The Separation of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and in the ConstitutionsThe Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1998 - 185 lappuses Bondy, William. Separation of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and in the Constitutions. New York: Columbia College, 1896. Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. vi,[7]-185, [1] pp. LCCN 98-44994. ISBN 1-886363-65-X. Cloth. $65. * Examines theories relating to the powers of the court and the legislature and the separation and balance of the two. Originally published as v.5, no. 2 in Columbia's series, Studies in history, economics and public law. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 60.
8. lappuse
... judge and legislator.1 As war begets the king , so peace begets the judge and legis- lator . As his followers become peaceable and civilized , the king is appealed to for the enforcement of internal order and justice rather than for ...
... judge and legislator.1 As war begets the king , so peace begets the judge and legis- lator . As his followers become peaceable and civilized , the king is appealed to for the enforcement of internal order and justice rather than for ...
14. lappuse
... judge would then be the legislator . Were it joined to the executive power , the judge might behave with the vio- lence ... judges are bound to observe . Were it joined with the executive , this union might soon be an overbalance of the ...
... judge would then be the legislator . Were it joined to the executive power , the judge might behave with the vio- lence ... judges are bound to observe . Were it joined with the executive , this union might soon be an overbalance of the ...
19. lappuse
... Judge Story considered one of the serious defects of the Confederation , which ultimately led to its decline and fall . * Of the twelve commonwealths which , prior to 1787 , had adopted constitutions , six had inserted in their organic ...
... Judge Story considered one of the serious defects of the Confederation , which ultimately led to its decline and fall . * Of the twelve commonwealths which , prior to 1787 , had adopted constitutions , six had inserted in their organic ...
22. lappuse
... Judge Comstock said : " I entertain no doubt that , aside from the special limitations of the constitu- tion , the legislature cannot exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or executive . These are by the ...
... Judge Comstock said : " I entertain no doubt that , aside from the special limitations of the constitu- tion , the legislature cannot exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or executive . These are by the ...
24. lappuse
... judges pursuant thereto , because the Con- stitution of the United States does not so explicitly restrain the judges from exercising executive or political functions as does the constitution of this commonwealth , and so far as we are ...
... judges pursuant thereto , because the Con- stitution of the United States does not so explicitly restrain the judges from exercising executive or political functions as does the constitution of this commonwealth , and so far as we are ...
Saturs
7 | |
17 | |
35 | |
CHAPTER VI | 47 |
PART II | 69 |
PART III | 86 |
Legislative Assumption of Judicial Powers | 94 |
CHAPTER XI | 103 |
CHAPTER XII | 109 |
CHAPTER XIV | 125 |
PART IV | 132 |
CHAPTER XVIII | 144 |
PART V | 151 |
CHAPTER XX | 160 |
CHAPTER XXII | 178 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
action administrative powers appeal appointment assume authority bills of attainder body CHAPTER chief executive commissioners committee commonwealth conferred Congress constitutional provision constitutionality construed Cooley's Const decide decision declare deem delegate department of government determine discretion distributing clause divorce duties election enacted ernment executive department executive officer executive powers exercise expressly Federalist functions governmental powers governor grant habeas corpus held judges judgment judicial department judicial power judiciary jurisdiction justice lative legis legislative power legislature limited mayor ment ministerial Montana Montesquieu municipal nature North Carolina North Dakota Ohio St opinion pardon person powers judicial prescribe President principle proper punish for contempt question refusal regarded regulations Rhode Island rules senate separation of powers Stimson's American Statute Supreme Court territorial three departments tion tive tribunal ture unconstitutional United Van Riswick vested violation Virginia void West Virginia writ York
Populāri fragmenti
59. lappuse - That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected.
59. lappuse - The question whether an act, repugnant to the Constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States ; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
60. lappuse - If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law ; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
35. lappuse - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.
61. lappuse - Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.
60. lappuse - To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained...
65. lappuse - The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.
173. lappuse - When private property shall be taken for any public use, the compensation to be made therefor, when such compensation is not made by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.
17. lappuse - All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.
60. lappuse - It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War Donald L. Westerfield Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 1996 |