4. And it seems that, on such discov-
ery, Equity might compel the defend-
ants to deliver up to the plaintiff the
forfeited copies.
id.

5. But the defendants cannot be direct-
ly required to convict themselves of
the act which carries with it the for-
feiture.
id.

6. The objections which may be taken
by general demurrer to a bill found-
ed on a copyright, and seeking a dis-
covery in regard to its infringement,
in aid of a suit at law, are: (1.) That
the plaintiff sets forth no title in him-
self to the subject-matter of the copy-
right; and (2.) That the bill lays no
legal foundation for the discovery
sought.
il.

7. To obtain a discovery in Equity in
aid of a suit at law, the bill must
show it to be necessary for the
plaintiff, and that, when made, it can
"be used to his advantage.

id.

10. It seems, too, that such a bill is de-
fective in substance, where it seeks a
discovery from three defendants, and
the action at law is against only one
of them.
id.

11. Under § 15 of the Act of Septem-
ber 24th, 1789, (1 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 82,) the Courts of the United
States have power, on the applica-
tion of a party to an action, to re-
quire the production of books or
writings in the possession or power
of the adverse party, which contain
evidence pertinent to the issue, only
in cases and under circumstances in
which a Court of Chancery, by the
ordinary rules of proceeding in that
Court, would compel the production
of the same. Finch v. Rikeman,

301
12. The authority conferred by the
Act can be exercised, therefore, only

in cases where the relief might have
been had by a bill of discovery, and
as a substitute for that proceeding.

id.

13. Where, in an action at law for the
infringement of a patent, the plain-
tiff applied to this Court for an order
requiring the defendant to produce
his books, for the purpose of ena-
bling the plaintiff to establish there-
from the quantity and value of cer-
tain machinery made by the defend-
ant, which the declaration charged to
have been made in vioation of the
patent: Held, that the application
could not be granted, because the
direct consequence of the evidence,
if obtained, would be to subject the
defendant to a penalty under § 14 of
the Act of July 4th, 1836, (5 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 123,) and the plaintiff
had not relinquished his claim to the
penalty.
id.

DIVORCE.

See MARRIAGE, 2, 3.

DRAFT.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

DRAWINGS,

See PATENTS, 33 to 37, 88, 89, 139.

DUTIES.

1. The proviso to the 61st section of
the Act of March 2d, 1799, (1 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 673,) which declares
"that it shall be lawful for the Presi-
dent of the United States to cause
to be established fit and proper
regulations for estimating the duties
on goods, wares and merchandise
imported into the United States, in
respect to which the orginal cost
shall be exhibited in a depreciated
currency issued and circulated under
authority of any foreign Govern-
ment," is not repealed by the Act
of May 22d, 1846, (9 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 14,) which prescribes the
rates at which certain foreign coins
shall be estimated in computations
at the Custom House. Grant v.
Maxwell,
220

2. Notwithstanding the Act of May
22d, 1846, an importer of foreign
goods is entitled, under the proviso
to the 61st section of the Act of 1799
and the Treasury Instructions issued
for carrying the same into effect, to
enter his goods on paying duties only
upon their cash value in the country
of their purchase; and is entitled, in
order to fix that value, to have the
paper or nominal value at which they
were purchased and invoiced, re-
duced to its specie value in such
country at the time of the purchase,
and to enter the goods on that valu-
ation.
id.

3. Where goods were purchased in
Austria, in 1850, and imported into
New York, and the invoice and entry
set forth the purchase-price in paper
florins, and they were paid for in
paper currency, and it appeared that

the paper florin was depreciated in
Austria, at the date of the purchase
of the goods, below the value of the
silver florin, although it was the
legal currency in Austria, and was a
legal tender at its nominal value:
Held that, although the Act of May
22d, 1846, directed the florin of the
Austrian Empire to be estimated at
forty-eight and one-half cents, yet,
under the proviso to the 61st section
of the Act of 1799, and the Treasury
Instructions in regard to invoices
made out in a foreign depreciated
currency, the goods were chargeable
with duty only on their value in silver
florins, after allowing for the depre-
ciation.
id.

4. Where wool, the growth and pro-
duction of Buenos Ayres, was pur-
chased there for exportation to New
York, but, on account of the block-
ade of Buenos Ayres, was transport-
ed in lighters to Montevideo, and
shipped thence to New York: Held
that, under 16 of the Act of Au-
gust 30th, 1842, (5 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 563,) the costs and charges of
such transportation from Buenos
Ayres to Montevideo could not be
added as a part of the dutiable value
of the wool. Wilbur v. Lawrence, 314

5. The Tariff Act of July 30th, 1846,
(9 U..S. Stat. at Large, 42,) did not
vary the law previously in force regu-
lating the method of ascertaining the
quantity of merchandise imported.
Such quantity is still to be ascer-
tained by the rules prescribed in §§
58 and 59 of the Act of March 2d,
1799, (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 671,
672.) Wilson v. Maxwell,

316

6. Accordingly, where soap in boxes

was imported in 1850: Held, that
the dutiable weight was the gross
weight of the soap and boxes, de-
ducting only 10 per cent, as tare, as
prescribed by § 58 of the Act of
March 2d, 1799, and that the im-
porter was not entitled to an allow
ance of the actual weight of the
boxes as tare.
id.

7. But, the soap having been entered
at the Custom House at a valuation
based upon its net weight, after
deducting the actual weight of the

boxes, and the Custom-House valua-
tion, upon an allowance of only 10
per cent. on the gross weight as tare,
having exceeded the invoice valua-
tion by more than 10 per cent., and
the collector having then imposed
an additional duty or penalty of 20
per cent, upon the Custom-House
valuation, claiming that such penalty
was authorized, in consequence of
such excessive valuation, by § 8 of
the Act of July 20th, 1846, (9 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 43): Held, that the
penalty was illegally imposed. id.

11. And, if such property be in the
actual possession of the United States
at the time of such sale, and it be
taken from that possession by the
purchaser of it on such sale, the
United States are entitled to recover
its possession by an action of re-
plevin against such purchaser.
id.

12. Under the 16th section of the tariff
Act of August 30th, 1842, (5 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 563,) and the 8th sec-
tion of the tariff Act of July 30th,
1846, (9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 43,) it
is the duty of a collector to assess
duties upon the appraised value of
goods imported by their manufac-
turer, notwithstanding there is an
invoice sworn to by their owner.
Those sections are not confined to

"embd.

16. Where goods were described in
the invoice as "plain Indiana
squares," "embd. Indiana hdkfs.,"
"emb. Indiana shawls,"
hdkfs." and "plain do.," with no
allusion to the material of which
they were composed, and were de-
scribed in the entry as "worsted
and cotton shawls," and were re-
ported by the appraisers as
"wool
and cotton, and worsted and cotton
shawls, suitable for wear," and as
"worsted shawls, suitable for wear,"
and the protest under which duties
were paid on them described them
simply as "cotton and worsted
shawls," and they were subjected by
the collector to a duty of thirty per
cent. Held, in an action to recover
back the excess of duties paid be-

yond twenty-five per cent., there
being no evidence explaining the
character of the articles, that they
were properly chargeable with thirty
per cent., as being "articles worn by
men, women or children," and fall-
ing within Schedule C of the Tariff
Act of July 30th, 1846, (9 U. S. Stat.
at Large, 44.)
id.

17. Where the time of exportation is
taken by the appraisers as the time
of valuation, and the importer claims
that the time of manufacture or pro-
duction should have been taken, he
must make that a ground of protest,
and must give evidence to show the
incorrectness of the appraisal. Ordi-
narily, the two periods may properly
be treated as the same.

id.

18. Where goods are, on appraisal,
valued at more than ten per cent.
above the invoice price, they are,
nevertheless, not liable to an addi-
tional duty of twenty per cent, under
the 8th section of the Tariff Act of
July 30th, 1846, (9 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 43,) if they were manufac
tured by the importer, or were pro-
cured by him in the country of their
production otherwise than by pur-
chase.
id.

19. In an action to recover back duties
as having been illegally exacted, no
ground of objection to the payment
of the duties can be taken, which
was not specifically and distinctly
stated in a protest made at the time
of paying the duties. Durand v.
Lawrence,
396

20. Where the protest merely protest-
ed against the payment of the duty,
but stated no ground of objection":
Held that, on the trial of an action
to recover back the duty paid, the
plaintiff could not question the va
lidity or accuracy of the appraise-
ment on which the duties were paid.

id.

21. Where the invoice valuation of
goods imported by their manufactu-
rer is increased on appraisement by
more than ten per cent., the collector

26. A quantity of coal was invoiced
and entered at a certain weight and
price per ton. On appraisement, the
price per ton was reported to be
correct, but the quantity was report-
ed as so much greater as to make
the entire valuation greater by 10
per cent. than the entry valuation.
The collector exacted a penalty of
20 per cent., under § 8 of the Act of
July 30th, 1846, (9 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 43): Held, that this was ille-
gal. The Manhattan Gas-Light Co.
v. Maxwell,

405

27. Held, also, that the importer was
not liable, in such case, under § 4 of
the Act of July 30th, 1846, (9 U. S.

Stat. at Large, 43,) to pay the fees of
the weigher and measurer. id.

28. Where duties paid to a collector
are sought to be recovered back, on
the ground that the proceedings in
the Custom House, in initiating or
conducting an appraisement of the
goods on which the duties were paid,
were irregular, the irregularities re-
lied on must be set forth specifically
in the protest. Pierson v. Lawrence,

495

29. The law as settled in Thomson v.
Maxwell, (ante, p. 385,) in regard to
what is requisite in a protest against
the payment of duties, again applied.

id.

30. An accepted order for goods, al-
though a purchase in the usage of the
particular trade, as between vendor
and vendee, is not a purchase under
the 16th section of the Act of Au-
gust 30th, 1842, (5 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 563,) so as to authorize the
entry of the goods, when imported,
at a dutiable value fixed at the cur-
rent price of like goods at the time
the order was accepted, where the
goods are to be manufactured after
the acceptance of the order.

id.