1919.] Opinion, per CUDDEBACK, J. [225 N. Y.] 5 N. Y. 285; Smith v. City of New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Abrams v. Horton, 18 App. Div. 208; Mack v. Mayor, etc., 37 Misc. Rep. 370; 82 App. Div. 637; Connelly v. Kingston, 32 Misc. Rep. 489; Higgins v. Mayor, etc., 131 N. Y. 128; Howard v. Daley, 61 N. Y. 362; Terhune v. Mayor, etc., 88 N. Y. 247; Dolan v. Mayor, etc., 68 N. Y. 278; People ex rel. v. Miller, 2 Mich. 459.) If the proceedings of the board of trustees of March 16, 1915, in appointing appellant are such as would constitute a contract binding upon the municipality for any period of time, such a contract is void as to duration after the taking effect of chapter 170 of the Laws of 1915. (Emert v. Delong, 12 Kans. 67; Miliken v. Edgar Co., 242 Ill. 528; Connelly v. Kingston, 32 Misc. Rep. 489; Manley v. High, 29 L. R. A. N. S. 652; Richmond County Gas Light Co. v. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; People v. Public Service Commission, 153 App. Div. 129; Gushee v. City of New York, 42 App. Div. 37; Britton v. Mayor, 21 How. Pr. 251.) CUDDEBACK, J. On March 16, 1915, the plaintiff, Fisher, was duly appointed village attorney by the board of trustees of the village of Mechanicville. On June 29, 1915, the defendant, the city of Mechanicville, was incorporated with the same boundaries and inhabitants as the village of Mechanicville which it thus supplanted. (L. 1915, ch. 170.) On the incorporation of the city, the plaintiff was discharged as village attorney on the theory that he held a public office in the village which terminated on the organization of the city. The act incorporating the village of Mechanicville (L. 1891, ch. 106, as amended) provided with regard to a village attorney: "It shall be the duty of the board and it shall have the power and authority * * [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CUDDEBACK, J. [Jan., "6. To appoint annually an attorney and pay such attorney a reasonable annual salary." At the same time that the plaintiff was appointed his salary was fixed at the sum of $750 a year. The act incorporating the village contains a list of village officers and the village attorney is not named therein. No provision is made in the act requiring the village attorney to take an oath of office. Neither is there any provision specifying the duties which the village attorney shall perform, and the fact is found that he does not perform any governmental duties. I think, therefore, that the plaintiff as village attorney was not a public officer but rather that he was an employee of the village. Upon any reasonable interpretation of the act incorporating the village, it must be said that it authorized the appointment of a village attorney for a term of one year. The court found that the village trustees and the plaintiff made a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to render legal services to the corporation for the period of one year for the sum of $750; that the plaintiff stood ready and willing to perform his contract; and that no fault was found with his services. These facts are sufficient to distinguish the case from those on which the defendant relies. In Richmond County Gas-Light Co. v. Town of Middletown (59 N. Y. 228), cited by the defendant, the statute authorized the board of town auditors to enter into a contract with the plaintiff for lighting the streets of the town with gas. The board entered into a contract for five years. In the following year, 1866, the act authorizing the contract was repealed. This court held that the board of town auditors had no authority to make the contract for five years and when their power to contract was taken away by the repealing statute, the con 1919.] Opinion, per CUDDEBACK, J. [225 N. Y.] tract came to an end. But here the village trustees in appointing an attorney for one year did not exceed their authority. Higgins v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y. (131 N. Y. 128) and Quintard v. City of New York (51 App. Div. 233) are cases which hold that where an individual has a right to employment or a preference in employment by a municipality, but is not actually employed, he cannot recover compensation though perhaps he may have a cause of action for damages against the officer who keeps him out of employment. But those cases do not control where the claimant has been actually employed under a contract to run for a definite period. It is apparent furthermore that the legislature did not intend on the organization of the city of Mechanicville to abrogate the contracts made by the former village. It is expressly provided in the act organizing the city that all debts of the former village shall be the debts of the city and that the city shall succeed to all rights as well as the obligations and liabilities of the village in respect thereto. (L. 1915, ch. 170, § 7.) From all that has been said it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to recover his compensation from the defendant. I recommend, therefore, that the judgment appealed from be reversed and that the judgment of the County Court be affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division. HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ., concur. Judgment accordingly. [225 N. Y.] Statement of case. [Jan., THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. VILLAGE OF SOUTH GLENS FALLS, Respondent, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, SECOND DISTRICT, Defendant, and UNITED GAS, ELECTRIC LIGHT AND FUEL COMPANY, Appellant. Gas companies public service commission - South Glens Falls (village of) — contract of gas company to furnish gas to inhabitants of municipality at fixed rate for term of years increase of such rates by company on the ground that they have become insufficient and confiscatory owing to increased cost of production power of public service commission to regulate such rates. 1. There is a distinction between a contract made by a gas company to furnish a municipality itself with light and the terms and conditions upon which a municipality grants a franchise to furnish gas to its inhabitants. In the first instance the arrangement may be a contract pure and simple protected by the Constitution both federal and state from subsequent abrogation even by the legislature unless such power be reserved. But the regulations regarding rates which municipalities may impose in granting licenses or permission to use its streets by public service corporations cannot be said to form contracts beyond the inherent police power of the legislature to modify for the public welfare. 2. In September of 1900 the village of South Glens Falls granted to the defendant company the right and power to use the streets within the village for the purpose of maintaining pipes and necessary feeders for lighting, fuel and other purposes for which gas may be used, for the term of fifty years to be furnished at a certain limited compensation. In August of 1917 the gas company increased its rate. Thereupon the village made complaint under section 71 of the Public Service Commissions Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 48) asking the commission for the second district to investigate the case and prohibit and restrain the gas company from raising its rate above that originally fixed by its license. It appeared that the cost of furnishing gas had during the past few years very largely increased. The only question presented was whether the franchise is such a binding contract that it could not be abrogated in any way by the gas company or by the public service commission. The latter body determined that it had power to regulate the rate to be charged for gas irrespective 1919.] Statement of case. [225 N. Y.] of the franchise and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the order of the commission and decided in effect that the public service commission had no power over the matter and granted the demand of the village that the company should be prohibited from charging more than the rate fixed in 1900. Held, first, that the legislature under the circumstances mentioned has the power to regulate the price of gas; second, that it has conferred that power on the public service commission. (Pub. Serv. Com. L. § 66, subd. 5; § 72.) (Matter of Quinby v. Public Service Commission, 223 N. Y. 244, distinguished.) Feople ex rel. Vil. of South Glens Falls v. Public Service Commission, 185 App. Div. 912, reversed. (Argued November 12, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered September 18, 1918, which reversed, on certiorari, a determination of the public service commission, second district, dismissing the relator's complaint against the United Gas, Electric Light and Fuel Company, and referred the matter back to the commission for action thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Erskine C. Rogers for appellant. The legislature has paramount and supreme rate-making power, especially in the matter of gas rates, where there is no constitutional restriction. (Matter of Quinby, 223 N. Y. 261; R. C. G. L. Co. v. Town of Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; People ex rel. N. Y. & N. S. T. Co. v. P. S. Comm., 175 App. Div. 872; People ex rel. S. S. T. Co. v. Wilcox, 196 N. Y. · 212.) The legislature intended to delegate to the public service commission its undoubted power to permit an increase of a gas rate beyond that agreed upon between a gas company and the local authorities in a franchise. (Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas Co., 191 N. Y. 123; People ex rel. N. Y. Ry. Co. v. P. S. Comm., 181 App. Div. 338.) The village exceeded its grant of power |