Please also pay to Mr. Ingle the installment of $500, due in September last, with interest from 27th September, 1820. Please also to execute and deliver to Mr. Ingle your two notes for the other installments, drafts of which he will present you.

I also require of you the surrender of J. D. Barry's draft, indorsed by me for $1,000, which had been discounted in the Bank of Washington, and which you promised to take up and release me from. I must notify you that if you persist in refusing to comply with the terms of your ontract, according to your pledged faith in presence of the respectable witness above mentioned, I shall hold you accountable in money, for the whole balance due me according to our settlement, and shall merely hold the house, wharf, etc., which you were to have conveyed to me, as collateral security for the entire balance ascertained by that settlement, and for the expenses since laid out in repairs and improvements of the same, under the faith of your contract.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Griffith Coombe.

644*] *The defendant, Robert Barry, denies in his answer, the liabilities to which, by the bill of the complainant, he is said to have been under as connected with the tanyard, and the concern with James D. Barry; and, after stating other matters, not necessary to be inserted, admits, in the language of the answer, that in the yea! 1820, he had a conversation with the complainant about settling their accounts, "including the debt alleged to have been secured by the pretended bill of sale aforesaid, and the complainant then proposed to purchase from this defendant, his undivided moiety of the lots and wharf aforesaid, and that the amount of purchase money should be considered as a pay; ment to the complainant, in part of the amount which he then alleged was owing to him; and the defendant, at the request of the complainant, who alleged the badness of his handwriting as an excuse for making that request, copied from a written memorandum furnished by the complainant, the statement of the account referred to, in which the defendant's name was written by him, only for the purpose of stating him as debtor to the complainant, in compliance with his request, not as signing any contract or agreement. And that the said state ment so written by him, at the instance and request of the complainant, being signed by him, was delivered to this defendant, for the purpose of considering whether, after due examination, he would assent to the terms therein proposed, and was not deposited in the hands of Daniel Carroll, as the complainant alleges. For this defendant declares that he did not then assent to the correctness of the several charges and estimates in the said statement, although he expressed his willingness to sell his undivided moiety of the said wharf and premises for the price proposed by the complainant, if this defendant should be satisfied, on examination, that he would actually receive a compensation fully equal in value to the said price; and therefore the said statement was delivered to this defendant, for the purpose of examination and consideration as aforesaid, and has always since been, and now is, in the

possession of this defendant; and in reference to the said verbal agreement, and explanatory of the condition on which this defendant was willing to carry the same into effect, this defendant, a few days after he received the said statement, having discovered a part of the representations made to him, as aforesaid, to be incorrect, wrote a letter to the complainant, representing the said conditions so far as they were affected by the discovery then made, a copy of which letter this defendant herewith exhibits, which he prays may be received as a part of this, his answer; which letter was, as this defendant believes, delivered to the complainant, and was read by him, and is probably in his possession, or in his power to produce; and this defendant prays that the said original letter may be here produced The answer also states, *that upon subsequent examina- [*645 tion, the account which was made out, and in which was the entry of "E. B. wharf, etc.," had been found erroneous in many particulars.

The answer submits to the decision of the court, whether the account set forth in the complainant's bill is "an agreement, such as is required by law and equity, to compel the defendant to make the sale and conveyance claimed and prayed by the complaina."

The letter referred to in the defendant's answer is as follows:

Baltimore, 7th October, 1820.

Mr. Griffith Coombe.

Sir-Having agreed to sell you my undivided half interest in the Eastern Branch wharf and premises, at Washington, lately deeded to you and to me by James D. Barry, I hereby bind myself to give you a good and sufficient conveyance of all my right and title in law and equity for the same, as soon as you send me, or that I receive, the stock of leather now working out at the tanyard (the same being a part of the consideration for my right to said property), or otherwise place the proceeds thereof at my disposal, as far as you have, or can, or shall have, the right or power to do, or cause to be done, agreeably to the inventory lately given me by Mr. Edmund Rice, of said stock and materials, which inventory must embrace a quantity of finished leather, amounting to about eight hundred and six dollars, removed by him to his brother William's store; and as, this lien to you is blended with a lien to others, I further engage, on receipt of said stock of leather, to provide likewise for the lien held thereon by Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Dud., for about eighteen hundred dollars, and also for the payment of a lien on said stock of leather, to secure the amount of a note due to Edmund Rice, or indorsed by him, at the Patriotic Bank, for about twelve hundred dollars; and, in other respects, to settle for any balance 1 may owe you on the account you have furnished me, agreeable to the principles of equity and justice.

I remain, etc., yours, respectfully.

P. S.-The effect of the paper signed by you, and deposited with Mr. Carrol, will, of course, remain suspended, subject to its conditions, for the purpose of carrying the foregoing into effeet, and which will, by me, be complied with in good faith.

The evidence before the Circuit Court, con

than one house in F street, like the two manors of sale, put by several authors.

Perhaps this case belongs more properly to the third class, since the description suggests several circumstances of identity, by reference to which, the premises in question are distinguishable from all others; first, it is a wharf; 653*] second, a wharf *the property of Barry; third, a wharf of which he owns a moiety; and connected with these descriptive circumstances, the letters E. B. became in fact the initials of the name of a place; and the case is analogous to that of a will, in which the devisee is designated as my son A, my nephew B C, or my uncle D E, in which the circumstance of relationship will let in evidence to fill up the names designated by the initials.

In fact, the cases on this point have gone much farther, and without committing ourselves on the correctness of the following two, it will be found by referring to them, such evidence has been let in to supply names, in cases where the identification was by no means as circumstantial as the present.

In the case of Price v. Page, 4 Ves. Jr. 68, the entire Christian name was supplied on parol evidence without any initial, Price, the son of Price, being the only designation. In the case of Abbot v. Massie, 3 Ves. Jr., the devise was to A. G. and Mrs. G., and evidence ordered to be received to identify the legatees.

If ever extrinsic evidence may be admitted to carry out the initials of a name, it is impossible that a case can occur, to furnish evidence more full or unexceptionable in its character than the present. The bill alleges that the letters E. B. mean Eastern Branch, and the defendant not only admits in his answer that the treaty had relation to his moiety of a wharf and premises on the Eastern Branch of the Potomac, but voluntarily, although altero intentii, introduces a letter from himself to complainant, in which it is explicitly acknowledged. "Having agreed to sell you my individual halfinterest in the Eastern Branch Wharf and premises," is his language in the letter. Besides which, the original deed is spread upon the record, by which it appears that the defendant held a moiety, as tenant in common with the plaintiff, of a wharf and premises on the Eastern Branch of the Potomac River, which is well known in common parlance as the Eastern Branch, without the addition of Potomac or river. We are therefore of opinion, that the ambiguity is fully removed, and legally, since it is by reference to a medium of explanation suggested on the face of the memorandum; and on evidence, which, while it neither adds to, detracts from, nor varies the note in writing, supplies every exigency of the statute of frauds.

his part, the complainant will hold himself exonerated, and will resort to his original money contract, as it stood prior to their entering into the contract for the sale of the premises.

Nothing, therefore, but the equivocal conduct of Barry on the receipt of that letter as proved in the deposition of Ingle, deprives him of the benefit of this defense. To have availed himself of it, he should have adopted the alternative offered him; and as the only unequivocal proof of it, should have tendered to Coombe the amount justly due to him, after extracting that item from the account. This he did not do, and it was too late after the bill filed to claim the benefit of a right thus gone by; at least, without paying unto Coombe the amount which would have been due to Coombe upon a mutual relinquishment of the bargain.

As to the ground of misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, we have not thought it necessary to say more than that there is not the least evidence to support the charge set up in the answer.

Nor is it necessary to examine the case on the ground of part performance, since this court is fully satisfied on the sufficiency of the memorandum in writing to sustain the decree, so far as it requires Barry to make title to the moiety of the wharf, lot and premises.

With regard to that part of the decree which relates to the payment of the balance of the stated account, and perpetuates the injunction not to remove certain property beyond the jurisdiction of the court, until that balance be paid, we are induced to consider all objections to be waived.

Yet we mean not to express any doubts of its correctness, since the defendant has nowhere put his defense upon the ground of the remedy at law; but on the contrary, by his answer he impeaches the conclusiveness of the stated account, and raises an issue, in equity, upon the fairness and correctness of several items, which, if expunged, would leave a balance in his favor.

This defense he has failed to sustain by proof, and the court on that ground alone, independent of its connection with the principal subject of the bill, might legally decree payment of the stated balance, and the means of enforcing payment.

Decree affirmed with costs, and cause remitted for final proceedings.

ute-land titles.

Both the plaintiff and defendants claimed title under the provisions of the act of Congress, passed 3d March, 1803, entitled, "An Act regulating the grants of land, and providing for the disposal of the lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee;" and the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, was, upon the construction given to that act by the commissioners acting under its authority. This is a case which draws into question the construction of an act of Congress, and the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction on a writ of error, by which the decision of the court of the State

must be sufficient to maintain an action at law. The form is not regarded, nor the place of signature, provided it be in the handwriting of the party or his agent, and furnish evidence of a complete and practicable agreement. A Court of Equity will supply no more than the ordinary incident to such an agreement; such as the ingredients of a complete transfer, usual covenants, etc.

At first view, this would seem to be an anomalous case, but it is only necessary to reduce it to its elements, in order to discover that it is one known to the, adjudications of Courts of Equity on this statute. As to the balance stated, it is final and conclusive between these parties, and insimul computassent, might be maintained upon it, by Coombe, for the amount. And in an action by him, going to claim the whole amount charged to Barry, it would be good evidence in the hands of Barry, to reduce Coombe's demand down to the balance stated.

It is, then, equivalent to a mutual and reciprocal receipt between these parties; on the one hand, Coombe signs a receipt for the price of the premises in controversy, in account 651*] with *Barry, and Barry, on the other, signs a receipt to Coombe, acknowledging that he has received the price stipulated, in full of the purchase money of the same.

This is the real purport and effect of the writing in evidence, and had the instrument, signed by the parties, been expressed in these terms, there could not have been a doubt of its sufficiency. 12 Ves. Jr. 446; 9 Ves. Jr. 234. But it is argued that this was not the intent with which the writing was concocted. That it was to state an account, and not to note an agreement for the sale of property, that it was drawn up and signed. An examination of the cases on this subject, will show that Courts of Equity are not particular with regard to the direct and immediate purpose for which the written evidence of a contract was created. It is written evidence, which the statute requires, and a note or letter, and even in one case, a letter, the object of which was to annul the contract, on a ground really not unreasonable, 1 Atk. 12; 1 Sch. & Lef. 22, has been held to bring a case within the provisions of the statute. But, in the present instance, although not the sole object of creating the instrument, it really was an object, and an important one, inasmuch as the balance of account, the immediate object of the stated account, mainly depended upon the item for the sale of these premises. It could not be stated without acknowledging that the one had agreed to sell, and the other to purchase these premises, at a stated price. On this part of the cause, the case of Stokes v. Moore has been cited, 1 Cox, 218, and insisted on as furnishing an argument, against the sufficiency of the signature of Barry in this cause. But in the case of Stokes v. Moore, it must be observed that both the judges who sat on that cause admit that this was not the principal question in the cause, and it was decided upon the ground that the memorandum was proved but to express the entire agreement between the parties. But, if considered as authority in this point, it is only necessary to advert to the ground upon which the opinion is expressed, "that the name there

was not a sufficient signature under the statute," in order to discover that it does not impugn the opinion entertained by this court in the present cause. The rule there laid down is, "that the signature is to have the effect of giving authenticity to the whole instrument;" and in this instance, we hold it to be in its proper place for that purpose. If so, the court there further observes, "that it does not signify much in what part of the instrument it is to be found." It remains to examine whether the memorandum is sufficiently full and explicit to admit of a decree for specific performance. The words are: "By my purchase of your one-half E. B. wharf and premises, this day, as agreed on between us, $7,578.63." Brief as it is, this memorandum contains a condensed summary of all the essentials *to [*652 a complete contract. By the use of the present tense, it speaks of a thing final and concluded. By reference to the date at the head of the account, the use of the words "this day" gives a date to the transaction. By the use of the pronouns "your" and "us," the parties are distinctly introduced. By carrying out the price, the consideration is expressed with absolute precision, and by deducting it from the sum acknowledged due by Barry, the receipt of the consideration is acknowledged; nor is there a single ingredient of a complete contract deficient, unless the description of the property contracted for, be insufficient. If that description be fatally ambiguous, it is certainly a sufficient ground to refuse relief. The ambiguity here, arises from the use of the capital letters E. B. in the description of the premises; and if those letters stood alone, and unconnected with anything that could give them a definitive signification, there would be much reason to doubt whether the defect would be curable. The words are, "Your one-half E. B. wharf and premises," and it is argued that this is one of those ambiguities, generally designated by the epithet "patent," and as such admitting of no explanation from extrinsic evidence.

Sir Francis Bacon, in his elements of common law, Regula, 23, is the author usually referred to on this distribution of ambiguities, into patent and latent; the former appearing on the face of the instrument, and not to be removed by extrinsic evidence, but only, in the language of the author, "to be holden by construction or election;" the latter raised by reference to extrinsic circumstances, and remediable by the same means. It would perhaps be a more convenient, and certainly a more intelligible distribution of the doctrine on this subject, if the cases were divided into positive, relative, and mixed; the positive corresponding to the patent; and the relative to the latent ambiguities of the authors who treat of the subject. The mixed, would consist of those cases in which, although the ambiguity is suggested on the face of the instrument, the face of the instrument also suggests the medium by which the ambiguity may be removed.

The facts of this case will bring it either within the second or third class; within the second, because, for anything that appears on the face of the instrument, E. B. wharf may be as definitive a description of locality as F street, and then the ambiguity could only arise, if it be shown that the bargainor had more