federal courts. The company is a necessary party
although the citizen of the other State raises! a
separate issue as to the validity of the proceedings
under which said sale was had.

66

and several cause of action, does not create a sepa-
rate controversy so as to entitle him to removal
under the Act of 1875.
Idem,

388

St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Wilson,
21. The decision of the questions whether the
5.1A petition, showing a right to removal, signed City of New York has, under its charter, the exclu-
by plaintiff's attorneys, and not sworn to, but ac- sive right to establish ferries between Manhattan
companied by an affidavit by the plaintiff made Island and the shore of Staten Island on the Kill
prior to the commencement of the suit, will sustain Von Kull; and, if so, whether the defendants have,
a removal of the cause, the affidavit being sufficient in law and in fact, interfered with that right by
under sec. 639, R. S. and the absence of an oath to setting up and operating such a ferry, does not de-
the petition being an informality which the defend-pend on the Constitution or the laws of the United
ant waived by not taking the objection on a motion States.
to remand.

6. In a suit in a court of New York against a cor-
poration of that State upon a judgment recovered
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Ohio, merely alleging in a pe-
tition for removal, that the defendant was not an
inhabitant of Ohio, and was not found there, and
was not personally served with process by itself or
its officers, was not sufficient to raise a defense
under sec. 739, R. S. of want of jurisdiction in the
circuit court, without also negativing service of
process on an agent of the defendant in Ohio and
the actual appearance of the defendant to the suit.
Prov. Sav. L. Assur. Soc. v. Ford,

261

261

7. Want of jurisdiction set up to avoid a judgment
must be shown with the greatest certainty.
Idem,
8. The mere fact that a suit in a state court is
brought on a judgment recovered in a federal court
does not entitle the defendant to removal.

Idem,

261

10. Corporations of the United States are enti-
tled as such to remove into the Circuit Courts of the
United States, suits brought against them in state
courts.

Union Pac. R. Co. v. Myers,

319
11. The Union Pacific Railroad Company and the
Texas Pacific Railway Company are corporations of
the United States though certain state and terri-
torial corporations have been consolidated with
them.

Idem,
819
12. În proceedings for widening a street a trial
before the mayor is in its nature an inquest of valu-
ations and assessments, not having the character of
a suit, and a petition for removal may be filed after
appeal taken to a state court.
Idem,

319
13. Under such proceedings there is a distinct
controversy between the city and the company, al-
though many others are made parties defendant.
Idem,

319
14. A suit brought by citizens of one State
against citizens of the same State and citizens of
another State, is not removable though there be
separate defenses.

Pirie v. Tvedt,

331
15. Where the cause of action is several as well as
Joint, the plaintiff may elect to sue each defendant
separately, or all jointly, and the defendants are
not permitted to object."

Idem,

331

16. The fact that judgment may be rendered
against a part of the defendants only, does not
divide a joint action in tort into separate parts any
more than it does a joint action on contract.

Idem,

331
17. A sult in equity brought by a citizen of one
State, against a corporation of the same State, and
a citizen of another State, is not removable into the
Circuit Court of the United States under sec. 2 of
the Act of March 3, 1875.

Idem,

388
22. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage under the
Connecticut statute brought against the grantee
of the mortgagor, the latter is an indispensable
party where it is sought to charge him with any in-
sufficiency in the appraised value of the property
to discharge the debt, and if he and the mortgagee
are citizens of the same State the cause cannot be
removed.
610

Coney v. Winchell,

23. A joint cause of action cannot be removed by
the defendants unless all join and are citizens of
different States from the plaintiffs. All are af-
fected by the loss by one of his right to remove.
Fletcher v. Hamlet,

679

24. A suit begun in a state court of Louisiana by
service of process on a firm through one of its mem-
bers, is not so changed in character as to make it a
new suit by subsequent service on another mem-
ber of the firm.
Idem,

679

25. A suit cannot be removed from a state to a
federal court on the ground of citizenship of par-
ties unless the plaintiff and defendant are citizens
of different States at the time when the suit was
brought as well as at the time when the petition
for removal is filed.

Smith v. Akers,

888

32. An action of tort against several defend-
ants for a wrongful seizure of the property of the
plaintiff is not removable, though separate answers
are filled, if a necessary defendant and the plaintiff
are citizens of the same State.
899

Sloane v. Anderson,

33. The right to remove a suit on the ground of
separable controversy is, by the statute, confined to
the parties to that controversy.

Rand v. Walker,

907

34. Where a party by a supplemental bill seeks to
avoid the effect of a judgment of a federal court,
not by avoiding the judgment as between the par-
ties, but by showing that as to her it is of no effect,
she not having been a party to it, no question is

912
37. The right to remove a suit under the Act of
March 3, 1875, is lost by a failure to file a petition
"before or at the term at which said cause could
be first tried and before the trial thereof," and it is
not restored by a subsequent amendment of the
pleadings presenting different issues.

Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Walrath,

Stone v. South Carolina,

924
38. A state court is not bound to surrender its
jurisdiction of a suit on a petition for removal un-
til a case has been made, which, on its face, shows
that the petitioner has a right to the transfer.
962
39. All issues of fact made on the petition for re-
moval must be tried in the circuit court, but the
state court is at liberty to determine for itself
whether on the face of the record a removal has
been effected. If it decides against the removal its
action will, after final judgment, be reviewable in
the Supreme Court of the United States.

Idem,

962
40. An action in which a State is a party is not re-
movable from a state to a federal court on the
ground of citizenship.

Idem,

962
41. An action against partners for money, paid to
them as such is not removable unless all the par-
ties on one side of the controversy unite in the
petition for removal.
Idem,

962
42. A proceeding under the Act of Assembly of
Virginia approved January 14, 1882, as amended by
the Act of March 12, 1884, for the identification and
verification of coupons tendered in payment of
taxes, debts, or demands due the State is not a suit
of a civil nature arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States within the meaning of
the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875.

Stewart v. Virginia.

REPLEVIN.

1006

2. Where, under a contract for the purchase of
an undivided interest in land, the purchaser cuts
timber and removes it, and the owners of the re-
maining interest take possession of it, he cannot
maintain replevin against them.

Idem,

454

3. The Pennsylvania Act of May 15, 1871, No. 249,
sec. 6, concerning actions of replevin, has no opera-
tion as between tenants in common.

Idem,

454

2. Under a contract for the sale of "5,000 tons of
iron rails, for shipment from a European port or
ports, at the rate of about 1,000 tons per month, be-
ginning February, 1880, but whole contract to be
shipped before August 1, 1880," the sellers are bound
to ship 1,000 tons in each month from February to
June inclusive, except that slight and unimportant
deficiencies may be made up in July.

Idem,

366

3. Under a contract for the sale of 500 tons of pig
iron, "shipment from Glasgow as soon as possible,
shipment from Glasgow is a condition precedent.
Filley v. Pope,

372

4. Where goods of a specified quality, not in ex-
istence or ascertained, are sold, and the seller un-
dertakes to ship them to a distant buyer, and, when
they are made or ascertained, delivers them to a
carrier for the buyer, the latter, on their arrival,
has the right if they are not of the quality required
by the contract, to reject them, and rescind the
sale, and, if he has paid for them, to recover back
the price in a suit against the seller.
Pope v. Allis,
393

5. Under the laws of Kansas a sale by the vendor
to defraud his creditors is not invalid as against the
vendee if he purchased in good faith and for a suf-
ficient consideration.
742

10. Upon examination of the entire case this court
finds a design on the part of the defendant to mis-
lead the complainant and lull her into security, and
thus to prevent her from redeeming the property
in question within the time prescribed by law; and
sustains the decree of the court below allowing fur-
ther time to redeem.
Idem,
SET-OFF.

SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 28.

839

1. A counterclaim cannot be sustained to recover
money, which the defendant alleges in his plead-
ings to have been advanced by him, and used with
his concurrence, to carry on a gambling transac
tion. And the fact that the plaintiff believed the
transaction to be legal does not affect the right of
the defendant to recover on his counterclaim.
Higgins v. McCrea,
764
Under the Ohio Code a counterclaim stands on
1. Custody of prisoner on habeas corpus pending the same footing and is to be tested by the same
appeals.
rules as if it were an independent action.
Idem,

9. The Act of the Legislature of Illinois of Febru-
ary 28, 1867, is held by this court to be valid as with-
in the principle that the Legislature may, by retro-TAXES.
active statutes when not restricted by the Constitu-
tion, legalize the unauthorized acts and proceedings
of subordinate municipal agencies, where such acts
and proceedings might have been previously au-
thorized by the Legislature.

poration is taxable notwithstanding the payment | tle of every species of property owned by a territo-
by the corporation of a tax on its property situated ry passes to the State upon its admission to the
In the State.
Union.

Sturges v. Carter,

240

5. The law of Louisiana requiring the court, when
rendering a judgment against a parish to order the
levy of a tax to pay it, is properly construed with
reference to the tax limit fixed by the Act of 1872.
Stewart v. Police Jury of Jefferson. 588
6. A judgment creditor, upon a judgment ob-
tained on a contract made subsequent to the pass-
age of the Act of 1872,is not entitled to a mandamus
to compel the levy of a tax in excess of the limit
fixed by that Act.
Idem,

588

7. Land, owned by a religious corporation or so-
ciety in the District of Columbia, which is neither
actually occupied for a church building, nor rea-
sonably needed and actually used for the convenient
enjoyment of such building as a church, is not ex-
empt from taxation, whether used for any other
purpose or not.

Gibbons v. District of Columbia,

680
8. In the exercise of its power to levy taxes in the
District of Columbia for district purposes, Congress
may exempt certain classes of property, or tax
them at different rates.

Idem,

680

9. The right of a State in which personal property
is situated to tax it is not affected by the fact that
the owner resides in another State, which taxes
him for the same property as a part of his general
estate attached to his person.

Coe v. Town of Errol,

715

1. Where the acts or omissions of a trustee are
such as to show a want of reasonable fidelity, a
court of equity will remove him.

Cavender v. Cavender,

212
2. Where trust funds are to be invested by the
10. Products of a State, though intended for ex-breach of trust, and is ground for removal.
trustee, neglect to invest constitutes of itself a
port to another State and partially prepared for
212
that purpose by being deposited at a place or port
of shipment within the State, are liable to be taxed
like other property within the State.
Idem,

715
11. Exportation is not begun until they are com-
mitted to the common carrier for transportation
out of the State to the State of their destination,
or have started on their ultimate passage to that
State. Until that time they are taxable as a part
of the general mass of property in the State, though
they are not taxable as exports.

Idem,

715

12. The carrying of property in carts or vehicles,
or even floating it, to the depot where the journey
is to commence is no part of the journey.

Idem,

715

13. A lawful tender of payment, as well as an actu-
al payment, of taxes deprives the collecting officer
of all authority for further action to enforce pay;
ment, and renders every subsequent step illegal

and void.

14. The taxes of the Blue Ridge Railroad Compa-
ny are not payable in the revenue bond scrip issued
by the State of South Carolina in exchange for the
bonds of the company guarantied by the State.
Hagood v. Southern,
805

15. The holder of revenue bond scrip, issued un-
der the Act of the Legislature of South Carolina of
March 2, 1872, has no legal right to have such scrip
received for taxes, unless he owes taxes for which
it is receivable. There is no breach of contract
until a tender for taxes due from the holder has
been refused.
Idem,

805
16. The charter exemption from taxation of the
capital stock of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Railroad Company, applies to its shares of
stock in the hands of individual stockholders.

UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COM-
PANY.

1. In a controversy between the Union Pacific
Railway Company and the United States arising un-
der the Act of July 1, 1862, it is immaterial whether
the amount actually found to be due for transpor-
tation of the mails, at fair and reasonable rates of
compensation, not to exceed the amounts paid by
private parties for the same kind of service." as re-
quired by said section, is ascertained upon evi-
dence comparing them with the rates previously
determined and fixed by the company, or with
those allowed by the accounting officers of the gov-
ernment. The only material thing is to adjudge
what is due according to the rule prescribed by the
statute.

Union Pac. R. Co v. United States,

920

2. The bridge of the Union Pacific Railway Com-
pany between Council Bluffs and Omaha is subject
to the provisions of the Act of July 1, 1862, as to the
rates to be paid by the government for transporta-
tion service over it.
Idem,

USURY.

920

1. To constitute usury, there must be an intention.
knowingly to contract for or to take usurious inter-
est.

Call v. Palmer,

539

2. When an agent who is authorized by his prin-
cipal to lend money for lawful interest exacts for
his own benefit more than the lawful rate, without
authority or knowledge of his principal, the loan is
not thereby rendered usurious.

1dem,

559

MAR 3- 1916