INDIAN COAL LANDS-Continued.
lands could not be applied to the production royalties
which said railroad as purchaser was required to pay
as a security for the ultimate payment of the purchase
price, to be credited against such purchase price. Id.
INDIAN TREATY.
See Indian Claims VI, XI.
INDIRECT RESULTS OF ENACTMENT.
See National Industrial Recovery Act IV, V, VI.
INFRINGEMENT.
See Patents VII, XI, XII.
INSTALLMENT NOTE.
See Taxes LVII.
INTENTION OF CONGRESS.
See Patents V, VI.
INTEREST ON DEBENTURE STOCK,
See Taxes V, VI.
INTERNAL REVENUE,
I. Following the decision in the case of Abraham L.
Gordon v. United States, 92 C. Cls. 499, it is
held that under the provisions of the offer of
reward made by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the amount of the award is within
the discretion of the Commissioner. Katzberg,
et al., 281.
II. Where no definite or ascertainable sum was of-
fered, no contract arose from the offer of reward
and the giving of information by the plaintiffs.
Id.
III. Where, as the result of an act of plaintiff's em-
ployee, 726.6 proof gallons of gin were lost by
overflow of one of the cisterns or tanks in the
cistern room of plaintiff's distillery, and where
prior to the transfer of said gin from the gin
house to the cistern room the manufacture of
said gin had been fully completed, it is held
that the plaintiff is liable for the tax on dis-
tilled spirits under section 1150 (a) (1) and
section 1158 (b) of title 26 of the United States
Code. Seagram, 538.
IV. The tax is levied not on the manufacture of gin
but on the manufacture of distilled spirits. Id.
V. The tax on distilled spirits, "removed from the
place where they were distilled and not deposited
in bonded warehouses," is due as soon as said
distilled spirits "is in existence as such," under
subsection (b) and (c) of section 1150. Id.
INTERNAL REVENUE-Continued.
VI. There is no provision of law which exempts a
distiller from payment of the tax on distilled
spirits because the liquors were lost or destroyed
in the process of being removed from the dis-
tillery to the cistern room. Id.
VII. Where loss of distilled spirits was due to negli-
gence of distiller, statutory provisions providing
tax relief for distiller failing to produce certain
percentage of estimate capacity of distillery and
using materials in excess of its capacity are not
applicable. Id.
INVESTMENT TRUST.
See Taxes XXXV.
JOINT RETURN.
See Taxes X, XI, XII, XIII.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Taxes XLI.
JURISDICTION.
See Taxes LX, LXXIV;
See Rental of Property By Government II.
See National Industrial Recovery Act VI.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
See Taxes LXXIX, LXXX.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts X, XIV, XXII, XXIII.
LOSS OF POSSIBLE PROFIT.
See National Industrial Recovery Act II.
LOSSES OF AFFILIATE.
See Taxes XXIV, XXVII, XXVIII.
MOTION TO DISMISS.
A motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the evi-
dence produced by the plaintiff shows no liability is, in effect, a
demurrer to the evidence, and as such is not a proper motion
under the rules of the Court of Claims, following the decision of
the court in Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cls. 490.
Creek Nation (L-137), 559.
NATIONAL BANK.
See Taxes LXXV, LXXVI, LXXVIII.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT.
I. Under the provisions of the Act of June 25, 1938, it is
held that plaintiff is entitled to recover for the increase
in labor costs in manufacturing brick for use on Govern-
ment contract for the construction of the Philadelphia
post office, such increase in labor costs under the Na-
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT-Continued.
tional Industrial Recovery Act to be based on the plain-
tiff's average labor costs for a period of six months from
January to June 1933. Gray's Ferry Brick Co., 713.
II. The Act of June 25, 1938, does not authorize recovery for
a loss of possible profit on material manufactured prior
to enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which material might otherwise have been disposed of.
Pollock v. United States, 91 C. Cls. 257 cited. Id.
III. Where in order to comply with the provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act it was necessary for
plaintiff, in supplying material on a Government con-
tract, to employ an extra foreman; and where it was
necessary also for plaintiff in order to comply with said
Act to employ an extra shift, entailing increased costs
by reason of the inefficiency of new and inexperienced
labor so employed, it is held that plaintiff is entitled to
recover. Id.
IV. Where contractor, engaged in the construction of a float-
ing drydock for the Government, under a contract exe-
cuted on March 9, 1933, increased hourly wages and
decreased the work week in accordance with the Code of
Fair Competition for the Shipbuilding and Ship Repair
Industry, approved by the President pursuant to title I
of the National Industrial Recovery Act on July 26,
1933; and where the Public Works Administration
awarded contracts to another shipyard adjoining plain-
tiff's yard, on which contracts higher wages were stipu-
lated than wages stipulated by the Code minimum and
paid by plaintiff on its said contract; and where there-
upon plaintiff's employes working on said drydock con-
tract became dissatisfied and struck for higher wages;
and where such strike was settled by the acceptance
of a new wage scale as recommended by a conciliator
from the Department of Labor, resulting in increased
wage costs to plaintiff; it is held that plaintiff is not
entitled to recover for such increased wage costs so
incurred, which were not "increased costs incurred as
a result of the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery Act" within the meaning of the Act of June
25, 1938. Dravo Corporation, 734.
V. In the enactment of the Act of June 25, 1938, it was not
the intention of Congress that such general occurrences
as increases in the cost of living and the surrounding
wage level, creating dissatisfaction with their income
among the employes of one employer, were to be re-
garded as a compensable "result" of the enactment of
the National Industrial Recovery Act. Id.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT-Continued.
VI. The "result" so intended by the 1938 Act was the legal
result, determined by the usual principles of legal
cause and legal liability. Id.
VII. Where contractor, engaged in the construction of a
roller-gate dam near London, W. Va., and the installa-
tion of machinery for the Government under a contract
executed November 26, 1932, signed the President's Re-
employment Agreement for the construction industry
July 31, 1933, and again, with modifications, September
2, 1933; and where after negotiations concerning cer-
tain changes in the contract originally proposed by
the contracting officer and agreed to by the contractor
but never approved by the Army Chief of Engineers,
contractor made increases in wages in accordance with
said proposal of the contracting officer and in accord-
ance with said President's Agreement; it is held that
plaintiff is entitled to recover for the increased costs
so incurred. Id.
VIII. The contractor, having agreed to take certain steps to
comply with the National Industrial Recovery Act,
took steps which purported to be in that direction
and which are not shown to have deviated greatly
therefrom. Id.
IX. The provisions of the Act of June 25, 1938, are not
limited to increased costs incurred by reason of com-
pliance with the provisions of Title I of the National
Industrial Recovery Act.
X. Plaintiff in making increases in the hourly wages of its
unskilled labor employed on the London dam and
increases in wages in classifications above the un-
skilled grades was acting in purported compliance
with the President's Reeemployment Agreement as
well as with section 206 of Title II of the National
Industrial Recovery Act and is entitled to recover
under the provisions of the 1938 Act. Id.
See Taxes XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV.
OCEAN MAIL CONTRACT.
I. Where plaintiff on March 21, 1930, entered into a con-
tract with the Government, through the Post Office
Department, whereby the plaintiff, among other things,
agreed to carry ocean mails of the United States from
New York to Port Limon, Costa Rica, on a desig-
nated route and "on a schedule approved by the
Postmaster General that shall include" certain approx.
imate annual trips, under the Merchant Marine Act
OCEAN MAIL CONTRACT-Continued.
of 1928; and where under said contract plaintiff was
permitted initially to operate vessels of class 5 capable
of a speed of 13 knots, and where plaintiff was re-
quired to substitute as soon as practicable after the
beginning of the service vessels of class 4, capable
of a speed of 16 knots; and where in the performance
of said contract plaintiff on the first two sailings of
the said route did operate newly constructed vessels
which vessels, according to the logs of said voyages,
qualified as class 4 vessels with a speed of 16 knots;
and where the Postmaster General so certified to the
General Accounting Office; it is held that plaintiff was
entitled to be paid for said voyages at the rate speci-
fied for class 4 vessels, and is entitled to recover.
United Fruit Co., 97.
II. The defendant received the benefit of the higher rate of
speed and quicker delivery on ships which had been
specially built under the terms of the Merchant Marine
Act, and the Postmaster General had the power and the
right under said act to make the calculation on the
speed of the vessel as determined by him. Id.
III. There was no justification for the Comptroller General's
appliction of a rate and classification lower than that
certified to him by the Post Office Department and pro-
vided by the Contract.
ORIGINAL PETITION, DATE OF.
OVERTIME, PENALTY FOR.
See Contracts XI.
PATENTS.
I. Where patentee made an assignment to another
providing that all the rights under the two patents
in suit were transferred to the assignee only
"insofar as they relate to the exclusive use
thereof in connection with the manufacture, use,
and sale of hydroplane boats, or the like, pri-
marily designed not to leave the surface of the
water and not including toy and model boats too
small to carry one person, together with the right
to sue for and recover profits and damages for
past or future infringements of any one or all of
said patents," it is held that said transfer was of
exclusive rights in a limited field and did not
convey title to the patents. Gamewell Fire-
Alarm Telegraph Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Fed.
255, cited. Fauber, 11.
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