CROSSINGS-Continued.

caused by, difficulties of other travellers in attempting to pass may be
shown. Phelps v. Winona, etc., R. Co. (Minn.). 56.

Ordinance: violation of, limiting speed of train does not excuse con-
tributory negligence. 15 n.

Passing between parted cars standing on switch track when space is only
eighteen inches, but when engine is not seen nor warning heard, is not
contributory negligence. Nichols v. Washington, etc., R. Co. (Va.). 27.
Path across switch track. Railroad company by keeping it open when
cars are standing on track invites public to use it, and is guilty of
negligence if it backs cars without warning when person is crossing
the track. Nichols v. Washington, etc., R. Co. (Va.). 27.
Presumption. There is no presumption that person if injured at familiar
crossing was free from negligence; prima facie the fault was his own,
and proof should show that he exercised due care. Indiana, etc.,
R. Co. v. Hammock (Ind.). 121.

Private crossings: duty of railroad at.

37 n.

Private crossings: failure to give signal at, is not negligence. Philadel-
phia, etc., R. Co. v. Fronk (Md.). 31.

Private switch track: liability of railway for injury on. 23 n.

Pushing train. If pushing train past crossing increases the risk, it is neg-
ligence for the railroad not to give notice of what it is doing. Nor-
folk, etc., R. Co. v. Burge (Va.). 101.

Railroad, railroads collision. Action may be maintained against either
company. 23 n.

Railroad. Railroad's evidence held to make a case for the determination
of the jury upon the question of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff and the engineer in charge of the engine upon which plain-
tiff was riding. Hansen v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (Minn.). 13.
Railroad. Railroad's failure to stop engine 400 feet from crossing in obe-
dience to rule not conclusive evidence of negligence. Hansen v.
Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (Minn.). 13.
Signal: failure of company to perform statutory duty as to, cannot
be held to be the efficient cause of an accident which the party might
have avoided by proper precaution. Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Ham-
mock (Ind.). 127.

Signal. Failure of engineer to sound statutory signal although it would
have prevented accident will not entitle a recovery if deceased could
have avoided accident by looking out for train. Matti v. Chicago,
etc., R. Co. (Mich). 71.

Signal: failure to give, at private crossings is not negligence. Philadel-
phia, etc., R. Co. v. Fronk (Md.). 31.

Signals: effect of failure to give statutory. 6 n.

Signals: evidence as to.

6 n.

Signals. Instructions assuming that warnings or signals of the approach
of the train were given, when that is one of the controverted facts in
the case, are properly refused. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchison
(Ill.). 82.

Signals. Persons who are near crossings at the time of an accident may
testify that they did not hear any bell or whistle and that if these
signals had been given they would have heard them. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Dillon (Ill.). 1.

Signals. Traveller may rely somewhat upon their being given, and if
track is temporarily obstructed after traveller has looked and listened
and heard no signal, he is not required to stop his team and go on
foot to the track. Gugenheim v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (Mich.). 89.
32 A. & E. R. Cas. -42

CROSSINGS-Continued.

Signals. Where crossing is in constant use and view is obstructed, it is
the duty of the railroad company to give signals without regard to
statute. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dillon (Ill.). 1.

Speed: duty of railroad company as to, in approaching crossings. 100 n.
Speed must be consistent with care and prudence although there is no
statute limiting it. If company makes up by increased diligence in
guarding people against danger to which they are exposed by reason
of the train being off time, they are not guilty of negligence. Gugen-
heim v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (Mich.). 89.
120 n.

Speed. No rate of speed at crossings is negligence per se.
Speed of train and fact that it is behindhand is not per se evidence of neg-
ligence. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kellam's Adm'r (Va.). 114.
Speed. Railroad company not bound to stop trains nor slacken speed on
approaching crossings. Traveller must take notice of this rule and
act with reference to it. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (Ind.). 121.
Speed. Witness may compare speed of train at the time of the accident
with the speed of the same train on other days. Gugenheim v. Lake
Shore, etc., R. Co. (Mich.). 89.

Stationary cars: injury caused by attempting to pass between. 30 n.
Statute. Where an accident happens by wagon being driven against
engine, and was not on the track, a statute relating to precautions to
be taken when person appears on the track is not applicable. Nash-
ville, etc., R. Co. v. Seaborn (Tenn.). 9.

Street-car collision. Duty of street-car driver approaching railroad track
to stop car and go ahead on foot to see if train is approaching. Cen-
tral Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.). 16.

16.

Central

Street-car collision. Railroad failing to post flagman, and street-car driver
attempting to cross after discovering the train, renders both compa-
nies negligent and liable to street car passenger injured.
Passenger R. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.).
Street-car collision. When passenger on street-car is injured by collision
with railroad train, burden to disprove negligence is on street-car
company; but if passenger desires to recover of railroad company he
must prove negligence on its part. Central Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn
(Ky.). 16.

Street-car driver in approaching railroad crossing must exercise highest
degree of care. 23 n.

Taking case from jury. In action for injury caused by collision at rail-
road crossing where track was in plain view for great distance, trial
court may properly take case from jury on ground of contributory
negligence. Straugh v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (Mich.). 164.
Torpedoes. Fact that they were accidentally placed on track without ne-
cessity and contrary to rules does not exempt company from liability
if any one is injured thereby. Harriman v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
(Ohio). 37.

Torpedo being left negligently on track at point used as a crossing by
children with the knowledge of the railroad company, and picked up
by boy, who, in attempting to open it, explodes it, and another boy is
injured, the company will be held liable. Harriman v. Pittsburgh.
etc., R. Co. (Ohio). 37.

Trespasser. Complaint averring that plaintiff was on the crossing of a
public street, and in a street along which a track was laid shows that
he was not trespassing, and is good without alleging that he was will-
fully run upon if it contains a general allegation that he was free from
fault. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (Ind.). 121.

DAMAGES. See specific titles.

Abutting owner. Where abutting owner testifies as to the value of the
property, and that after the construction of the railway it would not
sell at all, and that the rental value had decreased, it is irrelevant on
the cross-examination to ask him what he paid for the property in
1874. Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Schmitt (Col.). 231.

Change of grade. Measure of damages is the difference in the market
value of the property before and after the grade of the street was al-
tered. Sheehy v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. (Mo.). 233.

Crossings. In estimating the damages of a railroad company for land
taken in laying out a way across its track, expenses of defending it-
self against claims for accidents are not to be taken into account.
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. County Com'rs (Me.). 271.

De minimis non curat lex. Maxim does not apply to crossing of gravel
road by railroad company without consent and without proceedings
to condemn. Gravel road company is entitled to at least nominal
damages. Indianapolis, etc., Gravel Road Co. v. Belt R. Co. (Ind.).
173.
Excessive. Court will not weigh proof unless verdict is such as to in-
duce belief that it is the result of passion or corruption. Sheehy v.
Kansas City, etc, R. Co. (Mo.). 233.
Excessive. In an action for damages for the depreciation of the value of
property by the construction of a railway in the street, where there is
a conflict in the evidence as to the amount of depreciation of the
property, and the jury view the premises, verdict will not be set aside
as excessive. Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Bourne (Col.). 227.
Excessive. Where jury had before them plats and figures and there was
evidence of the amount found it cannot be said that there was no evi-
dence to uphold the finding. Sheehy v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.
(Mo.). 233.

Excessive. $2,000 is not excessive for loss of truck, amputation of two
toes, and permanent injury to leg. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Burge
(Va.). 101.

Fires. Where land to which fire was communicated is valuable only as
meadow land, and the roots of the grass growing thereon were de-
stroyed, evidence of the cost of re-seeding and of its rental value
during the time it would not produce a crop, is admissible upon
the question of damages. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hixon (Ind.). 374.
Fires. Where plaintiff's farm was divided by railroad, and locust grove
being on the smaller tract, which was burned, instruction that if the
jury found for the plaintiff, one item of recovery would be value of the
locust grove to the farm, is proper. Brooks v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.
(Iowa). 383.

Joint trespassers. Under Kentucky statute in action against joint tres-
passers, jury has power to direct damages to be paid in certain pro-
portions. Central Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn (Ky.). 16.

Personal injuries. It is not error to permit plaintiff to testify that he
has wife and three children if jury are properly instructed as to what
shall be considered in ascertaining measure of damages and do not ap-
pear to have been influenced by the evidence. Central Pass. R. Co.
v. Kuhn (Ky.). 16.

Railroad in street. Abutting owner: on the trial of an action by, against
a railroad, witnesses cannot testify as to how much less per year was
received as rent for the property affected than before the track was
laid in front of it, or give opinions concerning the amount of damage
sustained. Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Gardner (Ohio). 243.

DAMAGES-Continued.

Smoke, noises, and sparks of fire, occasioned by running of locomotives and
cars may be considered in action by abutting property owner against
railroad company. Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Gardner (Ohio). 243.
Streets: damages for the occupation of, by railways. 251 n.

Streets. Measure of damages by the occupation of streets by railways.

252 n.

Worth of deceased may be shown in action for causing death. Attorney
who has managed his estate may testify. Phelps v. Winona, etc., R.
Co. (Minn.). 56.

DECREE.

Recital in, of foreclosure, contained in a duly acknowledged master's deed
is prima facie evidence of the decree. New York, etc., R. Co. v. State
(N. J.). 186.

DELIVERY. See CARRIERS.

DISCRIMINATION. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Act to regulate rates and prevent unjust discrimination being a remedial
statute is to receive liberal construction. State v. Fremont, etc., R.
Co. (Neb.). 426.

Carrier exercising a franchise of a public character is limited as to remun-
eration. Presumption is that a higher charge for a shorter distance
is not reasonable, and that reduced rate is made because of competi-
tion with other railroad does not show that reasonable cost or expense
to the company of carriage of goods to the more distant point is tem-
porarily less than to the nearer point. The statute is not limited to
that kind of rivalry which competes for a common business to the
common market. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. People (Ill.). 417.
Discrimination must exist in the doing for or allowing to one party or
place what is denied to another. It cannot be predicated of action
which in itself is impartial. Crews v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (Int.
St. Com.). 596.

Fact that two towns are 117 miles apart, and there is no competition be-
tween them in retail grocery trade, it does not show that a discrim-
ination between them in the transportation of bags of coffee in that
they are carried to the most distant town from a given market for a
less rate than to the nearer town is not an unjust discrimination. The
injustice is in overcharging. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. People (Ill.).

417.

Illinois statute gives a right of action for personal injury independent of
suit by the State for the statutory penalty. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
People (Ill.). 417.
Rebate does not amount to discrimination when it does not appear that the
concession was granted to any one exclusively. Christie v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co. (Mo.). 413.

Statute prohibiting any discrimination in respect to any locality. The
word "locality" means the territory unjustly discriminated against,
and may be village, State, or county, or portion of the State. State
v. Fremont, etc., R. Co. (Neb.). 426.

Under Illinois statute concerning unjust discrimination on railroad freights,
it is not incumbent to prove a personal discrimination and a personal
injury, but the offence is made out by proof of a discrimination as be-
between localities, omitting specific evidence of its effect upon differ-
ent individuals. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. People (Ill.). 417.

ELEVATED RAILROADS. See STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.

EVIDENCE. See DAMAGES; FIRES; STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.

Carriers. Connecting lines. Evidence of custom of road receiving goods
from another to examine them, and if in good condition checking
them "all right," is competent to show a delivery of the goods in
good condition to a connecting carrier. Knott v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co.
(N. Car.). 481.

Carriers. Delivery. No excuse is allowed to a carrier for wrongful deliv-
ery of goods except the fault of the shipper himself, and where there
is any doubt which may be determined by documentary evidence its
production should be required. Furman v. Union Pac. R. Co. (N. Y.).
500.

Carriers. Rain. In action for injury to tobacco from rain evidence of vol-
unteer weather-observer appointed by United States to show that it
did not rain at a certain time is competent.
Knott v. Raleigh, etc.,

R. Co. (N. Car.). 481.

6 n.

Coroner's inquest: when witness denies that he made certain statements
at, his deposition taken at the inquest may be introduced in rebuttal.
New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kellam's Adm'r (Va.). 114.
Crossings: evidence as to signals at.
Crossings evidence of. Difficulties of other travellers in attempting to
pass obstructed crossing may be shown in action for injury caused
by it. Phelps v. Winona, etc., R. Co. (Minn.). 56.

Crossings. Persons who are near crossings at the time of an accident may
testify that they did not hear any bell or whistle and that if these
signals had been given they would have heard them. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Dillon (Ïll.). 1.

Crossings. There is no presumption that person injured at familiar cross-
ing was free from negligence. Prima facie the fault was his own, and
proof should show that he exercised due care. Indiana, etc., R. Co.
v. Hammock (Ind.).
Crossings. Witness may compare speed of train at time of accident with
speed of same train on other days. Gugenheim v. Lake Shore, etc.,
R. Co. (Mich.). 89.

121.

Damages. Worth of deceased may be shown in action for causing death.
Attorney who has managed his estate may testify. Phelps v. Winona,
etc., R. Co. (Minn.). 56.

Fires. Evidence that defendant was in the habit of refusing to adopt
certain appliances to modify discharge of smoke cannot explain
whether spark arresters used by defendant were up to the standard
required, and its admission is erroneous. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Page
(Pa.). 386.

Flagman: general reputation of, for carelessness is inadmissible where it is
admitted that accident was caused by his carelessness. Baltimore,
etc., R. Co. v. Colvin (Pa.). 160.

Opinion evidence as to damages suffered by abutting property owners by
reason of the construction of a railroad in the street. Columbus, etc.,
R. Co. v. Gardner (Ohio). 243.

Real parties in issue. Where an issue is raised as to who are such parties,
testimony to impeach an alleged assignment of the cause of action is
admissible. Nanson v. Jacob (Mo.). 553.
Withdrawal of suit. It is not error to exclude testimony going to show
that the plaintiff had once offered to withdraw suit where there is no
plea under which to admit it. Central Pac. R. Co. v. Avant (Ga.). 475.