1919.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [225 N. Y.] were contemplated by the parties, and in part at least required under the lease by which the exposition association obtained and held its possession of the property. There is evidence that the racing association had full knowledge of the changes and alterations that were being made during the time of the correspondence mentioned and at all times stated in the several liens that were filed and that such improvements were being hastened by common consent in preparation for the August exhibition to be given in accordance with the terms of the lease and that the secretary of the exposition association from August 2 maintained an office in the property in view of the improvements then in progress and accepted for the racing association its share of the receipts as provided by the lease. Full knowledge and general acquiescence in the improvement of the real property considered in connection with the covenants and agreements contained in the lease are some evidence of consent on the part of the owner within the meaning of the statute. (National Wall Paper Company v. Sire, 163 N. Y. 122; Barnard v. Adorjan, 116 App. Div. 535; affd., 191 N. Y. 556; Tinsley v. Smith, 115 App. Div. 708; affd., 194 N. Y. 581.) The Special Term found that the improvements were made with the consent and knowledge of the owner and such finding is not without some direct and other evidence to sustain it. It is urged that the lien of the defendant William J. Sullivan should not be sustained because the appellant expressly refused its consent to the particular improvements upon which the materials furnished and work done by him were used and performed. The lien of the defendant Sullivan was filed for "gravel, crushed stone and sand" furnished, and for "carting, hauling, sprinkling, watering, and repairing and cleaning up generally the driveways and tracks" on the real estate [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [Jan., described. If the court had found that the materials furnished and work done by the defendant Sullivan were for "the improvement of the present roadways and making new connections for the convenience of the public" the contention of the appellant would be sustained in view of the express refusal of the racing association to sanction the same." The court did find that the defendant Sullivan furnished the materials and did the work with the knowledge and consent of the racing association, and we cannot say that there is not some evidence to sustain such finding. The exposition association was required at its own expense "to keep the grounds and buildings in good condition and repair." And qualified assent was also given in the letter of July 9 to finish the half-mile track. In the liens filed severally by the plaintiff and by five of the defendant materialmen it is stated that the name of the owner of the real property against whose interest the lien is claimed is Empire City Trotting Club. In the liens filed severally by the defendants Yonkers Lumber Company and Lawrence Brothers, materialmen, it is stated that the name of the owner of the real property against whose interest the lien is claimed is James Butler. In each of said liens it was stated that the interest of the owner, so far as known to the lienor, is in fee simple and said liens were filed and indexed accordingly. The value and effect of these liens depend upon the statute. The term "owner" when used in the statute "includes the owner in fee of real property, or of a less estate therein, a lessee for a term of years, a vendee in possession under a contract for the purchase of such real property, and all persons having any right, title or interest in such real property, which may be sold under an execution in pursuance of the provisions of statutes relating to the enforcement of liens of judgment." (Sec. 2.) 1919.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [225 N. Y.] The notice of lien shall state: "The name of the owner of the real property against whose interest therein a lien is claimed, and the interest of the owner as far as known to the lienor." (Lien Law, sec. 9, subd. 2.) "A failure to state the name of the true owner or contractor, or a mis-description of the true owner, shall not affect the validity of the lien." (Lien Law, sec. 9, subd. 7.) The Lien Law quoted "is to be construed liberally to secure the beneficial interests and purposes thereof. A substantial compliance with its several provisions shall be sufficient for the validity of a lien and to give jurisdiction to the courts to enforce the same." (Lien Law, sec. 23.) It appears that the appellant was incorporated by the name Empire City Trotting Club. In 1908, pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court authorizing it so to do, its name was changed to Empire City Racing Association in which name it has since continued. The change of name was authorized by title 10 of chapter 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it then existed. A large part of the real property described in the lease was purchased by the appellant and conveyed to it in the name of Empire City Trotting Club before its name was changed to Empire City Racing Association. The change of name in no way affected the identity of the corporation. The name of the owner as given in the liens of the several lienors mentioned was defective but not a substantial "misdescription of the true owner." The entry by the county clerk of the name of the appellant as given in the liens in the book as provided by the Lien Law, section 10, would give to the public substantially the same notice of the lien on appellant's real property as if the exact name by which appellant is now known had been used, or at least its entry therein would put a person examining the lien docket upon inquiry as to the intent and scope of the lien. No one has been misled [225 N. Y.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [Jan., by the lienors using the name by which the appellant was incorporated and the lienors who gave the name of the owner of the real property as Empire City Trotting Club should be deemed to have substantially complied with the statute. The liens of the Yonkers Lumber Company and Lawrence Brothers cannot be sustained. James Butler, named as the owner of the real property described in each of said liens, is an officer and stockholder of the racing association and actively connected with its management but he has no personal interest in the real property as an owner. A lien is not invalid simply by reason of a misdescription of the true owner if there is a substantial compliance with the statute. Where, however, the person named in the alleged notice of a lien as the owner of the real property against whose interest therein a lien is claimed is not an owner of any interest therein which is defined in the statute, there is a complete failure to comply with the directions thereof and the alleged lien is ineffectual and worthless. The findings of the Special Term so far as they sustain the filing of said liens against the appellant as owner are without any evidence to sustain them. There is no special finding of the court in any way sustaining either of said liens. It was not the legislative intent to give a lien upon the property through the filing of any notice describing it; it was intended that such a lien should be acquired as against the title or interest of the person party to or assenting to the agreement under which the work was done "against whose interest therein a lien is claimed" in the notice. If the notice fails to state the name of the true owner then a provision of the 9th section preserved the validity of the lien so far as the person named as owner and against whom a lien is asked in fact, may have some title or interest. If this provision were to be construed as giving a lien against the unnamed owner of the fee, the 1919.] Opinion, per CHASE, J. [225 N. Y.] construction would violate the plain legislative intent that the notice of lien should only affect the person whom the notice names, or attempts to name as owner." (Strauchen v. Pace, 195 N. Y. 167; De Klyn v. Gould, 165 N. Y. 282.) Although it is expressly provided that the Lien Law must receive liberal construction it may not be extended to cases not clearly within its general scope and purview. (Spruck v. McRoberts, 139 N. Y. 193.) We next come to the judgment so far as it affects the seventy-nine laborers whose liens were sustained. Each of the said seventy-nine liens was filed against the Empire City Racing Association and James Butler, as owners. We do not think that the liens are invalid as against the Empire City Racing Association because James Butler is also named as an owner. The notice of lien when entered in the "lien docket" (Lien Law, sec. 10) by the county clerk as against the racing association as owner, was not made valueless and ineffectual by the further docket of said liens as against James Butler as an alleged owner. The delivery of worthless checks to the laborers by the exposition association for the whole or a part of the amount of their accounts for labor severally, does not in itself constitute a payment of said accounts particularly as to the laborers who upon ascertaining that the checks were worthless returned the same to the association. Some of the laborers, not knowing that the checks were worthless, indorsed and delivered them severally in payment for supplies received by them and several of those who so used their checks failed to pay and redeem them after they found that there was no money in the bank to pay the checks. Such defendants are not in a position to urge their right to file and sustain a lien for their accounts severally so far as they were canceled by the checks so used by them. So long as such checks |