Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 P.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); 15 U.S.C. SS 1011-1015 (regulation of the insurance industry left to the states). The fact that federal claims form the jurisdictional basis of a plaintiff's complaint is not significant in the application of Burford abstention. See Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d at 964 (observing that federal claims were present in the Burford case itself). Nor is there any requirement that complex issues of state law be presented for federal adjudication in order for Burford abstention to be appropriate. Id.; New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. City of New Orleans, 798 F.2d at 861. The Burford doctrine has been held applicable to the adjudication of RICO claims that would interfere with important matters of local concern. See Dubroff v. Dubroff, 833 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1987) (RICO claims arising from divorce proceedings dismissed without prejudice to allow a plaintiff to pursue claims in Texas state courts); Bradenburg v. First Md. Savings and Loan, 660 F.Supp. 717, 734 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 859 P.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988) (RICO claims against savings and loan associations in state receivership dismissed). Exercise of RICO jurisdiction in this case "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (describing circumstances under which Burford abstention is appropriate). Abstention is proper when, as here, monetary damages are being sought. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107-13 (1981). State regulation of utilities is a matter of 'substantial public concern." State interests in this area are enormous. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) ("[T]he regulation of utilities is one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States."); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 521 (1947) (the states have a "vital interest[] in the regulation of rates and service" where utilities are concerned). Note should also be made of the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1342. It bars federal courts from interfering with any state order affecting utility rates when: 1) jurisdiction is based solely on diversity or a constitutional claim; 2) the order does not interfere with interstate commerce; 3) the order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and 4) there is an adequate remedy in the state courts. The Act does not by its terms apply to a RICO action, but it is another strong indicator that Congress intended state ratemaking to be free from unnecessary federal court intrusions. See Miller v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 807 F.2d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1986) jurisdiction in rate cases, including the awarding of money There is no need to describe other related abstention doctrines at this time except to note that they interact in this case to strengthen the conclusion that RICO does not require manhandling a subtle and comprehensive state regulatory scheme. See, e.g., L. H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 195-201 (2d ed. 1988); C. A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts $ 52 The protection of state institutional autonomy is a matter of deep concern to federal courts. Even in the case of constitutional challenges federal courts have become increasingly reluctant to interfere with state enforcement of state laws in state courts and administrative agencies. L. H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 201-08 (2d ed. 1988); C. A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts $52A (4th ed. 1983). Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), illustrates one phase of this approach in the area of criminal law. "Our Federalism, the Supreme Court pointed out is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. Id. at 44. In recent years the Court has broadly applied the principles articulated in Younger to require abstention by federal courts in order to protect the integrity of state adjudication of civil matters. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (state judicial proceedings); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (state administrative proceedings). Among the recent manifestations of this reluctance to unnecessarily upset the balance of power between Washington and state capitals are cases such as Pennhurst State Schools and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). There the Court held that a federal court hearing constitutional claims brought against state officials may not entertain pendent claims that the defendants violated state law. Said the Court, [It is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 106. In the instant case it is apparent that while LILCO is the defendant, the challenge is really to the actions of the PSC and its commissioners under state law. Pursuant to New York law, the PSC is directed to set "just and reasonable" New York Public Service Law $72. The federal court here is being asked to determine whether in fact the commissioners did so. rates. A construction of RICO which permits a jury to retroactively reduce electric rates may violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Gulf Water Benefaction Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 674 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy |