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which did not allege that the corporations in question either joined the combination or were left outside, or that it was any part of the alleged conspiracy to enable defendants to buy the stock in billposting corporations, states no cause of action for damages under the Sherman Act. Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters, 272 F. 330. 259
5. Charging Defendants, by Means of Threats, etc., with Compelling Plaintiff to Sell His Stock for Inadequate Sum, States No Cause of Action at Common Law, Based on Duress.-A complaint alleging that defendants, who were the principal stockholders in corporations, by means of threats to destroy the value of plaintiff's stock in the corporations and by manipulation and control of the finances thereof, compelled plaintiff to sell his stock to them for an inadequate sum, is insufficient to state a cause of action at common law based on duress. Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters, 272 F. 330 259
1. In View of, District Court Did Not Abuse Discretion in Permitting Corporations To Be Joined as Plaintiffs.-In view of the conformity act and the law of Arkansas respecting consolidation of causes, held, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting several allied corporations to be joined as plaintiffs in an action prosecuted by their receiver to recover triple damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act for the destruction of their properties and business committed in an alleged conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 382. 676
1. Can Not Abridge Power of Inferior Federal Courts.-Under Constitution, article 3, section 1, providing that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and" in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and section 2, as to extent of the judicial power, the inferior courts, when so ordained and established, are not the creatures of Congress, subject to have their inherent rights abridged or taken away by Congress. In re Atchison, 284 F. 606. 814
1. Defined. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means. If the purpose be unlawful, it may not be carried out by means otherwise lawful; and although it be lawful, it may not be carried out by means that are unlawful. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. 254 U. S. 465. 132
2. Definition of.-A combination or conspiracy to use unlawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose is unlawful. Leather Workers' Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 284 F. 452. 787
3. Same—Persons Engaging in, Are Chargeable with Intending Result of Their Acts.-Persons purposely engaging in a conspiracy which necessarily and directly operates to restrain interstate commerce, which the antitrust act is designed to prevent, are in legal contemplation chargeable with intending that result. Ib. 786
4. Same-Execution of, May Be Enjoined in Federal Court.-The right of persons engaged in interstate commerce to keep their business running and to the continuous flow of their currents of interstate commerce are property rights which they are legally entitled to exercise and in which they are entitled to protection. Ib. 787 5. Acts Constituting under Sherman Act.-For the purpose of compelling a manufacturer of printing presses to unionize its factory in Michigan, in which there had been an unsuccessful strike, and to enforce there the "closed shop," the eight-hour day and the union scale of wages, organizations of machinists with headquarters at New York City, and a larger organization of national scope with which they were affiliated, entered into a combination to interfere with and restrain the manufacturer's interstate trade by means of a "secondary" boycott, centered particularly at New York City and vicinity where many of the presses were marketed; in pursuance of which this manufacturer's customers in and near New York were warned, with threats of loss and sympathetic strikes in other trades, not to purchase or install its presses; a trucking company usually employed by customers was notified, with threats, not to haul them; employees of the trucking company and of customers were incited to strike in order to prevent both hauling and installation; repair shops were notified not to repair them; union men were coerced by threats of the loss of their union cards and of being blacklisted as "scabs" if they assisted in installing them; an exposition company was threatened with a strike, if it allowed them to be exbibited, etc.—all of which seriously interfered with the interstate trade of the manufacturer and caused great loss to its business. Held, a combination and conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce against which the manufacturer was entitled to relief by injunction under the Sherman Act, as amended by the Clayton Act. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 478. 143
6. Under Sherman Act, Must Directly Affect Interstate Commerce. A conspiracy, to be unlawful under Sherman Act, section 2, must be one the direct intent of which is a restraint on interstate commerce, and where such effect is merely incidental, it is not within the statute. Konecky v. Jewish Press, 288 F. 181. 916
7. Same-Petition Held Not to State Cause of Action for.-Allegations of a conspiracy to cause plaintiff to be driven from the State by attempting to injure his social standing, to have him discharged from his employment, to compel him to vacate the premises where he lived, and to induce subscribers to his newspaper to refuse to take the same, will not support an action for damages, under Sherman Act, section 7, as for conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce, merely because plaintiff's paper has an interstate circulation. Ib.
917 8. United States May Maintain Bill to Enjoin, under Its General Equity Jurisdiction and under Sherman Act.-The United States may maintain a bill in the public interest to enjoin an unlawful conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade among striking railway employees, both under its general equity jurisdiction and under Sherman Act, sections 1 and 4. U. S. v. American Federation of Labor, 283 F. 485. 719 9. To Prevent Manufacture and Shipment of Articles in Interstate Commerce, Is Restraint of Such Commerce.-A combination or conspiracy to obstruct and prevent the manufacture of articles of commerce which the makers, in the usual course of their business, manufacture on orders from customers, largely in other States, or which they have contracts to make and ship in interstate commerce, is one in restraint of such commerce within Sherman Act, section 1. Leather Workers' Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 284 F. 449. 783 10. To Disable Railroad Engines, Not Attached to Train, Not One to Restrain Trade within Sherman Act.-A conspiracy or agreement to disable railroad engines belonging to a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, but which were not at the time attached to any train, is not a conspiracy to restrain trade, within Sherman Act. U. S. v. Hency, 286 F. 171. 831 11. In Indictment for, under Sherman Act, Overt Act Need Not Be Alleged. An indictment charging a conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act need not allege an overt act. U. S. v. Hency, 286 F. 169. 828
12. Same-In Indictment for, under General Conspiracy Statute, Overt Act Must Be Alleged. An indictment charging an offense under the general conspiracy statute, Criminal Code, section 37, must allege an overt act. Ib.
1. Can Not Recover Damages from Coconspirator.-A retail dealer who participated in a conspiracy under the Sherman Act, and benefited thereby is not entitled to recover damages under section 7 of such act, by reason of certain acts of the defendant which he did not initiate, but from which he received benefits, since all participants in a conspiracy are conspirators, whether the part they play is great or small. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 700. 502
1. Equal Protection Clause of, Aimed at Undue Favor and Individual or Class Privilege.—The equal protection clause was aimed at undue favor and individual or class privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the suppression of inequality on the other; it secures equality of protection not only for all, but against all, similarly situated; it is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Truar v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 332. 414 2. Rights Guaranteed by, To Be Exercised with Regard for Rights of Others.-Rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not so absolute that they may be exercised under all circumstances, and without any qualification, but, like other rights, must always be exercised with reasonable regard for the conflicting rights of others. U. S. v. American Federation of Labor, 283 F. 494 732
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Statute, How To Be Construed.-A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid any doubt of its constitutionality. Federal Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 F. 1003. 757 2. Intent of, Gathered from Report of, and Statements by Members of Committee Having Bill in Charge.--In the case of an ambiguous or obscure statute the intent of Congress may be gathered from statements in reports of committees having the legislation in charge in either House of Congress, and statements made on the floor of either House by the committee in charge of the bill in the course of its passage may in like manner be considered. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 F. 788.
1. Power of Court to Punish for, Is Inherent in Courts.-The power to punish for the willful violation of an order duly and properly made is inherent in the courts independent of legislation. In re Atchison, 284 F. 606.
2. Court Issuing Injunction, Has Power to Punish, though Act Committed in Another Division of District.-Court issuing injunction restraining interference with employees during strike, etc., had jurisdiction to punish violation as criminal contempt, though committed in another division of the same district. McCourtney v. U. S., 291 F. 498. 1032
3. Willful Disobedience of Injunction, Constitutes.-Willful disobedience of an injunction issued by a court having jurisdiction, however erroneously, and while such injunction is in force, unreversed, constitutes a contempt of court. Patton v. U. S. ex rel. South Side Co., 288 F. 814. 947
4. On Rule to Show Cause for Violating Injunction, Not Entitled to Jury Trial.-On a rule to show cause for contempt for violation of an injunction, defendant held not charged with any act which constituted a criminal offense under the laws of the State, which entitle him to a jury trial under the Clayton Act, section 22. Ib. 946
5. On Proceeding to Punish for Violation of Injunction, Jury Trial Not Allowed.-Where an order restraining labor unions, their officers and agents, from intimidating, assaulting, or threatening persons employed and operating merchant ships of the United States, was granted in a suit by the United States, the Shipping Board, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, a proceeding to punish violations thereof as a contempt was not within the class of contempts in which trial by jury is allowed by Clayton Act, section 22, in view of section 24, relative to contempts in disobedience of any order, etc., in any suit brought by the United States. Forrest v. U. S., 277 F. 876.
6. Failure to Pray for Special Punishment, on Proceeding for, Did Not Deprive Court of Power to Proceed.-Under Judicial Code, section 268, authorizing punishment for contempt by fine or imprisonment, the failure of a petition by the United States attorney for attachment, in the name of the United States and certain governmental agencies, to pray for any special punishment, did not deprive the court of power to proceed. Forrest v. U. S., 277 F. 876. 528
7. Same-Proceeding for Attachment to Punish for, Held Criminal, Rather than Civil.-Where, in a suit of the United States, the Shipping Board, and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, an order was granted restraining a number of labor unions and their officers and agents from intimidating, assaulting, or threatening persons employed on merchant ships of the United States, a proceeding for attachment for violation of such order, brought by the United States attorney in the name of the United States and such governmental agencies, was a case of criminal, rather than civil, contempt. Ib. 528