tion, and "could not, without the utmost danger, be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations." 1

Congress of

1822.

Soon after this, in the middle of 1821, a royalist insurrection occurred in northern Spain, to which France so far Verona, Oct. extended aid as to allow the insurgents to gather along the borders, to retreat in case of need across the line, and to make open preparation of arms and money on French soil. A congress had been arranged to meet at Verona when that of Laybach broke up. The principal measure here agitated was armed interference in the affairs of Spain, which, if undertaken, would naturally be the work of France. The British envoy, the Duke of Wellington, not only declared the refusal of his government to participate in any such proceeding, but also that England would not even attempt to persuade Spain to conform to the views of the Congress. The French envoys, Montmorency and Chateaubriand, against express instructions of their court, urged forward the intervention, which was supported by the other powers, and energetically by Russia, which power at Laybach had hung back from decisive movements by force of arms. The envoys acted herein in the interest of the ultra-royalist party, which was thus able to carry its measures through. For a French army occupied Spain, penetrated as far as Cadiz, overthrew the constitution of Cadiz to which the king had given his assent, and left him "free," but the country enslaved. No stretch of interference had gone so far as this, for Spain would have had a settled constitutional government, and probably settled peace, unless the agitators had looked for aid to foreign power.

§ 48.

The proceedings at Verona indirectly gave rise to what has been called the Monroe doctrine,2 which met the reigning 1 Circular despatch of the sovereigns, etc., Laybach, May, 1821, and Lord Castlereagh's circular despatch of January 19, 1821.

2 Compare especially the North American Review for April, 1856, and Mr. Calhoun's speech in the Senate on the proposed occupation of Yucatan, May 15,

doctrine.

principle of interference in Europe by a similar principle in the opposite direction. The history of this doctrine 3. Monroe is, in brief, the following. At Verona the subject was agitated of attempting, in conformity with the known wishes of the absolutists in Spain, to bring back the Spanish colonies into subjection to the mother country. This fact having been communicated to our government by that of Great Britain in 1823, and the importance of some public protest on our part being insisted upon, President Monroe, in his annual message, used the following language: "That we should consider any attempt on the part [of the allied powers,] to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety;" and again, "that we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [governments on this side of the Atlantic whose independence we had acknowledged] or controlling in any manner their destinies by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Soon afterwards a resolution was moved in Congress, embodying the same principle, but was never called up. But the mere declaration of the President, meeting with the full sympathy of England, put an end to the designs to which the message refers.

In another place of the same message, while alluding to the question of boundary on the Pacific between the United States and Russia, the President speaks thus: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." Was it intended by this to preclude the South American republics, without their will, from receiving such colonies within their borders of surrendering their territory for that purpose? Such a thing, probably, was not thought of. Mr. Adams, when President in 1825, thus refers to Mr. Monroe's principle, while speaking in a special message of a con

gress at Panama. "An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders, may be found desirable. This was more than two years since announced by my predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents." Mr. Adams, when Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe, originated the "principle," and must have known what he meant. But the principle, even in this tame form, was repudiated by the House of Representatives, in a resolution declaring that the United States "ought not to become parties" with any of the South American republics "to any joint declaration, for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their independence or form of government; or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continent of America."

On the whole then, (1) this policy is not a national one. The House of Representatives, indeed, had no right to settle questions of policy or of international law. But the Cabinet has as little. The opinion of one part of the government neutralized that of another. (2) The principle first mentioned, of resisting attempts to overthrow the liberties of the Spanish republics, was one of most righteous self-defense, and of vital importance. And such it will probably always be regarded, whenever a similar juncture shall arise. But the other principle of prohibiting European colonization was vague, and if intended to prevent Russia from stretching her borders on the Pacific further to the south, went far beyond any limit of interference that has hitherto been set up. What right had the United States to control Russia in gaining territory on the Pacific, or planting colonies there, when they themselves had neither territory nor colony to be endangered within thousands of miles.

The Monroe doctrine came up again in another shape in 1848. President Polk having announced that the government of Yucatan had offered the dominion over that country to Great Britain, Spain, and the United States, urges on Con

gress such measures as may prevent it from becoming a colony and a part of the dominions of any European power, which would be, he says, in contravention of the declaration of Mr. Monroe, and which must by no means be allowed. Mr. Calhoun, in his speech on this subject, shows that the case is very different from that contemplated by Mr. Monroe, that the declarations of the latter could not be regarded as expressing the settled policy of this country, and that they were mere declarations without threat of resistance. The "colonization" contemplated by the Monroe doctrine could not apply to Yucatan, and the possibility of England (which was especially intended) acquiring power there was remote. The principle, he adds, "which lies at the bottom of the [President's] recommendation is, that when any power on this continent becomes involved in internal warfare, and the weaker side chooses to make application to us for support, we are bound to give them support, for fear the offer of the sovereignty of the country may be made to some other power and accepted. It goes infinitely and dangerously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration. It puts it in the power of other countries on this continent to make us a party to all their wars."

To lay down the principle that the acquisition of territory on this continent, by any European power, cannot be allowed by the United States, would go far beyond any measures dictated by the system of the balance of power, for the rule of self-preservation is not applicable in our case: we fear no neighbors. To lay down the principle that no political systems unlike our own, no change from republican forms to those of monarchy, can be endured in the Americas, would be a step in advance of the congresses at Laybach and Verona, for they apprehend destruction to their political fabrics, and we do not. But to resist attempts of European powers to alter the constitutions of states on this side of the water, is a wise and just opposition to interference. Anything beyond this justifies the system which absolute governments have initiated for the suppression of revolutions by main force.

§ 49.

Results of attempt to

ence in the internal affairs of states.

The attempts to introduce into the European law of nations a right of interference in the internal affairs of other set up a law states, have come to the following results: (1.) of interfer- England has constantly protested against such a principle, and has been scrupulous in placing her interventions on other grounds. When, in 1826, the government of that country, in accordance with ancient treaties and on application, sent troops to Portugal to sustain the regency there against the pretensions of Don Miguel, it was declared that nothing would be done to enforce the establishment of the constitution, but that others would be resisted in their attempts to overturn it. At that time it was said by Mr. Canning, in the House of Commons, that France had given to Great Britain cause of war by her violation, in 1823, of the independence of Spain. (2.) The principle has been applied only in the case of weaker nations; while the two French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, were allowed to take their course, and the revolutionary governments were soon acknowledged. (3.) France cannot, without gross inconsistency, accede to this principle. (4.) The principle, carried out, must bring Christian states into conflict; for the right of interfering in favor of liberty can be urged even on the ground of self-preservation, as well as that of interfering to put down popular movements, since free and despotical institutions must be dangerous to one another's existence. If the powers of Europe had been equally divided between constitutionalism and despotism, such a principle would not have been avowed, for it might work both ways. Its avowal, therefore, can be ascribed only to the consciousness of superior might. (5.) The interference, as it cannot prevent the moral and intellectual causes of revolution, by delay only embitters and fanaticizes its spirit. It leaves the payment of a debt at compound interest to posterity.