to have opinions of what the law is, though a wil lingness to change them, if reason appears in the course of the trial. They may all be challenged on one side or the other, if having an opinion of the law in the case is ground of challenge. It is enough in point of indifferency, that jurors have no interest of their own affected, and no personal bias or prepossession, in favor or against either party, and not requisite that they should be igno. rant of the cause, or unopinionated as to the rules and principles on which it is to be decided. It has been adjudged (23 Can. K. B.) not to be a sufficient cause of challenge, that a juror had declared his opinion concerning the title of the land in question; so also that the jury have found others guilty on the same indictment; or that a juror has declared his opinion that the party is guilty, and will be hanged, if it appears he made such declaration from his knowledge of the cause, and not out of ill will to the party. 2 Hawk. P. C. 418."

I trust the authorities I have adduced fully shew, that in point of law there was no valid objection to Mr. Basset as a juror, and that the illegality charged against Judge Chase on this account falls to the ground.

I will now turn to an authority cited by one of the honorable managers-3rd Bacon-756-[Mr. Key here read the case.]

We find that all the causes of challenge here recited go to evince partiality, or in the language of the ancient books," favor or malice." If the having formed and delivered an opinion on the law were a good cause for challenge, no capital case could come before an unprejudiced jury. The only question in such cases is whether the facts proved come up to the charge. For such is the interest men take in the commission of great crimes that every man forms an opinion on them.

Something has been said of the trial of Logwood for forging the currency of the bank of the United States. There is probably no man of information that has not heard something of the subject, or made up his opinion on the illegality of counterfeiting. But does it follow that the having formed such an opinion could disqualify a man from serving as a juror in the case? If this were so, it would follow that he who had formed the most correct opinion on the laws of his country would be the most incompetent, while he who was the most ignorant of them, would be the most competent juror. It appears that if Mr. Basset had even answered in the affirmative to the question put to him, supposing the indictment to have been previously published, it would not have destroyed his competency as a juror, because he, notwithstanding, stood perfectly impartial as to the facts to be proved and the law arising on them.

Believing that no subtility or ingenuity can shake the principle I have laid down, or establish a contrary principle, I feel full confidence in having shewn the legality of the opinion laid down by the court; and I do believe that a more correct opinion was never delivered.

Suppose we are mistaken in the fact, which we say is proved, that Mr. Basset did not desire to be excused; admit that he did pray to be excused, still so far as he has himself on oath explained the situation of his mind, there was no cause for challenge.

Admit also that we are mistaken in the law we have laid down, does it follow as a necessary consequence that the directing Basset to be sworn on the jury was done with an intent to oppress the traverser ? We call for the facts that impeach the motives of Judge Chase. In the opening of this case we were told that the respondent was highly

gifted with rich attainments of mind. It was cOFrectly said; and it might have been added that his integrity was equal to his talents. But the observation was made to raise his head at the expense of his heart. I will examine this argument.

The truth is that no judge is liable for an error of judgment. I apprehend this is conceded by the article itself, which states a criminal intent. Now for the evidence. What criminal intention do the honorable managers draw from it? It is said that the respondent is highly gifted with intellectual powers, and must have known in this instance the law. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. Í dislike the compliment; the best gifted mortals are frail, and a single erroneous decision may be made by any man.

Let us, on this point, refer to decisions in modern times. They will shew that an error in judgment has never of itself been considered an evidence of corruption in a judge.

Mr. Key here cited a case from Dunford and East, folio 653-King vs Johnson, containing the opinion of justice Buller, who declares" that you can never infer corruption from the judgment itself but from the opinion given."

Here then is the decided opinion of a most able judge that although the act and judgment of the court be illegal, there is no ground to infer corruption. So in this case, admit, for argument's sake, that we are mistaken in point of fact, and that the law we have laid down is incorrect; still, however gross the error of the judge, it cannot in itself contain any foundation for presuming fraud. From what fact is fraud inferred? From the general mass of the transactions attending the trial of Callender? The evidence cannot be taken accumulatively. Each article must be taken by itself, and one can derive no force from the rest. Were this

not the case, a hasty word, uttered in an unguard. ed moment, might be construed into a crime, and a number of small offences, individually of the most trifling nature, be made to constitute a great

one.

I shall, in a subsequent view, take into consideration the whole conduct of judge Chase, and shew that, so far from operating to his injury, it redounds to his credit. Upon this second article, I trust I may be permitted to say that the evidence does not bear out the facts in the manner stated; that even if the alleged facts are proven, the law is clear that Mr. Basset was still a competent juror. I have also endeavoured to shew that no inference of corruption can be drawn from an error in law; but that, on the contrary, particularly if it be committed by a man of acknowledged talents and unimpeached integrity, it is to be considered at best but as a mistake.

It would be well to analyze this argument of the honorable managers, by putting it in the form of a syllogism. The major proposition represents judge Chase as possessed of great legal attain ments and as highly gifted by nature; this I ad. mit-the minor is that with these high gifts and attainments he has erred in a clear point of law this I deny-But what is the conclusion deducible from the premises? That his decision was corrupt? So say the managers. I deny it. In the language of the judge it is a palpable non sequi

tur.

;

I will now proceed to the third article, which, when correctly understood, will be found as destitute of impeachable matter as either of the other articles. It is as follows:

"That, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner, the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness on behalf of the afore

said Callender, was not permitted by the said Samuel Chase to be given in, on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact."

In opening the case one of the honorable managers enquired what human subtility or ingenuity could devise to extenuate this act of the respondent. Our reply is that it requires no subtility or ingenuity; that it was correct in point of law, and that the case is so clear, that he who runs may read. The court must permit me to observe that the article presents an abstract case, not growing out of, or connected with the evidence. This court, I apprehend, is not sitting here to decide this abstract point, whether in any case it is admissible to prove one fact contained in a particular charge by one witness, and one by another; but to determine whether in this case, where one witness was offered to prove part of one charge, and no other witness offered to the same charge, it was proper to receive the testimony offered. I contend that the decision was correct on the case before the court. The indictment against Callender contain. ed two counts, each of which embraced twenty distinct set of words. Col. Taylor was called to prove particular facts contained in one of the charges. It is not necessary here to discuss the propriety of ordering the questions to be reduced to writing, as that is the subject of the next article. Col. Taylor, without meaning any improper use of words, was a witness on speculation; for no man has a higher respect for his character; but I bottom the remark on this circumstance, that se veral days previous to Col. Taylor's appearance, an affidavit had been drawn, on the part of Callen. der, for a continuance, in which the names of a