"Third, that we plan and implement an effective national defense against the likely threats of chemical or bacterial warfare. "Fourth, that we significantly increase the funding and manpower of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to develop the detection equipment necessary to enforce any treaty on chemical or bacterial warfare.

"Fifth, that this Nation seek to make the limitation of atmospheric testing and nonproliferation of germ and gas warfare weaponry the next item on the agenda of the Geneva Disarmament talks.

"And, sixth, that this Nation pursue, with every means at its disposal, the development and implementation of a workable, safeguarded treaty to limit development, testing, production, stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and bacterial weapons by the nations which now possess them."

Senator Hartke's views relate to our use of defoliants and antiriot gases in Vietnam and are expressed in his recent book, The American Crisis in Vietnam.29

Others who have expressed their interest and concern about CBW on the floor of the House during the last 10 years include: Congressmen Don Clausen, Craig Hosmer, Philip Philbin, Abraham Multer, William Ryan, and Congresswoman Patsy Mink.

Hartke, Vance, "The American Crisis in Vietnam," the Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis and New York (1968), pp. 126–132.

V. LEVEL OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR CBW

Since there are no detailed budgetary breakdowns for the total of chemical and biological warfare it is difficult to be precise in estimates of past and current funding levels. In the 1967 hearings,30 Senator Symington noted that, around 1966 "we had a briefing on the subject [research, development, test, and evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare], and were spending about $50 million." In 1959, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in its report estimated that CB research was supported at the level of about $35 million to $40 million a year at that time.31

The current CBW program is the product of decisions made and steps taken during the late 1950's and early 1960's. It is reported 32 that in fiscal 1961 the R. & D. budget for CBW for all three military services was about $57 million. By 1964 it had risen to about $158 million. It is estimated that the spending through 1967 for research and development remained at about that level, 33

In fiscal 1961 only the Army had funds for CBW procurementabout $46 million. In fiscal year 1964 the Army received about $117 million for procurement related to CBW; the Navy $11 million; and the Air Force $87 million.34 Procurement figures since that time are classified, although Senator Clark reported that the Air Force had requested $70.8 million for herbicides for defoliation in Vietnam for fiscal year 1969.35

These sums for procurement are in addition to the amount spent for research and development. Combining estimates for research, development, and procurement costs, it can be calculated that between $300 million and $350 million is the on-going cost for all aspects of this program.

21

Op. cit. U.S. Armament and Disarmament Problems (p63).

Op. cit. Research in CBR (p. 14).

"Chemical and Biological Warfare (I): The Research Program." Elinor Langer, Science, vol. 155, Jan. 13, 1967 (p. 174).

Senator Clark reports in a Senate statement (Congressional Record, Senate, July 15, 1968, S8633): "The Department of the Army has requested funds for research, development, and production of chemical and biological agents as part of the budget request for ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment. The total budget request for these items in fiscal 1969 was $175.7 million."

Op. cit. Langer.

Op. cit. Congressional Record, Senate (S8633).

VI. DIFFICULTIES IN CB WEAPON CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The first reaction one has to the question of viable approaches to the control of chemical and biological weapons is that there are no such approaches. And it is most difficult to dispense with this first. reaction. The reasons are that the nations, including some of the smaller ones, are already downstream too far. The larger arsenals for CB warfare may be restricted to the major powers, but there is little doubt that an increasing capability is proliferating to some of the smaller and developing countries. What used to be largely a picture of research has turned to development and development has turned to manufacturing and stockpiling. The subject is shrouded in secrecy and it is the secrecy which seems to provide a nonstop momentum to realize the full potential of these types of weapons. No one really knows what someone else may have ready for employment, in a military situation. The large and expensive programs in the United States and the Soviet Union are attributed to each other's "large and expensive programs." Knowledge and capability required for detection and defense are tied to knowledge and capability for retaliation. The "no first use" policy of the United States and other major nations implies that this retaliation be in kind and this requires that weapons of the CB class be available.

A philosophy of mutual deterrence is developing in CB warfare comparable to that in nuclear warfare. In fact, much of the literature on the subject repeats that the stalemate in the latter opens up the need for capability in the former. As an arms race, CBW does not present the spiraling costs of the ICBM-ABM systems, hence a movement to CB weapons (especially chemical) among some smaller nations. S. M. Hersh believes there are at least 13 nations prepared or getting prepared in CBW.36 So far as the major powers are concerned, the elements in CBW which are in common with the nuclear arms race include the now-accepted approach to that race. Thus, in discussing control of CB warfare, an editorial in the British journal, Nature, concluded:

"The balance of terror between the great power blocs may not be to everybody's taste, but it is probably still the best way of avoiding war." 37

The primary frustration rests upon the fact that arms control measures do not really change the general posture of the opposing sides. The specific posture with respect to CBW may be similar to that dictated by poor chemical warfare intelligence during World War II, which "credited the enemy with a capability commensurate with the assumed diabolical nature of his intentions * * *"' 38 And how does one get at a viable approach to what may be largely a kind

Hersh, Seymour M., "Chemical and Biological Weapons-The Secret Arsenal," the New York Times Magazine, Aug. 25, 1968 (p. 82). 37"Can Biological War Be Stopped?" Nature, Aug. 17, 1968 (pp. 665-666).

"Op cit., Brown (p. 295).