ten days were granted for filing a bill of exceptions, which time was extended from time to time but expired before April 1, 1889, when they were signed. Held, that the allowance of this bill of exceptions was not seasonable.

THE record contains, in addition to the record of the trial, the entry of judgment, and the offers of exceptions, the following certificate from the presiding judge:

"At the request of the counsel of plaintiffs in the case of N. C. Morse, Jr., and others v. John Jay Anderson and others, I make this statement:

"I presided at the trial of the case at the December term, 1887, of the court, held at Covington. The trial was concluded December 17, 1887, when the counsel of plaintiffs asked

Statement of the Case.

and obtained ten days' time within which to file their bill of exceptions. They tendered to me at Louisville, my residence, a bill of exceptions on the 24th day of December, 1887, which was ordered to be noted of record in the court at Covington, and plaintiffs were given until January 20, 1888, in which to complete their bill of exceptions so tendered.

"I examined the bill of exceptions thus tendered and declined to sign it, and had counsel notified of the refusal. I sent with my refusal a written memorandum to the clerk at Covington, by way of suggestions to counsel, as an aid in preparing a bill of exceptions. This was about January 13, 1888, and on the 14th of January, 1888, an order of court was entered, extending the time within which another bill of exceptions could be prepared and tendered to the 15th of March, 1888.

"Some time during the spring of 1888 and, I think, before March 15, 1888, one of plaintiffs' attorneys, Hon. Thomas F. Hargis, presented to me at Louisville another bill of exceptions. I examined it and said to him that it did not conform to my suggestions theretofore given. He replied that he thought it did, and that he had a copy of my suggestions which he would send or bring to me, I do not remember which. He also said, as I now remember, that he would come to see me soon and when I was at leisure, and we would talk the matter over and have the bill of exceptions settled. Judge Hargis sent by mail a copy of my memorandum, but not the bill of exceptions, that I remember of; but he did not see me further in regard to the matter. I wrote to the clerk of the court to enter an order extending the time to tender a bill of exceptions until the second day of the next term of the court, which was May 15, 1888; which was done by an order of March 12, 1888.

"My recollection is not distinct as to the exact time I saw the second bill of exceptions, but I am sure it was prior to the May term, 1888, of the court. I did not see it again, nor did Judge Hargis or any one else appear before me again in regard to said bill of exceptions. The plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial at the December term, 1887, of the court, which

Opinion of the Court.

motion was taken under consideration and not disposed of until the 3d day of May, 1888, when the motion as to John Jay Anderson was overruled, and granted as to the other defendants.

"On the first day of the regular term, May term, 1888, I entered another order extending the time within which to present a bill of exceptions to the 18th day of June, 1888, and on the 18th day of June, 1888, extending the time to present a bill of exceptions to July 2nd, 1888. (The term of the court continues from term to term, as we construe the law.) Since the commencement of the December term, 1888, plaintiffs' counsel has made various efforts to have the counsel of defendant Anderson present and before me, so that a bill of exceptions might be prepared and signed, but owing to sickness in the family of counsel this has been impracticable until the bill of exceptions now signed by me as of April 1st, 1889.

"JOHN W. BARR, Judge."

Mr. Thomas F. Hargis for plaintiffs in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The judgment is affirmed, for want of bill of exceptions seasonably allowed, upon the authority of Müller v. Ehlers, 91 U. S. 249; Jones v. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co., 131 U. S. Appx. cl.; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U. S. 293; Glaspell v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 144 U. S. 211; Hume v. Bowie, 148 U. S. 245. Judgment affirmed.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.

No. 60. Submitted October 25, 1893. - Decided November 6, 1893.

A bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States in Tennessee, by a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky, against another company described as a corporation organized under the laws of that State and having its principal office in the district in which the suit was brought, and against five individuals, citizens of a county within that district, prayed "that the parties named as defendants be made such," and for a reconveyance and an account of property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been fraudulently caused by the individual defendants to be conveyed to the defendant corporation, and to have been wasted and injured by all the defendants. The individual defendants demurred for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, filed an amended bill, which "refers to the original bill and its prayer, and makes the same a part hereof, as if set out herein in hæc verba;" and further alleged that the individual defendants, in pursuance of their fraudulent scheme, pretended to procure from the State of Kentucky a charter under the name of the company "which is the same corporation mentioned in the original bill," and caused the plaintiff's property to be conveyed to said pretended corporation," but this company was never lawfully organized, and the individual defendants controlled it and were doing business as a partnership under its name; and prayed that the parties defendants to the original bill be made defendants to this amended bill, and that the individual defendants be made defendants as partners under the name of the company, and be made to account personally and individually. Held, that this company, as a corporation of Kentucky, was a party defendant to the amended bill of the plaintiff, likewise a Kentucky corporation; and that the amended bill must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. H. Garland and Mr. H. J. May for appellant.

No appearance for appellees.

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee, (within which lie the city of Nashville and the county of Davidson,) by which a bill in equity, after having been twice amended, and the plaintiff having declined to amend further, was dismissed on demurrer for want of jurisdiction, because it showed that the plaintiff and one of the defendants were corporations of the State of Kentucky, and alleged no ground of jurisdiction except the citizenship of the parties.

The sole plaintiff is the Empire Coal and Transportation Company, a corporation incorporated and duly organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky. The principal question in the case is whether the Empire Coal and Mining Company is a party defendant to the second amended bill.

The original bill, filed April 6, 1886, named as defendants. "the Empire Coal and Mining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and whose principal office is in Nashville, Tennessee," and five individuals, "all citizens of Davidson County, Tennessee;" alleged that those individuals, being directors and stockholders in the plaintiff corporation, by conspiracy and fraud, and through various conveyances and transactions particularly set forth in the bill and the exhibits thereto annexed, caused all its coal lands and other property to be conveyed to one of them, and "procured to be incorporated the defendant, the Empire Coal and Mining Company, for the purpose of mining, &c., with its principal office located at Nashville, Tennessee, under and by virtue of an act of the legislature of Kentucky," of which they were and had since been the stockholders and directors, and, upon its organization, caused him to convey to it, as such corporation, all the plaintiff's property, and that the defendant corporation, as well as the other defendants, wasted and greatly injured that property. The bill prayed “that the parties named as defendants be made such, and be required to answer," and for a reconveyance of the property, an account, an injunction and further relief, against all the defendants.