453 Opinion of the Court ing. The two reports are identical. (See Senate, 75th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 440, to accompany H. R. 1315; House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 111, to accompany H. R. 1315). The reports speak of the complaints of the claimants "that they were in fact forced to be on duty and subject to call for the entire 24 hours every day, excluding Sundays"; that "they were required to be on duty, in attendance at the yard and subject to call for all hours of the day and night;" the reports say that "claimants maintain, with proof, that they actually served the 24-hour period." [Italics supplied.] The reports further say "The bill is merely jurisdictional, and, we feel, if these claimants were in fact required to serve as they allege, they are entitled to the opportunity of establishing their claims before the Court of Claims." There is no word in the committee reports about actual labor performed by plaintiffs during the third eight-hour period. Congress was aware, as we are, that plaintiffs must have, except on occasions of emergency, spent the period in sleep and having breakfast and getting ready to report at eight o'clock in the morning for their regular tour of duty. It is evident that the merit of these claims, in the eyes of Congress, was not that the claimants had actually worked without compensation, but that they had been required to stand by and be on call through the entire twenty-four hours of the day, without compensation. While the words "extra labor" used in the special act are not a completely apt description of what was required of plaintiffs, we have no doubt as to what Congress meant. We are, then, to determine whether plaintiffs were so required to stand by for emergency calls, and if so, for how many days. We find that they were so required, and for the number of days recited in the findings of fact. They should be compensated at the regular daily rate which they were receiving on those days for their regular duties. We recognize that the proof of the actual number of days of stand-by service required of plaintiffs is not as clear as could be desired. What is shown is that on the days counted, plaintiffs worked their regular daytime tour of Syllabus 93 C. Cls. duty; that there was no special reason why they would not have been required to stand by at night; that it was customary to require them so to stand by. In those circumstances it is probable that they were required to stand by. No further proof is available. Congress having regarded the defendant as the party in fault, it cannot escape liability because it did not keep records from which clearer proof could be gathered. Plaintiffs seem to argue that the rate should be one and one-half times the regular rate. We see no basis in the special act for that contention. Whether or not plaintiffs might have been entitled, under the general law and the regulations of the Navy Department, to have been paid time and one-half for the actual time spent in emergency service we do not decide. Such rights, if any, have long since been barred by the statute of limitations, and were not revived by the special act. Besides, no adequate proof of the actual time so spent has been offered. Judgment will be entered for each of the plaintiffs in the amount specified in each case. It is so ordered. JONES, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. WHITAKER, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. THE MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 44094. Decided April 7, 1941] On the Proofs Stamp tax on shares of national bank issued to Reconstruction Finance Corporation.-Where a national bank in 1934 issued shares of its preferred stock to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, on which stamp taxes were collected under section 800 of the Revenue Act of 1926, amended by section 722 of the Revenue Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 169, 272); it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to refund of said stamp tax under the provisions of the Act of March 20, 1936 (49 Stat. 1185) exempting from taxation shares of preferred stock of national banks (and others) held by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 464 Reporter's Statement of the Case Same. Where the stamp tax on the issue of preferred stock of a national bank acquired by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not levied against nor collected from the said Reconstruction Finance Corporation but from said national bank, such issue of preferred stock was not exempt from said stamp tax under the Act of March 20, 1936. Same; exemption.-It is a well-established rule that an exemption from taxation must be clearly declared by the language of the statute which it is claimed confers such exemption. Same. The statute under which exemption is claimed in the instant case was enacted in order to remove not only the inequality of treatment as between State and National bank stocks but also because of the varying rates of taxation levied by the several States. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. D. F. Prince for the plaintiff. Mr. Geo. E. H. Goodner was on the briefs. Mr. Hubert L. Will, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Samuel O. Clark, Jr., for the defendant. Messrs. Robert N. Anderson and Fred K. Dyar, were on the brief. Upon the stipulation of the parties and the evidence adduced, the court made special findings of fact as follows: 1. Plaintiff is a national bank incorporated under the laws of the United States, and is engaged in the banking business, with its principal place of business at Mobile, Alabama. 2. Prior to January 9, 1934, plaintiff filed with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation its application for the purchase at par by that corporation of $500,000 par value of its preferred stock. On January 9, 1934, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, by action of its executive committee, resolved to buy 20,000 shares, $500,000 par value, of the preferred stock of plaintiff and authorized its proper officers to carry out that action. 3. Pursuant to the application of plaintiff and the resolution of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, mentioned in Finding 2, plaintiff sold 20,000 shares of its preferred stock, par value $500,000, to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and on February 6, 1934, issued and delivered a temporary certificate for those shares to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. At that time no documentary stamp was attached to the certificate, but on July 26, 1934, in obedience to the demand of an Internal Revenue Agent, United States Reporter's Statement of the Case 93 C. Cls. Documentary Stamp No. D39588D was affixed to sheet 1 A of plaintiff's general ledger, where the sale of the stock was recorded, and duly cancelled. Plaintiff paid the defendant $500 for that stamp, no part of which has been refunded to plaintiff. 4. On February 1, 1934, the plaintiff issued a certificate to the Comptroller of the Currency certifying that its shareholders had adopted a resolution providing for the issuance of preferred stock in the sum of $500,000 and that the sum of $500,000 had been paid into the bank in cash for the preferred stock and the premium thereon. 5. On February 1, 1934, the plaintiff issued an "Interim Receipt For Payment of Purchase Price of Preferred Stock In The Merchants National Bank of Mobile, Alabama." 6. On February 6, 1934, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a certificate approving the issuance by the plaintiff of preferred stock in the sum of $500,000. 7. On February 6, 1934, plaintiff issued the temporary certificate referred to above, certifying that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was the owner of twenty thousand fully paid and non-assessable shares of the par value of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) each of the preferred stock of the plaintiff. 8. On August 8, 1934, plaintiff retired the twenty thousand shares of stock which it had sold to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on February 6, 1934, and the temporary certificate was returned to the plaintiff by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation which had held it from February 6, 1934, to August 8, 1934. 9. On March 27, 1936, plaintiff filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama, a claim for refund of the amount paid by it for the documentary stamp No. D39588D, upon the ground that The issue of $500,000 of preferred stock was negotiated and sold directly to the R. F. C. and the stock issued in that name. and that the act of March 20, 1936, Public No. 482, provides for the exemption from taxation of shares of preferred stock of national banking associations while owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This claim was rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on September 29, 1936. 464 Opinion of the Court The court decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. WHALEY, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the court: The question presented in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled to a refund of the stamp tax paid by it on 20,000 shares of its preferred stock which it issued to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The tax was collected under section 800 of the revenue act of 1926 and that act as amended by section 722 of the revenue act of 1932, by which sections a stamp tax at a specified rate was imposed on the original issue of shares of corporate stock. (47 Stat. 169, 272.) The parties are agreed that the tax in question was properly collected unless the plaintiff was exempted from the provisions of that act by the act of March 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1185, by reason of the fact that plaintiff's stock was issued to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. That statute reads in part as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any privilege or consent to tax expressly or impliedly granted thereby, the shares of preferred stock of national banking associations, and the shares of preferred stock, capital notes, and debentures of State banks and trust companies, heretofore or hereafter acquired by Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the dividends or interest derived therefrom by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall not, so long as Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall continue to own the same, be subject to any taxation by the United States, by any Territory, dependency, or possession thereof, or the District of Columbia, or by any State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority, whether now, heretofore, or hereafter imposed, levied, or assessed, and whether for a past, present, or future taxing period. At the outset it should be observed that the tax in question was not levied against or collected from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the tax was collected from the plaintiff, a national bank, on account of the issuance of its stock to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Apparently the only manner in which the tax could even indirectly have affected the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was that the tax would constitute an expense of plaintiff and therefore would reduce the income which would otherwise be available for |