ing require, but, granting this to be true, it will not avail the appellant, since the remedy for mere uncertainty of statement is by motion and not by demurrer. It has been long and firmly established in this State that negligence may be charged in general terms, and that if the defendant desires a more definite statement of the facts, he must move the court to make the complaint more specific. Railroad Co. v. Nelson, 51 Ind. 150; Kessler v. Leeds, 51 Ind. 212; Railway Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; s. c., 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 554; City v. Worthington, 97 Ind. 282; Columbus, etc., Co. v. Wynant, 100 Ind. 160; Railway Co. v. Gaines, 104 Ind. 526, 746; Railroad Co. v. Jones, 108 Ind. 551. This rule is not without support in principle, and it is well sustained by the decisions of other courts: A recent writer thus states the rule: "A general averment of negligence in a complaint, declaration or petition is sufficient; the particular acts constituting the negligence, need not be, in detail, specifically set out." Black, Pr. & Pl. 201. Many decisions are cited in support of the doctrine. Objections to evidence to be of any avail must be reasonably specific. The particular objection must be fairly stated. It is not enough to state that the evidence is incompetent, or that it is immaterial and irrelevant. This much is implied in the bare fact of objecting. If it be unnecessary to state the particular objection, quite as well say "we object," and done with it, since a more general objection amounts to nothing more, for it is simply tantamount to an expression of the fact that counsel do object. It is no answer to the proposition asserted by the authorities to say that the evidence itself may reveal the objection, for this may be said of all incompetent and irrelevant evidence, when carefully scrutinized; and, if this be true, then there would be no reason for requiring a specific objection in any case. But there is reason for requiring the particular objections to be stated with reasonable certainty; for in the hurry of a trial it cannot be expected that particular objections will occur to the judge, although, if stated, he would readily perceive their force. Counsel who are presumed to have studied the case ought to be able to state the particular objections, and if none are stated it is fair to assume that none exist, since an objection that cannot be particularly stated is not worth the making. The rule is a reasonable one, just to the court, and not burdensome to the parties; and it has been accepted as the law, at least since 1846. Branham v. Russell, 8 Blackf. 277; Stanley v. Sutherland, 54 Ind. 339; Shafer v. Ferguson, 103 Ind. 90, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 522; McKinsey v. McKee, 109 Ind. 209, and cases cited. Possibly there may be cases where a general objection should be deemed effectual; as, for instance, where it appears upon the face of a written instrument that it cannot under any conceivable theory be competent. But however this may be, a general objection cannot be regarded as sufficient in a case like this, where negligence is the issue. Upon such an issue a multitude of facts is often competent, and it is not just to expect that objections will occur to the mind of the trial court upon the bare statement of counsel that they object. But there is another phase of the general rule which makes it imperative on us to pronounce judgment against general objections, and that is this: only the specific objections stated to the trial court are available on appeal. A great number of cases affirm this doctrine. Wakeman v. Jones, 5 Ind. 454; Hyatt v. Clements, 65 Ind. 12; Evans v. State, 67 Ind. 68; City v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520; Indiana, etc., Co. v. Adamson, 15 N. East. Rep. 5. This doctrine necessarily implies that objections must be specific. RAILROAD NOT STOP ΤΟ SLACKE SPEED No attack is made on the instructions given by the court; but, on the contrary, they are highly commended by counsel. We are, therefore, not required to examine them except to ascertain whether they embrace the instructions asked by the appellant and refused by the court. Some of the instructions asked by the appellant are embraced in those given by the court, and others do not correctly express the law, and were for that reason properly refused. The eighth instruction asked by the appellant is not embraced in those given by the court; and, upon the facts of this case, does, in our judgment, state the law correctly. It reads thus: "Though a railroad company and the public have equal rights at the intersection of the track of the former with a public highway, those OBLIGED operating a train upon the railroad are under no obli- OR gations to slacken the speed of such train, or to bring the same to a stop, when they notice a person crossing, or about to cross the track at its intersection with the highway, but they may presume that such person will himself take all proper precautions to avoid injury." In a sense the rights of the traveller and the railroad company upon a highway crossing are equal. Neither has an exclusive right to use it, and both are bound to do what the law requires of them. The right of the company is, however, superior in one respect, and that is the right to the priority of passage. Of necessity this must be true, since it cannot be legally possible that trains must be brought to a halt at every highway crossing in order to allow travellers to cross. But we need not discuss the question, for it is put at rest by the authorities. Chicago, etc., Co. v. Boggs, 101 Ind. 522; s. c., 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 282; Railway Co. v. Phillips, 112 Ind. 59; and authorities cited. A traveller who approaches the highway is bound to know that he must yield precedence to the trains, and that he has no right to expect them to slacken speed, much less to stop and yield him priority of passage. This principle is settled beyond controversy. Railroad Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. Greene, ENGINEER MAY MAN ON TRACK 2 106 Ind. 279; s. c., 25 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 322; Railroad Co. v. Mann, 107 Ind. 89. Mr. Beach says of a traveller about to cross a railway track: "He must assume that there is danger, and act with ordinary care and circumspection upon that assumption." Beach, Cont. Neg. 191. Many cases are cited by this author declaring the duty of the traveller, and asserting that the company is under no obligation to stop its trains or to slacken their speed. Id. 198. Mr. Wood says: "The law does not require the speed of a train to be slackened when a team is seen approaching it." Ry. Law, 1330. This rule extends to persons on the track when there is nothing to indicate that they are not at liberty to leave it at will, if indeed, it does not go much further. PRESUME THAT We again quote from Mr. Beach: "It is to be presumed WILL STEP ASIDE. that a person of mature years will not stand still upon a railway track and deliberately suffer himself to be run down. It is also a presumption that all men are in possession of their senses, and will exercise ordinary diligence, in times of danger, to take care of themselves. It is, in accordance with these assumptions, held that when an engineer of a locomotive engine sees ahead of him a man upon the track, he may presume that the man possesses ordinary capacity; that he can see and hear and reason from cause to effect; and that, as a train approaches him, he will step aside, and not be run over." Beach, Cont. Neg. 394. We do not deem it necessary to refer to the cases, but we cite, as particularly applicable, the strongly reasoned case of Lake Shore, etc., Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 279, and refer to a few of our own cases: Palmer v. Railroad Co. (this term), and cases cited; Railroad Co. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179; s. c., 25 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 313; Terre Haute, etc., Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 286; s. c., 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 77, and authorities cited. It was the right of the appellant, under the evidence, to have the jury specifically instructed that its employees might presume that the appellee would use all proper precautions to avoid injury. There was nothing taking the case out of the general rule. There was no obstruction of the track. The train was in full view. There was nothing to indicate to the person in charge of it that the appellee was not a man of mature years, and at full liberty to leave the track at will. The train was not running rapidly; on the contrary, it was running slowly, for its speed was not greater than three or four miles an hour. There was no reason why the ordinary presumption should not prevail. There was no infirmity apparent in the appellee; nothing to indicate that he could not easily step from the track, and there was no indication that he would not protect himself by leaving the track before the train reached him. There was nothing, in short, to rebut the natural presumption that he would leave the track in time to avoid injury. Under such circumstances, the instruction was right in its state ment of the law, and was relevant to the issue and the evidence. The instructions of the learned judge who tried the case are unusually clear and vigorous, but on the point under immediate mention we cannot approve their statement of the law, and it is only to this point that we have critically examined them. The fifteenth instruction given by the court contains these statements: "Where a train is approaching, or is about to cross at a street crossing, it is the duty of the engineer to give sufficient signals of the approach of the train, by ringing his bell, or otherwise, as may be usual, and not unlawful, and also to approach such crossing at such a rate of speed as will enable him to check his train, if necessary. More than this cannot be required of the company, unless the engineer has actual knowledge or notice of special circumstances demanding special care; as, for example, knowledge by the engineer of a person on the track, under such circumstances as would make it seem uncertain to the engineer whether the person would get off or away from the track in time to avoid being struck by the train." The example given as illustrating the meaning intended to be conveyed by the court gives an erroneous effect to the entire instruction. It appears, therefore, that instead of giving the law as asked by the appellant, the court laid down an essentially different rule. It is unnecessary for us to express any further opinion upon this or any other instruction given by the court, and we refrain from doing so. Judgment reversed. Contributory Negligence at Crossings.-See Durbin v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., and note, post. INDIANA, BLOOMINGTON AND WESTERN R. Co. v. HAMMOCK. (Advance Case, Indiana. December 29, 1887.) The plaintiff was familiar with a certain railroad crossing, and was proceeding toward it along a public highway in a two-horse wagon, going in a northerly direction. The track was in plain sight of travellers going northward on the highway for a distance of 1000 to 1500 feet, until a point about ten rods from the crossing was reached, where the view was obstructed by a farm-house and buildings, and for the last three rods before going upon the track the railway was visible to a person looking to the east for a distance of eighty rods. The plaintiff testified that he looked to the east, but the approaching train was so near upon the wagon that he saw no means of escape. The evidence as to giving the signals was conflicting. In an action for an injury, caused by colliding with the train, held: 1. That the failure of the railroad company to perform its statutory duty in sounding the whistle cannot be held in legal contemplation to have been the efficient cause of the accident. 2. That persons who could have avoided injury by exercising the oppor tunity to look for the approaching train will be regarded as having made the attempt to cross after having seen the train approach. 3. That there is no presumption that a person injured on a highway and railway crossing, with which he was familiar, was himself free from negligence. Prima facie the fault was his own, and it is therefore essential that the proof should show that he was in the exercise of due care. APPEAL from a judgment of the Madison circuit court, Moss, J., against defendant in an action for damages for personal injury from negligence. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. New & Jones, Henry & Ryan, C. W. Fairbanks and Otto Gresham for appellant. Hernly & Brown and H. D. Thompson for appellee. FACTS. MITCHELL, Ch. J.-Oliver Hammock and his son-in-law, David Bohn, while going north over a public highway, standing in an open two-horse wagon, came in collision with a westbound freight train at the highway crossing of appellant company's line. Both were thrown from the wagon. Bohn was killed, and the appellee sustained serious bodily injury. This occurred between 9 and 10 o'clock, A. M. of September 15, 1884. In an action to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the railway company in failing to give the signals required by law, and for running its trains at an alleged immoderate rate of speed, the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment for $800. So far as appears from the evidence in the record, there does not seem to have been any delinquency imputable to the railway company, unless it was the failure of those in charge of its train to give the signals required by statute, upon approaching the highway crossing. Upon that subject the witnesses are in irrevocable conflict. All those connected with the running of the train, and two or three others, wholly disinterested, testify affirmatively and positively that the whistle was sounded at the required distance from the crossing, while others testify with equal assurance that it was not sounded until it was too late to avoid the collision which followed immediately. EFFECT OF FAIL- Fully recognizing the rule applicable to the issue involved, that affirmative evidence that an act was performed, or that a particular thing did occur, is entitled to more weight than merely GIVE negative evidence upon the same subject (Stitt v. Huidekoper, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 384; Steves v. Oswego & S. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 422; Whart. Neg. § 806), we are nevertheless of opinion that the finding of the jury in respect to the failure of the railway company to give the signals required cannot be said to be |