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C. N. GILMORE, Superintendent Des Moines & Ft. Dodge Railway, Des Moines, Iowa: DEAR SIR-I am desirous of shipping from Des Moines, Iowa, one barrel of alcohol to be used in my business in the manufocture of tinctures, fluid extracts, and medicinal, officinal preparations. I am not in any sense a dealer in liquor. I sell none, absolutely none, and permit none to be sold. I am, therefore, not a permit dealer in liquors, and do not wish to be on record as such. I am a druggist, and do business under warrant of law, chapter 75 of the acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly, which law has not been amended or changed since the Nineteenth General Assembly. Our Pharmacy Board gave an opinion that druggists properly registered have the right to keep and sell spirituous liquors without a permit from the board of supervisors. The Attorney-General thinks differently, but this is not strange; he decided differently from the opinion of our board on a similar matter two years ago, and now admits we were correct and he in error. I do not wish, and would not deign to ask you to violate any law or take any chances, but ask you to receive and forward to me the above named goods for a lawful purpose and under warrant of law, and I stand ready to indemnify you for any action any one may seek to sustain against you or any employe of your company in complying with this request.


Yours respectfully,

R. W. CRAWFORD, Commissioner of Pharmacy for the State of Iowa.

DES MOINES, Iowa, August 6, 1884.

R. W. CRAWFORD, Fort Dodge, Iowa:

DEAR SIR-Answering yours of August 2d, I have referred your letter to Mr. Kauffman, our attorney, and he decides that we have no right to ship a barrel of alcohol as requested by you, and for this reason we must decline to do so.


Very respectfully,


FORT DODGE, IOWA, August 12, 1884.

E. G. MORGAN, Secretary Board of Railroad Commissioners: DEAR SIR-I herewith hand you copy of correspondence with superintendent of Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railway, which I desire you to lay before the Railroad Commissioners to determine if the railroad is justified by law in refusing to transport to me the barrel of alcohol to be used in my business as a registered pharmacist, in the manufacture of tinctures, fluid extracts and officinal medicinal preparations of recognized medicinal utility by the United States and National Dispensatories and Pharmacopoeia, as provided in chapter 75, acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly, which law has not been repealed, amended or changed since the acts of the Nineteenth General Assembly, and then only by chapter 137, which does not relate to this subject.

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The Supreme Court in the case of the State of lowa v. Knowles and State of lowa v. Mercer, clearly held that chapter 75 conferred the right upon registered pharmacists to sell, in good faith, spirituous liquors for the purpose of medicine. The court further held that said chapter 75 did not repeal title xi, chapter 6, of the Code, except so far as was necessary to allow sales by registered pharmacists of intoxicating liquors for medicine. This clearly indicates there was no conflict between the pharmacy law and chapter 6, title xi, of the Code.

The late enactment by the Twentieth General Assembly of chapter 143, does not repeal, refer to, or change chapter 75 of the acts of the Eighteenth General Assembly, neither does it change the purposes for which intoxicating liquors may be sold. If it provided liquor should not be sold for the purposes of medicine, it would be in conflict, but it does not; in other words, if the pharmacy law provided for a purpose not included in chapter 143, it would be in conflict and inconsistent. My attorney advises me that as common carriers the railway company is bound to transport to me, for a lawful purpose, the alcohol as requested. Not conceding the Attorney-General's opinion to be correct, but out of respect for his decision, I have refrained from selling any liquor. The penalty act leaves the granting of permits to the discretion of the boards of supervisors, who have refused all applications in this county for permits; there is, therefore (by the Attorney-General's decision), no lawful custodian for the sale of liquor in our county; therefore, no one from whom I can purchase the amount necessary to continue my lawful business of manufacturing medicinal preparations.


Yours truly,


DES MOINES, IOWA, August 15, 1884.

HON. R. W. CRAWFORD, Fort Dodge, Iowa:

DEAR SIR-Your communication has been received and considered by the Commissioners. They are of the opinion that under the provisions of section 1553, found in chapter 143, acts of the Twentieth General Assembly, the railroad company is prohibited from shipping any intoxicating liquors except to a consignee furnishing a certificate from and under the seal of the county auditor of the county to which the liquor is consigned that the consignee is authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors. As you expressly state that you have no such permit, they must decline making any order in the matter.

By order of the Board.






Filed August 14, 1884.

A horse belonging to complainant was, on April 24, 1884, severely burned in a fire started, as he alleged, by an engine on respondent's road, and the company refused to indemnify him for the loss, claiming that they were not legally liable inasmuch as the engine in question was in perfect working order and the fire did not start inside their right of way. The matter was again presented by the Commissioners to the proper officers of the company, who made substantially the same defense as at first. Mr. Enfield was accordingly advised that as liability on the part of respondent was disputed by them it would be necessary to obtain a money judgment against the company, which, under the law, the Commissioners had no power to render. His redress must be sought in the courts.


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Filed August 23, 1884.


Messrs. Jesmer & Day, of Ochedon, Iowa, made complaint that on July 5, 1884, there was shipped to them via Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway, a consignment of merchandise from Poole, Gilliam & Co., of Dubuque, the freight charges being prepaid to destination; that when the goods arrived at Spencer, ten miles east of Ochedon, they were detained by respondent's agent, who refused to ship them further without payment by complainants of the local rate from Spencer to Ochedon, and they were therefore under the necessity of transporting the goods by wagon, making an additional cost to them of ten dollars. Complainants also stated that a car of goods shipped by them from Independence to Spencer was at their request forwarded to Ochedon by respondent, the charge for this service being thirteen dollars. This the parties claimed was an overcharge, and a discrimination against them, as the company had previously shipped cars between these points for five dollars, both for complainants and others. Their claim was accordingly for cartage on first shipment $10, and overcharge on second shipment $8, making a total of $18. In defending this

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claim before the Commissioners, respondents affirmed that, regarding the shipment from Dubuque, the freight charges were paid to Spencer only, and the shippers so understood; the goods should have been billed at Hartley rates from Dubuque to Ochedon, as the latter is only a flag station. As to the car of household goods from Independence, it was consigned to complainants at Spencer, and billed at Spencer rates. They requested it reshipped to Ochedon, which was done at tariff rates. Referring to the charge of discrimination in the latter case, respondent replied that a rate of $5 per car was given to a lumber dealer at Spencer and Ochedon, on lumber moved hetween these two points, for the reason that said dealer had a yard at each point, and was obliged in the course of his business to transfer lumber from one yard to the other. No other party was given such rate and respondent stated that if this special arrangement was illegal it would be canceled. On receipt of this testimony from respondent, the complainants were notified that they must furnish proof sustaining their allegations by affidavit or deposition. They eventually notified the Board that their claim had been satisfactorily adjusted by the company.




Filed August 25, 1884.

Violation of contract.

Mr. Day complains under date of August 25, 1884, that the grant of lands made more than twenty years ago for a road in the region in which he resides has been diverted from its purpose; that the people paid double prices for land because it was on the selected route of a railroad on the forty-second parallel of latitude; that in 1864 a new act of Congress allowed a modified line upon certain conditions; that the Maple River Branch of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway is built in Monona county only about three miles, leaving about three-fourths of the county with railroad facilities on one side of them, while under the law they were to hold the selection of the lands on the old original line on condition that a road be built at or near Onawa in Monona county, etc.; that twenty years having elapsed, the reasonable time has surely expired.

Commissioner Coffin for the Board replied that Congress alone, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States could forfeit a land grant, and as that body had of late shown a disposition to proceed against all delinquent roads to forfeiture, it might be well to bring the matter before that body, to the end that the question of delinquency and the expediency of forfeiture be determined.



Delay to shipments.


Filed September 27, 1884.

Mr. Woren complained that consignments of butter delivered by him to respondent's agent at Belknap were not forwarded promptly, but were frequently allowed to remain in their freight house two or three days, thereby causing considerable damage to the same. Investigation by the proper officers of the company disclosed the fact that the trouble arose from a misunderstanding between the agent and complainant, the latter desiring to send his produce to the Kansas City market, while the agent neglected or refused to explain to him that the arrangements of the company as to dairy products were entirely for the purpose of shipping them to Chicago and the east, no ice being used in their cars except when loaded east-bound. His differences with the company having been satisfactorily settled by the Superintendent of the Refrigerator Line, Mr. Woren advised the Commissioners to that effect, and stated that no further trouble was anticipated by him.




Violation of section 1292 of the Code.

Filed September 2, 1884.

The Standard Lumber Company, of Dubuque, made complaint to the Board that several cars of lumber, shipped by them via Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul and Burlington & Missouri River Railroad in Nebraska to points on the latter road, were compelled to be unloaded at Council Bluffs from cars of the initial line and reloaded into respondent's cars, that company refusing to receive and haul foreign cars over its line.

As the contents of one car were thus frequently divided into two loads and the full car-load weight placed upon each, the expenses of shipment were greatly increased to complainants, the delivered prices of the lumber having been based upon the rate from Dubuque to Council Bluffs and the local rate from the latter point to stations on respondent's line in Nebraska. Respondent having admitted the truth of the charges made, the following order was issued by the Commissioners:

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