greatest breadth, 33 feet; draught, 174 feet. Protected by a girdle of 4-inch iron plates, 34 feet above and 4 feet under the water-line, about 15 feet fore and aft being without armor. Carries 12 cast-iron rifled guns, muzzle-loaders, 10 of which have a caliber of 54 inches and 2 of 63 inches. The greatest speed of this vessel is 9 knots, and for this reason, as well as for the insufficiency of its armor, it may be a match for a wooden vessel of the same strength, but would have no chance whatever against the most ordinary iron-clad. This vessel visited Shanghai last year.

Nishin-kan, wooden corvette, screw-steamer; 250 horse-power; length, 201 feet; greatest breadth, 29 feet; draught, 14 feet; carries 6 cast-iron guns of about 5 inches and 1 Armstrong muzzle-loader of 7 inches. She is said to be a fast and serviceable vessel, and is, we believe, the one now in port.

Tsukuba-kan, wooden corvette, screw-steamer; 200 horse-power; length, 197 feet; greatest breadth, 294 feet; draught, 15 feet; carries 6 steel Armstrong guns of 5 inches, 2 cast-iron guns of about the same caliber, and 2 smaller bronze guns of native fabrication. This vessel is very old and used up; her greatest speed not more than 6 knots. Kasuga-kan, wooden paddle-steamer; 300 horse-power; length, 243 feet; greatest breadth, 27 feet; draught, 11 feet; carries 4 bronze guns of 5 inches, 2 cast-iron guns of about the same caliber, and 1 Forbes gun of 7 inches.

Ho-shio-kan, compound-system gunboat, screw-steamer; 75 horse-power; length, 145 feet: greatest breadth, 224 feet; draught, 7 feet; carries 1 Armstrong breech-loader of 7 inches, 1 idem of 54 inches, and 2 small steel guns.

Mo-shuim-kan, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, of about the same dimensions as the preceding; carries 1 Forbes muzzle-loader of 7 inches, 1 Armstrong muzzle-loader of 54 inches, and 2 smaller Armstrong guns.

Dai-itchi-Teibo-kan or Teibo I, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, 60 horse-power; length, 132 feet; greatest breadth, 22 feet; draught, 74; carries one cast-iron gun of 61⁄2 inches; 1 Krupp gun of 5 inches; and 2 small steel guns.

Dai-in-Teibo-kan or Teibo II, same construction and dimensions as the preceding; carries 2 Armstrong muzzle-loaders of 64 inches, and 2 small steel Forbes guns.

Un-yo-kan, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, about the same dimensions as the preceding carries 1 rifled muzzle-loader of about 6 inches, 1 of about 5 inches, and 2 small Armstrong guns.

Chiotagata-kan, small wooden gunboat, screw-steamer of 40 horse-power; carries 1 breech-loader of 54 inches, and 2 small guns.

Kotetz'en, iron-clad ram, screw-steamer, with two propellers 500 horse-power, length 15 feet, greatest breadth 27, draught, 13 feet; carries 3 very large and 2 smaller guns. This ram is old and completely unseaworthy; in fact last year it was not considered as belonging to the active navy any more. As, however, it may, perhaps, still be fit for defending the entrance of a harbor, we have not felt justified in omitting it. Latest advices from perfectly reliable sources fully confirm the unseaworthiness of this ram, and further inform us that the other so-called iron-clad, the Rio-jio-kan, is undergoing boiler repairs, which cannot be finished for a considerable time. The gunboats are said to be generally in good order.

The Japanese have, moreover, five or six transports, not at all or insignificantly armed; two of these are sailing-vessels.

As we said at the beginning, these particulars have been taken from a statement drawn up at the end of last year, but they may stand even now, as we hear that no additions of any importance have been made to the Japanese navy since that time. The actual strength of the active navy of Japan would, therefore, be as follows: ̧

JULY 15.

Dispatches re Formosa.

A copy of a reply addressed to Lo Taotai at Foochow, by Mr. Fukushima, His Imperia 1 Japanese Majesty's consul for Amoy.

AMOY, June 17, 1874.

I have the honor to inform you that I returned to Amoy to-day, the 17th of the month, from Formosa, and received your letter of the 21st of the 4th moon, (Chinese calendar,) in which you state that you had been informed by his excellency Li, the viceroy of Fohkien, on the 18th of your 4th moon, touching the subject of his excellency's official letter addressed to his excellency Saigo, commander-in-chief of the Formosan expedition, and requesting me to communicate the matter to Mr. Shinagawa, consul for Shanghai, &c. I fully comprehend the position, and beg to say that I do not consider such a matter can be treated by us, but that it is a subject for the commander alone to decide as he sees fit when he receives the viceroy's dispatch. From my personal experience in the Formosan territories, through which I lately traveled, and partly also from my opinion of the circumstances under which our commander has invested the country of the savages by special instructions from his Japanese majesty, I apprehend that there would be found some difference in the views of our commander from those entertained by the viceroy, as expressed in his excellency's letter.

For instance, as regards the territories which are occupied by aborigines, and which have long been claimed to be under the control of your government, I would remark that I put a few questions to the aborigines as to whether their territory as well as themselves had ever been subject to the sovereignty of China. They said "they had not," and substantiated their denial in an especial manner by showing that their taxes are paid only to their chief. They maintain that they have never been under the control of the Chinese government. It seems to be their custom to quarrel and even fight furiously with each other, taking possession of ground by force and robbing each other, up to the present time, there being no authority to execute impartial justice or to exercise control over them.

I would here mention an instance in which they lately applied to our commander, begging for his adjudication in a question respecting a right of property in ground, which had been contested for forty years. In disposition they seem to be amicable, though they are generally reckless and of a morose temperament, never getting rid of a sense of injury when despoiled of their property by wicked people, from whom they suffer on account of their having no proper court in which to make complaint.

They regarded therefore with extreme satisfaction the approach of our invading party. Placed as they were, it was as if they had met a light on a dark night, and they showed every kindness by helping the army to their utmost and begging protection from us, which seems to show that they were much gratified by the entrance of the invaders within their boundary, and that they preferred them to any others.

I therefore think that our commander confidently believes that those savages as well as their territories have never been under the sovereignty of your government, and under the special instructions he holds from his Japanese majesty is daily exerting his energies toward reducing them to a proper condition. His commission, however, extends only to military affairs, and is limited to the measures necessary in reference to the savages. Consequently, I think, he could do nothing in the matter, nor even discuss with his excellency the viceroy the question as to the jurisdiction of your government, over that territory, this being a subject which ought to be left to the decision of our respective governments.

From my private considerations of this affair, I would express the hope that your high commissioner or authorities will negotiate it in an impartial and amicable spirit with our minister, and thus continue our friendly relations on a permanent footing. I have, &c.

No. 797.]

No. 163.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Davis.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, August 11, 1874. (Received September 17.) SIR: I have the honor to inclose to you herewith a series of telegrams that have passed between the consul at Amoy and myself, showing the arrival of General Le Gendre at Amoy, his arrest, &c.

It is notorious that General Le Gendre has a special concern in the

Japanese expedition to Formosa. You are aware that, during the time of his service as our consul at Amoy, he made many visits to the island. At a later moment he appeared in Japan, "having a very full and complete set of maps, charts, photographs, &c., of the coast, mainland, and people of Formosa" (Mr. De Long to Mr. Fish, No. 302, November 6, 1872.) He was then brought into communication with the Japanese government, and there followed negotiations for his employment by that government, "with a distinct reference to the use of his services as an adviser in military operations, should they become necessary." (Mr. Fish to Mr. De Long, No. 164, December 30, 1872.) The military operations here referred to would appear to be those since undertaken in Formosa, ostensibly to punish savage inhabitants of the island for alleged maltreatment of shipwrecked Japanese. This matter is thus spoken of by Mr. Low, in his dispatch No. 264, of June 13, 1873:

There are, he says, (the Japanese ambassador,) only two questions of importance which he desires to discuss with the Chinese government.

First. Whether China is responsible for the acts of the aborigines on the island of Formosa. If the government answers this question in the affirmative, he will then demaud redress and indemnity for the murder of some natives of Loochoo, who were wrecked there a year and more ago. If the answer be given in the negative, notice will be given that Japan proposes to send a military force to Formosa, to chastise the savage and semi-civilized tribes that practically hold undisputed possession of a large part of the island, and, as there are no safe harbors on that part of the island where the aborigines reside, permission will be asked to land troops at one of the ports open to trade, and to march them through Chinese territory that lies between the ports and the points where the troops are intended to operate against the savages. Second. To ascertain the precise relations between China and Corea, &c.

General Le Gendre was associated with the embassador on this mission. (See Mr. Low's letter, No. 256, May 13, 1873.)

It has been reported that the Chinese disclaimed responsibility for the acts of the Formosan savages.

It has been reported again that they agreed to take some steps to restrain them for the future. At any rate, in the early part of this year, the Japanese set on foot an expedition to Formosa of an extensive character. My several dispatches in regard to it have laid before you all the general information which I have gathered, and will have demonstrated that it was not intended for a raid against a few scattered miserable savages.

That expedition sailed from Japan in the middle of April. The southern part of Formosa, from sea to sea, was at once occupied. The savages were encountered and beaten in conflict or driven into inaccessible mountains. Long since the ostensible purposes of the expedition were accomplished, but the Japanese still remain. They have put up houses of such description as warrant the belief that they are intended for permanent occupation. They have constructed a few roads where their utility for military purposes is not manifest. It is said that large. numbers of troops are massed near Nagasaki, ready to be moved in case of the outbreak of war. Meanwhile the Chinese, who beyond a doub would be glad to see the Japanese evacuate the island and let the matter drop, have been in negotiation with Japan, and, as if in anticipation of war, have mobilized large forces and are everywhere preparing for

war.

Of the view which the United States representative at Peking takes you are doubtless informed. I may, however, quote from his dispatch to me of June 17 last:

I suppose my instructions to Mr. Henderson have reached you in passing, and I have therein given my views of the countenance and aid which our countrymen are affording

to the Japanese. It is our duty to maintain the peace existing between this empire and our own country, and these men are violating that peace, and must be restrained if it can be done. The first article of the treaty gives one of its chief obligations and its infraction by their assisting an armed invasion of Formosa needs no proof, now that the real nature of that expedition has been shown. It seems to me that all rightminded people thus engaged must now see that the Japanese are using them in carrying out hostile designs, and that their presence militates against the honor and obligations of the United States.

The persons more particularly referred to in this extract are Messrs. Cassell and Wasson, citizens of the United States, who are now actu ally in the Japanese camp in Formosa.

It would seem as if it had been the intention of General Le Gendre to accompany the expedition.

Under date of the 18th of May the United States minister at Tokei wrote to me as follows:

From information recently received I deem it proper to say to you that before any expedition left Japan for Formosa, or any other portion of China, viz, on the 18th and also on the 19th of April, I made written protest to the minister for foreign affairs against the employment by Japan of any ship or citizen of the United States in an arined expedition against Formosa until the written consent of China thereto should have been first obtained by the government of Japan. On the 22d of April, and while the expedition still remained in port at Nagasaki, I received from the minister for foreign affairs a dispatch, in which he said that in compliance with my request the steamer New York and Messrs. Le Gendre, Cassell, and Wasson, citizens of the United States, had been detached from this service.

66

What better evidence could be adduced to show that the moment for the use of General Le Gendre's services, as an adviser in military operations," had arrived?

Messrs. Cassell and Wasson did go to Formosa. The New York did not go. A vessel chartered from British subjects did not go, a similar notice having been sent to the Japanese government by the British minister. General Le Gendre also remained behind. Public report says that he was at Nagasaki on or about the date when the expedition sailed and engaged in promoting its departure. When the New York, a Pacific mail-steamer, was detached, he appeared at the Pacific mail agency and complained violently of her withdrawal, believing apparently that it was the act of the company. From the inception of the scheme for an invasion of Formosa on the part of the Japanese there are, then, numerous proofs to connect him with it and to establish the proposition that he has promoted it.

The first intimation that I had of his departure for the scene of operations came to me by Mr. Henderson's telegram of the 5th instant. Called upon to act promptly, lest the opportunity might be lost, I did not hesitate to advise his arrest. It remains now to determine whether there is a case against General Le Gendre which will justify me in prosecuting him for a breach of the neutrality act.

*

*

General Le Gendre remains at Amoy, and I am using my best endeavors and judgment to determine whether it is possible or right to hold him longer, having due regard to law and international obligations. I confess that the conclusion is forced upon me that I have no means open to me to prevent his going on to Formosa and there taking up arms against the country upon whose soil he now is.

Writing, as I do, at the last moment before the departure of the mailand having had but little time to give to the consideration of the sub, ject, I am unwilling to decide hastily what should be done. I should be sorry to think that you might see in my course any lack of regard for the rights of the individual. I should, however, be more sorry to

fail in regard to the rights of the great empire upon whose soil I stand, and which has deputed to our Government certain duties which cannot be too faithfully and impartially discharged.

Le Gendre arrived here to-day, I presume en route to Formosa. What instructions from Peking?

HENDERSON, Amoy :

HENDERSON. [SEAL.]

SHANGHAI, August 5, 1874.

Arrest Le Gendre, if possible, without collision with Japanese. Advise and ask aið Stanton and Chinese. Report.

SEWARD. [SEAL.]

Hold Le Gendre for instructions from Peking. Take every precaution against his escape. Treat him considerately.

SEWARD, Shanghai:

SEWARD. [SEAL.]

[Telegram No. 117.]

AMOY, 7, 8, 1874, 11.50 a. m.

Le Gendre wishes me to send him to Shanghai.

Answered August 8, 1874:

HENDERSON.

Le Gendre's request appears reasonable. In case you send him, send all possibleevidence and Williams's dispatches.

SEWARD.

[Telegram No. 130.]

AMOY, 7, 8, 1874, 2.35 a. m.

GEO. F. SEWARD,

United States Consul-General, Shanghai:

No legal advice here. I consider it unfair to keep me here; would like to go to Shanghai. Mr. Henderson has referred the matter to you. Can you comply with my request?

LE GENDRE.