Opinion of the Court 93 C. Cls. tion to these, under certain circumstances they may also have travel pay; they may have quarters instead of allowances for quarters, but the generally accepted meaning of the term "allowances" when used in the various articles of the code is that of rental and subsistence. These allowances--that is, rental and subsistence-are usually accorded officers in the active service only. That is the general provision of the law, and that is the position in which plaintiff would have found himself had the special act simply provided that he have the right to appear before the retirement board for retirement under the provisions of the general law. The general provision for the retirement of officers is set out in Section 167, Title 14, U. S. C. A. It is as follows: All officers borne upon the retired list prior to April 12, 1902, or thereafter, shall receive 75 per centum of the duty pay, salary, and increase of the rank upon which they have been or may be retired: * * * It will be noted that in this article of the code which makes provision for the retirement of officers generally there is no provision for allowances for such officers. In other words, officers generally do not receive allowances when they have been retired. Again we repeat that had plaintiff been retired under this statute, making the same proof that he made in the instant case, he would have received no allowances. The Congress, however, made special provision for him. What reason the Congress had-whether it thought he had been wronged, whether there were some special facts in the case which made the Congress believe special provision should be made for him, whether it was trying to make up for some injury that had been done him-it is not our province to inquire. We may not inquire into the reason, but only into the fact of what it did as disclosed by the language used. If by the special act the Congress desired to make special provision for "allowances" for plaintiff, what more specific term could have been used in the light of the various provisions that have been made for officers under the term of "allowances," and in the light of a long line of construc 544 Opinion of the Court tion which has been uniformly adopted by the Army and the Navy through regulations, and which regulations construe the term "allowances" to mean primarily rental and subsistence? To construe the term "allowances" as used in the special act as not including rental and subsistence is to practically give it no meaning at all. It could not refer to travel pay, which is allowed only when an officer is assigned to some duty away from his regular post. It could not apply to rental and subsistence which he would be given if called back into active service since by the terms of Section 163, Title 14, U. S. C. A., all retired officers so recalled receive these allowances; therefore, the use of the term "allowances" in a special act was not necessary in order to secure to plaintiff such rights. Thus to deny the plain meaning of the term "allowances" is by judicial construction to eliminate the word used by the Congress and to strike it from an act that could have had no other purpose than to give the plaintiff, for some reason that was peculiarly within the province of the Congress, the special provision that was made in the special act. If the court takes any other position it practically nullifies the plain provision of the special act. We repeat we have no authority to do this. It is urged that there are other privileges and perquisites which a retired officer has and which could have been in Icluded within the term "allowances." A simple examination of what those perquisites are will be sufficient to disclose the weakness of that position. One of these items is the right to hospitalization in naval hospitals. As a matter of fact, a deduction is made from the salary of all officers as a contribution to a hospital fund (Sec. 3, Title 24, U. S. C. A.). In other words, the officer purchases this right and pays for it. It becomes a vested right. The Congress would have no authority to take this away from him after he had purchased it. It is in the nature of an insurance contract. Another item urged is that he has commissary privileges; but these privileges are extended to officers of the Army and Navy, both active and retired, and even to civilian employees of the Army and Navy (Sec. 534, Title 34, U. S. C. A.). Other items suggested include the right to be carried on the Navy Dissenting Opinion by Judge Madden 93 C. Cls. Register and to wear the uniform of the highest wartime rank on ceremonial occasions. These items, of course, have no monetary value; on the contrary, they are usually a distinct expense. No legalistic phraseology can so warp the term "allowances" as to limit its application to the almost meaningless perquisites set out above. Besides, it may be added that all the items above listed are accorded officers who are retired under the provisions of the general law. The plaintiff would have been entitled to these had he simply been given general retirement privileges. Whichever horn of the dilemma is chosen, we are driven to the conclusion that to construe the term "allowances" as not including anything more than the plaintiff would have been entitled to had he been retired under the general act is to nullify one of the main provisions of the special act that has been passed. These facts are cited to show not only that the courts have practically determined this case by the principles enunciated in the Sweeney and Ralston cases, supra, but also to show the logical reason behind the construction there placed on the language of the Congress, which is supreme in the legislative field, and which for reasons it deems sufficient enacted into law the specific terms of the special act. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the allowances claimed for a period beginning 6 years prior to August 31, 1937, the date on which the petition herein was filed. The case, however, is a continuing one, and entry of judgment will be suspended pending the receipt from the General Accounting Office of a statement of the amount due plaintiff in accordance with this opinion. It is so ordered. GREEN, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. MADDEN, Judge, dissenting: I cannot agree that plaintiff is entitled to recover. The question is whether Congress intended that plaintiff, having been made the beneficiary of a special act which permitted him to be retired though he had not fulfilled the usual requisites for retirement under the general statutes, intended 544 Dissenting Opinion by Judge Madden further to prefer him above all other officers who are retired under the provisions of the general retirement laws. The findings of fact show that preference will amount to about $1,000 a year for life. Such a discriminatory intention on the part of Congress should not lightly be found, as it would run counter to the natural instincts of legislators in common with other people. Admittedly, Congress could entertain and make effective by legislation such an intent. But an intent so unusual should, before it is found by a court, be solidly supported by the text of the statute, or by explanatory language used in the Committee or on the floor. Here we get no light whatever from committee report or debate relating to the special act. Indeed a search of committee reports and debates with reference to a considerable number of such special acts over a period of years discloses that only rarely is the language of the committee directly helpful to an interpretation of the act. One case in which the Congressional intent was disclosed was that of Frank A. Jahn, a temporary officer (lieutenant, junior grade) in the Navy. Section 6 of the Act of July 12, 1921, 42 Stat. 122, 140, provided for the retirement of temporary officers under the general retirement statute if application should be filed not later than October 1, 1921. Jahn, in August 1921, filed a paper which was construed by the Judge Advocate General not to be an application for retirement, so that his time for filing a proper application expired. A special act of March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1500, authorized the President to appoint Frank Jahn a lieutenant (junior grade) in the Navy and to retire him and place him on the retired list of the Navy "with the retired pay and allowances of that grade.” The House Report, 1252, 67th Congress, 2d Session, says of the bill which became the special act in that situation: "The purpose of this proposed legislation is to give to Frank A. Jahn the benefit of the Act of July 12, 1921, governing the retirement of temporary officers of the Navy." The language of Jahn's act was the same as that of plaintiff's act. The Congressional intent in Jahn's case was not what plaintiff asserts that it was in his case. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Madden 93 C. Cls. The opinion of the majority suggests that perhaps plaintiff had been wronged; that Congress may have been making special provision for him for that reason. There is no word in any report or debate so indicating. If Congress had intended to give future preferential treatment to plaintiff to right a past wrong, it would have been natural for it to disclose that justification for treating this officer better than others. To return to the text of the act, the majority opinion relies principally upon the use of the word "allowances" in the act, urging that unless plaintiff gets the rental and subsistence allowances of an active officer, which he is not, that word will be rendered meaningless since there are no "allowances", or only small ones for regularly retired officers. In the Horton and Blair cases, decided today, that argument was rejected by the court as to the word "emoluments," when used in special acts. It was shown that there are perquisites of office which regularly retired officers receive which satisfy the call of the word "emolument" for a meaning in the statute. Those mentioned are treatment in a naval hospital at much less than ordinary rates with free medical care while there, the privilege of buying at naval stores, and the privilege of sending one's children to the public schools in the District of Columbia while not residing in the District. Plaintiffs in the Horton and Blair cases got those "emoluments," and it was not thought necessary to give them still others which are denied their regularly retired brethren. The language of the special acts there involved, "with the retired pay and emoluments of that grade," received the interpretation "with the retired pay and retired emoluments of that grade.” Thus a natural, easy, and non-discriminatory interpretation is made. In this case the language of plaintiff's special act, “with the retired pay and allowances of that rank," receives in the majority opinion the interpretation "with the retired pay and active service allowances" of that rank. Thus a discriminatory and what seems to me a forced and unnatural interpretation is made. This distinction is made, it is urged, because if it is not made, plaintiff will take nothing or little under the word |