(hereinafter called the 'Obligee'), in the sum of Two thousand (2000) dollars." And one of the express conditions precedent to the right of recovery was "Fourth: That no right of action shall accrue upon or by reason hereof, to or for the use or benefit of any one other than the Obligee herein named." In the application for the bond, the requirement "Give exact title of firm, organization or individual to whom bond is given" was answered "New Boston Biscuit Company, a corporation of Malden, Massachusetts." The amended declaration alleged that "the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiff, [Jacob Werlin] who was doing business under the name of the New Boston Biscuit Company, a corporation of Malden, Massachusetts, and who in fact is the obligee named . . ." the bond in question.

As matter of construction there is no uncertainty or ambiguity as to who is the obligee named in this bond. The defendant contracted with the New Boston Biscuit Company, a corporation. Plainly this plaintiff could not sue as obligee if the corporation was an existing one. Flynn v. North American Life Ins. Co. 115 Mass. 449. Penn Match Co. v. Hapgood, 141 Mass. 145. Mathews Slate Co. v. Sweeney, 219 Mass. 285. Frank v. Millen, 226 Mass. 71. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Beals, 201 Mass. 163. According to the testimony of the plaintiff there was no such corporation as the New Boston Biscuit Company in existence. In connection with this fact, however, the following facts must be taken into consideration: The defendant's agent, Byrne, who executed the bond in suit, testified that he believed in behalf of the defendant at the time of the execution and delivery of the bond, that the surety company was making a contract with a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Massachusetts, and not with the plaintiff individually; and that had he been informed that the New Boston Biscuit Company as a corporation did not exist, but that J. Werlin personally was the proprietor of the business, and that he was dealing with the plaintiff as an individual, he would not have executed the bond in behalf of the defendant, at least not without further investigation; and he stated reasons why it was more desirable for a surety company to make contracts with corporations. This testimony was not rebutted, and was admitted rightly. Blaney v. Rogers, 174 Mass. 277. Further, although the bond was handed to the plaintiff in October, 1913,

in the office of Mr. Byrne and remained in his possession until he gave it to his attorney, he never notified the defendant of any mistake in the obligee named or sought to have such mistake corrected. It further appears that in the Omaha Machine Works contract and in the letters to the defendant written by the plaintiff's counsel, the contracting party is referred to always as the New Boston Biscuit Company and not as J. Werlin; and Byrne testified that until after this action was brought he never was informed that the plaintiff claimed to be the actual obligee named in the bond. In these circumstances it does not appear that there was any contract between the individual plaintiff and the defendant. Sanders v. Filley, 12 Pick. 554. See Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 30; Stevenson v. Donnelly, 221 Mass. 161, 165. Indeed it is difficult to see why the plaintiff is not estopped as against this defendant from now asserting that the New Boston Biscuit Company was not an existing corporation. O. Sheldon Co. v. Cooke, 177 Mass. 441, 443. Nickerson v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co. 178 Mass. 308, 311. Bigelow on Estoppel, (6th ed.) 495. It does not avail the plaintiff that under the answer which the jury gave to the first issue it is settled that Sharp, acting for the Omaha Machine Works, believed that he was contracting with the plaintiff, and intended so to contract. Sharp's knowledge cannot be imputed to this defendant, on the evidence disclosed.

There was no evidence that Jacob Werlin carried on business under the trade name of the New Boston Biscuit Company, a corporation. See Crompton v. Williams, 216 Mass. 184; William Gilligan Co. v. Casey, 205 Mass. 26, 31; Kennedy v. Hub Manuf. Co. 221 Mass. 136. We assume it could be found that the business in ice cream cones carried on in the name of the "New Boston Biscuit Company" for which his father Samuel Werlinsky had filed a certificate as owner under St. 1907, c. 539, was in fact owned by the plaintiff. But the word "corporation" was not used in that trade name. It may be added that the insertion "a corporation of Malden, Massachusetts" cannot be regarded as a mere clerical error on this record. Hewes v. Cooper, 115 Mass. 42. The judge rightly ruled in effect that in this common law action on the bond the defendant was liable only to the obligee therein named and not to this individual plaintiff. It is not necessary to

consider whether he was correct in ruling that the plaintiff could not recover for the further reason that he did not file a business certificate with the city clerk of Malden under St. 1907, c. 539, as amended by St. 1908, c. 316. See National Fertilizer Co. v. Fall River Five Cents Savings Bank, 196 Mass. 458. Under the terms of the report the entry must be

Judgment for the defendant.

MONTE ROLLI vs. HARRY E. CONVERSE.

MARIO ROLLI & another vs. SAME.

GENISEO ROLLI vs. SAME.

Plymouth. March 27, 1917. — May 25, 1917.

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Present: RUGG, C. J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, & PIERCE, JJ.

Negligence, Trespasser on highway, Motor vehicle. Motor Vehicle. Partnership.

Under St. 1909, c. 534, § 2, as amended by St. 1912, c. 400, § 1, which provides that "Upon the transfer of ownership of any motor vehicle its registration shall expire, and the person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall forthwith return the certificate of registration to the commission with a written notice containing the date of such transfer of ownership and the name, place of residence and address of the new owner," and under the provision of § 9 of the first named statute that no motor vehicle shall be operated unless registered in accordance with the provisions of the act, a motor truck, registered in the name of a partnership consisting of two persons that has been dissolved by one of the partners retiring and transferring all his interest in the partnership and its property, including his interest in the motor truck, to a new partner agreed upon as his successor, if operated upon a highway without a new registration is a trespasser.

If the continuing partner who has become a member of the new firm, when travelling on a highway in the motor truck knowing it to be registered only in the name of the former partnership, sustains injuries by being run into by a touring car driven negligently by a servant of its owner, he cannot maintain an action against such owner for his injuries.

But, if at the time of the accident such partner had with him in the truck an employee, who also was injured and who did not know or have reasonable cause to know that the truck was not registered legally, such employee in an action against the owner of the touring car can recover for his injuries under the provision of St. 1915, c. 87, that such a violation of St. 1909, c. 534, § 9, shall not be a defence "unless it is shown that the person so injured . . . knew or had reasonable cause to know that said provisions were being violated."

THREE ACTIONS OF TORT against the same defendant for injuries to person and property sustained on June 28, 1915, by reason of a collision of a touring car driven negligently by a servant of the defendant with a motor truck belonging to the plaintiffs in the second case in which the plaintiffs in the first and third cases were travelling. Writs dated August 5, 1915.

In the Superior Court the cases were tried together before Hamilton, J. The second action was brought by Mario Rolli and Geniseo Rolli, copartners doing business in Brockton as bakers under the firm name of Rolli Brothers. They were the owners of the truck as partnership property and brought this joint action for damage to their property. Monte Rolli, the plaintiff in the first action, was an employee of Rolli Brothers and was engaged in their business when the accident occurred. Geniseo Rolli, already mentioned, was the plaintiff in the third action. At the time of the collision he and Monte Rolli were seated in the motor truck, which was being driven by one Grant, the chauffeur of Rolli Brothers, and both of them suffered personal injuries for which their respective actions were brought. At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, which is described in the opinion, the judge ruled that Rolli Brothers' truck was on the highway without legal registration, and on that ground alone ordered the jury to return a verdict for the defendant in each of the three cases. The plaintiffs alleged exceptions.

H. V. Cunningham, (C. C. King with him,) for the plaintiffs. E. C. Stone, for the defendant.

CROSBY, J. These actions were tried together. The individual plaintiffs seek to recover damages for personal injuries received by them by reason of a collision between a Buick motor delivery truck, in which they were travelling and which was owned by the joint plaintiffs, and a Packard touring car owned by the defendant. The joint plaintiffs seek to recover damages for injury to their Buick truck growing out of the collision.

The accident occurred on June 28, 1915, upon a highway in Canton in this Commonwealth. The Buick truck was being operated by a chauffeur in the employ of Rolli Brothers. The judge of the Superior Court before whom the cases were tried, at the close of the evidence for the plaintiffs, ruled that the Buick truck was on the highway without legal registration, and on that

ground alone directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant in each of the three cases." Verdicts were returned in accordance with this ruling, and the plaintiffs severally excepted.

The facts, so far as they have any bearing upon the issues presented by the bill of exceptions, are not in dispute. Before February, 1915, the plaintiff Geniseo Rolli and Joseph Benecchi were in the bakery business as copartners under the firm name of Rolli and Benecchi. This partnership owned the Buick truck. It was registered for the year 1915 in the firm name and was used in the partnership business. In February, 1915, Benecchi assigned his interest in the partnership, including his interest in the Buick truck, to Mario Rolli, a brother of Geniseo, and thereafter Mario and Geniseo Rolli carried on the bakery business as copartners under the firm name of Rolli Brothers, and owned and used the truck in the business until the date of the accident, June 28, 1915. No new or additional registration of the truck was taken out after it had been registered in the name of Rolli and Benecchi, before the accident.

The statute relative to motor vehicles (St. 1909, c. 534, § 2, as amended by St. 1912, c. 400, § 1) provides that the application for registration must contain the name, place of residence and address of the applicant, together with such further information as the commission may require, and also a description of the motor vehicle. The statute further provides "Upon the transfer of ownership of any motor vehicle its registration shall expire, and the person in whose name such vehicle is registered shall forthwith return the certificate of registration to the commission with a written notice containing the date of such transfer of ownership and the name, place of residence and address of the new owner." It is also provided (§ 9) that no motor vehicle shall be operated unless registered in accordance with the provisions of the act.

Because of the dangers and harm to the public which the statute relative to the registration of motor vehicles was intended to prevent, the Legislature has enacted that an unregistered machine cannot legally be operated upon a public street. Under such circumstances it is a trespasser, Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443, and a person travelling in an unregistered machine has no rights against other travellers except to be protected from reckless or wilful injury. Feeley v. Melrose,