290 Opinion of the Court. Mr. David A. Richardson, with whom Mr. C. B. Ames, Mr. T. G. Chambers, Mr. Russell G. Lowe and Mr. B. A. Ames were on the briefs, for appellant in No. 406. Mr. Robert M. Rainey and Mr. Streeter B. Flynn, with whom Mr. Dennis T. Flynn and Mr. John H. Roemer were on the brief, for appellants in No. 419. Mr. Henry G. Snyder and Mr. E. S. Ratliff, with whom Mr. I. J. Underwood, Mr. F. E. Murrell and Mr. Cliff V. Perry were on the briefs, for appellees. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. These two cases were argued separately, but they turn on the same point, were decided in a single opinion by the Court below and do not require a separate consideration here. The plaintiffs are corporations organized under the laws of Oklahoma and furnish natural gas to consumers in that State, at rates established by the Corporation Commission. They applied to the Commission for higher rates but were denied an advance. The Constitution of Oklahoma, admitted to be like that of Virginia dealt with in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, gives an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, acting in a legislative capacity as explained in the case cited, with power to substitute a different order and to grant a supersedeas in the meantime. Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court and supersedeas was applied for but refused. The appeals are still not decided. After the plaintiffs had been denied a supersedeas by the Supreme Court, they filed these bills alleging that the present rates are confiscatory, setting up their constitutional rights and asking preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions unless the Supreme Court should allow adequate rates. Applications for temporary injunctions supported by evi Opinion of the Court. 261 U.S. dence were heard by three judges but were denied by the majority on the authority of the Prentis Case. Appeals were taken directly to this Court. A doubt has been suggested whether these cases are within § 266 of the Judicial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162; as amended by the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 160, 37 Stat. 1013. The section originally forbade interlocutory injunctions restraining the action of state officers in the enforcement or execution of any statute of a State, upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, without a hearing by three judges. The amendment inserted after the words "enforcement or execution of such statute" the words "or in the enforcement or execution of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes of such State" but did not change the statement of the ground, which still reads " the unconstitutionality of such statute." So if the section is construed with narrow precision it may be argued that the unconstitutionality of the order is not enough. But this Court has assumed repeatedly that the section was to be taken more broadly. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 604. Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277, 280, 281. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 U. S. 212. Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, ante, 264. The amendment seems to have been introduced to prevent any question that such orders were within the section. It was superfluous as the original statute covered them. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 301, 318. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 555. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 221 U. S. 400, 403. But it plainly was intended to enlarge not to restrict the law. We mention the matter simply to put doubts to rest. 290 Opinion of the Court. Coming to the principal question, if the plaintiffs respectively can make out their case, as must be assumed for present purposes, they are suffering daily from confiscation under the rate to which they now are limited. They have done all that they can under the state law to get relief and cannot get it. If the Supreme Court of the State hereafter shall change the rate, even nunc pro tunc, the plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy for what they may have lost before the Court shall have acted. Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Barker, 231 Fed. 331, 335. In such a state of facts Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. has no application. See Love v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 185 Fed. 321, 324, 325. Rules of comity or convenience must give way to constitutional rights. In the case cited there was no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court but simply a decision that the bills should be retained to await the result of appeals if the companies saw fit to take them. 211 U. S. 232. The companies had made no effort to secure a revision and there had been no present invasion upon their rights, but only the taking of preliminary steps toward cutting them down. In such circumstances it was thought to be more reasonable and proper to await further action on the part of the State. As in our opinion the District Court had jurisdiction and a duty to try the question whether preliminary injunctions should issue, and as that question has not yet been considered, the cases should be remanded to that Court with directions to proceed to the trial. Generally it is not desirable that we should pass upon such matters until they have been dealt with below. Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U. S. 257, 267, 268. Brown v. Fletcher, 237 U. S. 583, 587, 588. Decrees reversed and cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Argument for City of New York. 261 U.S. UNITED STATES AND CITY OF NEW YORK v. BENEDICT, SOLE SURVIVING TRUSTEE OF LANGLEY. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 394. Argued January 23, 1923-Decided March 5, 1923. 1. In an action to recover money from the United States, wherein, upon a suggestion made by the Circuit Court of Appeals to avoid a reversal, the plaintiff assigned part of the recovery to a city which claimed an interest in the premises but insisted that the complaint should have been dismissed. Held, that the city, by not objecting to the suggestion in the Court of Appeals and by waiting three months before suing out a writ of error here, must be deemed to have accepted the assignment and consented to the judgment and that its writ of error must be dismissed. P. 298. 2. In an action against the United States for a balance due on property taken under the Lever Act, interest is recoverable from the date of the taking. P. 298. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, post, 299. Writ of error of City of New York to review 280 Fed. 76, dismissed. As to the United States, judgment affirmed. ERROR to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming, with modification, a judgment of the District Court for the plaintiff, in an action against the United States for a balance due as compensation for property taken under the Lever Act. The City of New York was joined as co-defendant to adjudicate its claim of interest in the property. Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for the United States. Mr. Charles J. Nehrbas, with whom Mr. Edward J. Kenney, Jr., was on the brief, for the City of New York, plaintiff in error. 294 Argument for Defendant in Error. The City of New York succeeded in the Circuit Court of Appeals to the extent of recovering the value of the beds of the streets between First Avenue and the high water line, but was unsuccessful in that it failed to recover the value of the portions of the streets between the high water line and the pier line. The City has accordingly sued out its writ of error to bring before this Court the question of its right to compensation for the portions of the beds of the streets in question between the high water line and the pier line approved by the Secretary of War on March 4, 1890. The deed conveyed to the City the land within the lines of the streets to the pier head line. The deed was within the power of the trustees who executed it, and was in all respects valid and effectual to convey the premises to the City. The judgment should be modified by requiring defendant in error to assign to the City of New York an additional portion of the judgment recovered against the United States, representing the compensation, with interest, awarded for the portions of the streets between the high water line and the pier head line, to wit, the sum of $589,731.82. Mr. Royal E. T. Riggs, with whom Mr. William H. Seibert was on the brief, for defendant in error. The only question between plaintiff and the United States is the right to interest and the assignments of error do not present that question for review. Just compensation must include interest upon the value of the property at the time of the taking from the date of the actual appropriation thereof to the date of payment therefor. The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in requiring the plaintiff to execute and file an assignment of $162,240 of the judgment to the City of New York because: (a) The |