of all the numerous cases in Maryland were stated in Brennen v. Banks, 80 Md. 316, 30 Atl. 656, as follows: "If the several sections of the law refer to and are germane to the same subject-matter, which is described in its title, it is considered as embracing but a single subject, and as satisfying the requirements of the Constitution in this respect. While the title must indicate the subject of the act, it need not give an abstract of its contents, nor need it mention the means and method by which the general purpose is to be accomplished." It has been held, also, that the constitutional requirement was not complied with in a case where from the title, the repeal of a former act was the sole object. New and affirmative legislation could not be enacted as stated above. Stiefel Case, supra; State v. Benzinger, 83 Md. 488, 35 Atl. 173; also where the title being "to regulate" only, a provision to "abolish" liquor traffic, was within the prohibition of the constitutional requirement. Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 416, 31 Atl. 325. In Luman v. Hitchens Bros. & Co., 90 Md. 23, 44 Atl. 1052, 46 L. R. A. 393, an enactment prohibiting railroad and mining corporations, their officers and agents, from selling to any person goods, wares, and merchandise, was held not to be germane to the description in the title; that the act was to prohibit such corporations and their officers from selling to their employés. It was there said that "though the title need not contain an abstract of the bill, nor give in detail the provisions of the act, it must not be misleading, by apparently limiting the enactment to a much narrower scope than the body of the act is made to compass; nor must there be cloaked in the enactment any foreign, discordant, or irrelevant matter not disclosed in the title." While it thus appears that this court has been careful to maintain this provision of the Constitution, so as to conserve to the fullest extent the objects that were intended to be protected thereby, it has been equally careful not to destroy by a too narrow construction important enactments, made with a wise purpose of effecting valuable and important results. M. & C. C. of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 119. Judge Alvey, speaking for himself and his associates in State v. Norris, 70 Md. 96, 16 Atl. 446, said, "This court has ever been reluctant to defeat the will of the Legislature by declaring such legislation void, if by any construction it could possibly be maintained." In that case an enactment preventing the taking and carrying away of sand from the bed of the Potomac river was held to be germane to a title to add a new section to the Code, title "Crimes and Punishments," subtitle "Rivers." See, also, Com'rs of Dorchester Co. v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, and Com'rs of Talbot Co. v. Com'rs of Queen Anne's Co., Id. 245. In the former case, where the title of the act was to repeal certain sections of the Code and all other sections and acts inconsistent, etc., and "to en act the following in lieu thereof," legislation involving the redistricting of a county, the appointment of tax collectors and treasurer, etc., was held to be germane to the title, and not obnoxious to the provisions of this clause in the Constitution. The court said, "Any member of the Legislature, upon reading the title, would be informed that the county commissioners, their powers and duties, formed the subject to be dealt with by the act." Many more such cases could be cited, but we think those we have referred to are sufficient to clearly lay down the rules that should be applied here. The title of the act now under consideration is "An act to limit and control the expenditure of money upon public highways by the county commissioners of Talbot county." The subject of the proposed enactment, as described in the title, is very broad. It is "to limit and control" expenditures upon public highways." There is no reference specially to the highways within the county, but the words are sufficiently extensive to include all highways, wherever situate, over which the commissioners of Talbot county had the power or control. It must be noted, also, that the subject, as expressed in the title, is not to regulate such expenditures, but to "limit and control" them. By the very terms of this title, the object of the act was to limit or take from and control of the county commissioners of Talbot county a part of their power to expend the county's money on public highways. The object of the act, as expressed in the title, therefore, does not raise any question of the difference between "regulation" and "abolition" such as arose in Whitman's Case, 80 Md. 417, 31 Atl. 325, where the title was to regulate, and the enactment was to abolish. The only question raised here is whether the prohibition contained in the body of the act, whereby the county commissioners are prohibited from levying taxes on the assessable property of Talbot county for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and repairing any highway, bridge, or public road not in whole or in part within the county, is germane to the subject of "limiting and controlling" expenditures "upon public highways." There would seem to be no doubt of this. By the Acts of 1876, p. 542, c. 314, the commissioners of Talbot county had been given power to levy upon the property of the county for money to be spent on the bridge and highway over Kent Narrows, which are wholly without the limits of the county. The operation and effect of the act of 1902 was to withdraw that power from them, so that thereafter no money could be raised from the property of Talbot except for roads and bridges wholly within the county. There can be no question, therefore, that the act embraced but one subject, and that was described in its title, and it is therefore not obnoxious to this provision of the Constitution. remain unexpended of the money allowed for such repairs, are totally insufficient to rebuild the old bridge, at a cost estimated to be less than $5,000, and there is no authority in the act or elsewhere for the Talbot county commissioners to levy any additional sum for construction. So that, conceding the act of 1876 to be still in force, there is no legal authority for the commissioners of that county to raise by taxation any sums for the restoration of the old bridge. It is also contended that this act is inoper- | act for the repairs, as well as those that now ative to affect the claim of the appellant, because by Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, it acquired a contractual right to require the appellees to contribute towards the maintenance of the bridge of 1876. But we cannot agree to this position. The counties of the state are merely political agencies created for the better government of the affairs of the state, and, as such, are constantly subject to legislative control. It seems to be clear that the object of Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, was to promote the public interests. As against the state itself, it conferred no vested right of any kind. Whatever powers it conferred upon Talbot | county, having been so conferred for the public good, could, at the legislative will, at any time be altered, changed, or entirely abolished. Mayor, etc., v. Groshon, 30 Md. 444, 96 Am. Dec. 591. Having decided that Acts 1902, p. 420, C. 300, was a valid exercise of legislative power, we might here conclude this opinion. But apart from the considerations already stated, it is clear that the appellees have no right to the remedy asked for by the petition. It is clear from the whole act that Acts 1876, p. 542, c. 314, authorized the county commissioners of Talbot county to levy for the construction of only one bridge across Kent Narrows. It was contemplated that, after it had been once constructed, it could be forever maintained by such repairs as were provided for in the second section of the act. By that section the two counties were severally to raise by taxation, annually, such sums as were necessary to keep it in good repair, but each county was limited for that purpose to the yearly sum of $300. The amount to be spent on construction is also limited, by the fourth section of the act. There is no provision to be found in any other act authorizing the appellees to levy any additional sums for "construction" purposes. So that the whole authority was to levy on Talbot county, for construction purposes, one-half of $6,000, by section 4; and $300 annually for repairs, and for a keeper of the draw, by section 3. It is not shown in the record how much of the $6,000 was expended in the construction of the original bridge; but if, in its present condition, it requires not less than $5,000 to restore it, it may safely be assumed that but a very small part, if any, of the amount allowed by the act for construction, now remains unexpended. And if this be correct, there is no authority for the commissioners of Talbot county to levy the $5,000 that are now needed. The condition of the original bridge is now such that it may be regarded as no longer existing. Part of the abutments and of the pivot still remain, doubtless in a more or less damaged state. Its condition as far back as 1887 was such that, as the petitioners allege, it then required "rebuilding," and it was found cheaper to build a new bridge on another site at a cost of $4,200. The annual amounts allowed by the With reference to the claim of the appellants to be reimbursed by the appellees, in part, for the expenses of maintaining the new bridge and furnishing a keeper thereof, there is clearly no authority to be found in the act of 1876. As we have said, that act has reference only to the original bridge, and, inasmuch as that has not been maintained, and no expenses incurred in respect thereto, there can be now no demand made upon the appellees for any sums that the appellants may have spent. There were other questions argued by the counsel, but, inasmuch as what we have said disposes of the case, we need not consider them bere. Order affirmed, with costs to the appellees. (98 Md. 637) MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE V. WALKER. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 19, 1904.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE NUISANCE-NOTICE. 1. Where, in an action for injuries received by a defect in a sidewalk, evidence was introduced to show how long the defect in the sidewalk had been permitted to remain out of repair after the accident to plaintiff, there was no error justifying a reversal of a judgment for plaintiff. 2. In an action to recover for injuries from a water box projecting above the sidewalk, which had been so placed by the city, as it was the original wrongdoer, and its negligent act caused the injury, it is unnecessary to submit to the jury the question of whether or not the city had notice of the existence of such water box. Appeal from Baltimore City Court; J. Upshur Dennis, Judge. Action by William Walker, by his next friend, against the mayor and city council of Baltimore. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and Albert C. Ritchie, for appellant. C. Hopewell Warner and Thomas Mackenzie, for appellee. BRISCOE, J. This is a suit instituted by the appellee against the mayor and city council of Baltimore to recover damages for per 1. See Municipal Corporations, vol. 36, Cent. Dig. § 1642. sonal injuries received by him while walking on one of the public streets in the city of Baltimore, and alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the city in not maintaining one of its streets in proper repair. At the trial of the case there were four bills of exception reserved by the appellant. Three relate to the rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, and one to the rulings upon the players. The declaration contains two counts. The first alleges that the defendant is an incorporated city, and is bound to keep its streets in repair; that one of its streets, called "St. Paul Street," was negligently suffered to be out of repair, whereby the plaintiff, in traveling on this street, and using due care, was hurt. The second count alleges: "For that the defendant is an incorporated city, and, as such, owns and controls the waterworks and system whereby water is distributed throughout the city; that, as part of the system, a water cock was placed in the foot pavement of St. Paul street, a public highway in the city of Baltimore, and used by the city in cutting off, whenever it should be necessary to do so, the water served to premises known as 325 St. Paul street; that the water cock was placed about six inches inside of the curb line of the pavement, and was negligently suffered by the defendant to extend about three or four inches above the footway, so that it obstructed and interfered with the free and unobstructed use by the public of the highway; that on the night of the 24th of November, 1900, the plaintiff, while passing along the highway and over the pavement, without the knowledge of the existence of the water cock, and which (it being nighttime) he neither saw, nor was able to see, though using ordinary care, the foot of the plaintiff came into contact with the water cock, and he was thrown violently to the ground, striking his head with great force against the pavement, in consequence of which he became unconscious, and so remained for a long time, and besides, in falling, struck and severely injured his neck, left leg, and knee, and received other injuries, whereby he suffered great pain, and has been, besides, permanently injured and rendered unable to earn his livelihood, and the injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant, as above set forth, and not by want of due care or caution on his part, or on the part of his lawful guardian, or Bernice Jones, his next friend, thereunto contributing." The material facts, as shown by the record, are as follows: The appellee, William Walker, a youth about 10 years of age, while walking along the sidewalk on St. Paul street, in the city of Baltimore, on the night of November 24, 1900, stumbled and fell over what is called a "water pipe or stop box," which projected about 2 or 3 inches above the pavement where the accident happened. The water pipe was located on the pavement at 325 St. Paul street, and was constructed by the city for the purpose of turn as ing on and cutting off the water from the premises. The pavement is described about 9 feet wide, but a portion of this space was covered by a doorstep, which left the footway at the place where the accident occurred about 4 feet wide. On the night of the accident the plaintiff was returning home alone, having gone with his grandmother to deliver some laundry, and was coming south, on St. Paul street, when he struck his foot against the water pipe, and was thrown violently to the ground, striking his head against the pavement, and sustained severe and permanent injuries. Robert M. Killmeyer, the only witness to the accident, testified that the night was dark and rainy, and, as he was returning home, he heard a boy hollo, and at the same time he saw him fall; having stumbled over the water pipe in front of 325 St. Paul street. He also testified that "he heard the boy hollo, and went and picked him up, and asked him if he had hurt himself and he said he had; he had hurt his head; that he had stumbled over the water pipe. I picked him up and carried him home, and the next morning he was lying in bed, and said he felt badly." The boy's condition was such as to prevent him from testifying in the case. It also appears from the evidence that the water pipe had been allowed to project above the pavement for over 10 years, and that it was repaired after the accident by the city water department, and is now even with the pavement. Mr. Read, secretary to the water department of Baltimore, testified that there are about 90,000 of these water pipes or top boxes in the city, and they are supposed to be put in flush with the pavement, and, if they protrude above the pavement, it is owing to the sinking of the pavement. There was other testimony on the part of the plaintiff and defendant, but, as the evidence stated by us presents the material facts, we do not deem it necessary to review it here. As the questions presented for our consideration arise on bills of exceptions, we will examine them in their regular order. The first and second exceptions can be considered together, and they relate to the admissibility of certain evidence tending to prove how long the pavement had been permitted to remain out of repair after the accident to the plaintiff. It is difficult to perceive in what respect the answer of the witnesses contained in these exceptions could have prejudiced the defendant's case. The evidence, when considered in connection with the defendant's evidence, could in no way have affected the verdict in the case. We find no such error in this ruling as entitles the appellant to a reversal. The third exception having been abandoned by the appellant, we come to the fourth, which embraces the rulings of the court on the prayers. The law applicable to this case, we think, was correctly stated by the court in the plaintiff's first prayer, which asserted 57 ATLANTIC REPORTER. the proposition that if the jury found that The duty, then, of maintaining in safe con- into possession of it, he is entitled to knowl- We find no error in the ruling of the We find no reason for disturbing the ver- STATE v. HYMAN. (98 Md. 596) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 19, 1904.) HEALTH-SWEAT-SHOP ACT-POLICE POWER- 1. The Supreme Court will take judicial notice that the manufacture of wearing apparel in improperly ventilated, unsanitary, and overcrowded apartments is likely to promote the spread of disease. 2. Acts 1902, p. 121, c. 101, adding four additional sections to Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art. 27, tit. "Crimes and Punishments," subtit. "Health, Workshops and Factories, Sweating System," provides by section to be known as 149ce (section 240) that no room or apartment in any tenement or dwelling house shall be used, except by the immediate family, for the manufacture of clothing, etc., and that no room or apartment shall be so used until a permit This is obtained from the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics, after an inspection. permit may be revoked at any time the health of the community or those employed may require it. No person, firm, or corporation can establish such a workroom in any building in the rear of a tenement house without a permit. Every person, etc., giving out incomplete materials from which such articles are made, or employing persons in such a workroom, shall keep a written register of the names and addresses of employés. Section 149ff (section 241) gives the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics and certain other officials authority to enter any room, factory, etc., where wearing apparel is manufactured for the purpose of inSection 149gg (section 242) auspection, etc. thorizes the chief to appoint deputies and asSection 149hh sistants to make inspections. (section 243) prescribes the punishment for violation of the act. Held, that the statute has a substantial relation to the public health, so as to be within the scope of the police power. 3. The statute does not apply to homes or places where wearing apparel is made for purposes other than sale. 4. The statute is not objectionable as clothing officials with arbitrary power. Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City: Henry Stockbridge, Judge. Louis Hyman was prosecuted for unlawfully conducting a sweat shop, and from a judgment quashing the indictment and discharging the defendant the state appeals. Reversed. Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PAGE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ. Atty. Gen. Bryan and Jacob M. Moses, for the State. Foutz & Norris and Myer Rosenbush, for appellee. MCSHERRY, C. J. This is an appeal by the state of Maryland from the criminal court of Baltimore City. It is a case wherein Louis Hyman was indicted for a violation of Acts 1902, p. 121, c. 101. The title of that act is in these words: "An act to add four additional sections to article 27 of the Code of Public General Laws, title 'Crimes and Punishments,' subtitle, 'Health-Workshops and Factories, Sweating System,' as the same was amended by chapter 302, Acts of 1894, and chapter 467, Acts of 1896; such four additional sections to be known respectively as sections 149ee, 149ff, 149gg, and 149hh, and to come in immediately after section 149d of the article." The indictment contains five counts. The first count charges that the appellee, Hyman, unlawfully did use and cause to be used a certain room and apartment in a certain tenement and dwelling house by other than the immediate members of the family then living therein for the manufacture of coats, vests, trousers, etc., contrary to the provisions of the above-mentioned act of assembly. The second count charges that the appellee, Hyman, did unlawfully use a certain room and apartment in a certain tenement and dwelling house for the manufacture of coats, vests, trousers, etc., he, the said Hyman, not being then and there an immediate member of the family then living in said room and apartment contrary to the form of the aforesaid act of assembly, etc. The third count alleges that the appellee, Hyman, being then and there a part of the family, unlawfully did use a certain room and apartment in a certain tenement and dwelling house for the manufacture of coats, vests, trousers, etc., not having first obtained a permit from the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics stating the number of persons allowed to be employed therein, contrary to the said statute. The fourth count charges that the appellee, Hyman, in a certain room and apartment in a certain rear building in the rear of a tenement and dwelling house unlawfully did work at and hire and employ divers persons to work at making coats, vests, trousers, etc., without first obtaining a written permit from the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics stating the maximum number of persons allowed to be employed therein, contrary to the provisions of the statute, etc. And the fifth count charges that the appellee, Hyman, employing divers persons in a certain tenement and dwelling house to make and wholly and partially finish coats, vests, trousers, etc., failed to keep a register of the names and addresses of all persons to whom such work was given to be made, contrary to the form of the act of assembly, etc. To this indictment, and to each count thereof, the appellee interposed a demurrer, and upon hearing the demurrer was sustained, the indictment was on motion quashed, and the traverser was discharged. Thereupon the state took this appeal. The question which is thus presented is one not only of importance, but of considerable interest, and, when reduced to its final analysis, it is whether the act under which the indictment was framed is a constitutional exercise of the legislative power of the General Assembly. To determine that question it will be necessary to briefly summarize the provisions of that statute. It will be observed at the outset that the act is ostensibly one intended for the preservation and the protection of the public health and safety. It is incorporated in the Code under the subtitle "Health," and its provisions were designed to promote the public health and welfare. By section 149ee (section 240), it is, in substance, provided: That no room or apartment in any tenement or dwelling house shall be used except by the immediate members of the family living therein, which shall be limited to husband and wife, their children, or the children of either, for the manufacture of coats, vests, trousers, etc. That no room or apartment in any tenement or dwelling house shall be so used by any family or part of a family until a permit shall first have been obtained from the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics stating the maximum number of persons allowed to be employed therein. Such permit shall not be granted until an inspection of the premises has been made by the inspector or his assistant named by the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics, and such permit may be revoked by the said chief of the bureau of industrial statistics at any time the health of the community or those employed or living therein may require it. That no person, firm, or corporation shall work or hire or employ any person to work in a room or apartment in any building, rear building, or building in the rear of a tenement or dwelling house at making in whole or in part any of the articles of wearing apparel mentioned above, without first obtaining a written permit from the chief of the bureau of industrial statistics stating a maximum number of persons allowed to be employed therein. That the said permit shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the room, or one of the rooms, to |