The United States v. Reed. ticular person, would be unobjectionable. This seems to be the practice adopted in some of the State Courts. But it is supposed that the description attempted to be given of the persons accused, in the instance before us, and to which the oath refers, vitiates it. It is true, if this description had embraced one or more persons by name, whose cases were about to be laid before the grand jury, and in respect to which the oath was administered, and nothing more, the objection would have been well founded, so far as concerned evidence given in support of any accusation against others. It must then have been confined to complaints against the persons specified. But, in the case before us, the oath was not restricted to any specified number of persons mentioned, or to the single person named. The witnesses were sworn to give evidence touching charges against him and any other persons concerning whom they should be interrogated by the grand jury. And, if a general oath to give evidence touching charges against any and all persons concerning whom they might be thus interrogated, would be unexceptionable, of which we think there can be no doubt, it would seem difficult to maintain the objection made to the oath in this instance. It is no more general and unrestricted, as it respects the persons against whom complaints may be made before the grand inquest, in the one case than in the other, but applies to every complaint presented for examination. There are no authorities to be found in the English books upon this question; as the mode of proceeding before the grand jury in England, in finding bills of indictment, differs from the practice usually adopted in this country. There, the indictment is drawn by the proper officers before the case is presented for examination, and the witnesses are sworn in the particular case. Here, the initiation of the proceedings is by swearing the witnesses and sending them before the grand jury, and the bill is drawn after they have agreed upon it. There is no cause pending in Court, or even before the grand jury, in the legal sense of the term, at the The United States v. Reed. time the witnesses are sworn, and, in consequence, no title to the proceedings can properly be given, or be necessary to the validity of the oath. If the person to be accused before the grand jury is named, it is simply for the purpose of giving application to the oath, or to the evidence under it; and, as we have seen, this application has been regarded as sufficiently direct and explicit when the oath is administered generally, and as relating to all persons concerning whom charges are to be made before that body. Indeed, if the description of the case given to the clerk could be properly regarded as a title to the proceedings, in a technical sense, there might be some difficulty in maintaining the validity of the oath to these witnesses, as no such proceeding was then pending, in contemplation of law. An affidavit taken in a suit in which the title is given, is invalid if no such suit is pending. But, we do not regard the memorandum given to the clerk, as already referred to, in this case or in any other, even where the accused are all specially named when the oath is administered, as a title, within the technical meaning of that term, but, as used simply for the purpose of giving application to the oath and to the evidence to be given thereafter under it. And, as the oath may be general as it respects all persons who may be accused, it would seem to follow, necessarily, that the form in which it was administered in this case is not liable to any well-founded objection. Another ground taken in support of the motion to quash the indictment is, that there was no evidence laid before the grand jury tending to prove that Jerry was a person held to service in the State of Missouri, or that he was a fugitive from such service, at the time of his arrest and detention by the officer, or when the rescue took place, and that for this cause the indictment is founded on insufficient evidence, and, as it respects this fact, in the absence of evidence. The indictment contains two classes of counts, one embracing an averment of these facts, and the other omitting The United States v. Reed. this averment, and resting the counts upon a statement of facts showing that the magistrate had jurisdiction of the case, the issuing of the warrant, the arrest, &c. The affidavit upon which this ground for sustaining the motion is founded, charges the absence of this evidence before the grand jury upon information and belief only-a charge, as is obvious, that may be readily made by the accused in any case where an indictment has been found, and which, if maintainable on such an allegation, might devolve upon the public prosecutor and the Courts, in all cases, the necessity of going into the evidence before the grand jury, for the purpose of re-examining and revising the adjudication of that body; and this, without any authentic record of the evidence produced before them, or any means of arriving at that evidence. They are not bound to keep a record of the evidence taken before them, and are prohibited from disclosing their proceedings, and so, also, are all other persons who have access to or are permitted to participate in those proceedings. They are allowed by statute, in some of the States, to testify whether the evidence of a witness examined before them is consistent with or different from the evidence given by him before the Court, and also upon a complaint for perjury, or upon a trial for that offence, to disclose the testimony given by any such witness; and, perhaps, evidence in these cases might be given by them at common law and without the aid of the statute. It is even doubtful whether they will be allowed to disclose the fact that a bill of indictment was found by a less number than twelve of their body, the authorities being contradictory. (The King v. Marsh, 6 Ad. & Ell. 236; Low's Case, 4 Greenl. 439; Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 192; The People v. Iulbut, 4 Denio, 133; Regina v. Cooke, 8 Carr. & P. 582; The People v. Jewett, 3 Wend. 314; Wharton's Crim. Law, 129.) The rule is founded upon public policy, to guard against abuses that might arise from a disclosure of their proceedings to the accused, and to protect witnesses who may have given evidence before them, from being exposed to the ill-will and The United States v. Reed. resentment of parties indicted. The permission to disclose in the case of a complaint for perjury, or for the purpose of contradicting a witness, seems to remove every well-grounded objection to the rule. No case has been cited, nor have we been able to find any, furnishing an authority for looking into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof, or whether there was a deficiency in respect to any part of the complaint; and the grounds and reasons which we have briefly alluded to, account sufficiently for the absence of any such precedent. The unfitness and inconvenience of an inquiry into the evidence before the grand jury, in this ex parte and informal manner, afford, also, strong grounds of objection to any such practice. The re-examination and revision of the evidence before them, attempted to be established by ex parte statements, and upon the allegation of information and belief by interested parties, would necessarily lead to abuses in the administration of criminal justice, besides involving it in endless and profitless litigation. It presupposes improper, if not dishonest conduct, in the members constituting the body, and seeks to establish the fact in this loose and imperfect mode of arriving at the truth, and under circumstances in which the jurors themselves are precluded from vindicating their proceedings. For, it was well remarked by the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court in the case of The People v. Hulbut, (4 Denio, 133,) upon this subject, that "the evidence which the defendant proposed to give could amount to nothing less than an impeachment of the grand jurors. They had found a bill charging the defendant with five different offences, and the substance of the offer was to show that only one offence had been proved before them." "It cannot be proper," he further observed," to allow the jurors to be thus assailed. To permit the question to be tried over again in another place, whether The United States v. Reed. the indicting jurors had sufficient evidence or any evidence to warrant their finding, would be plainly contrary to the policy of the law, which, in everything that may affect the jurors themselves, has placed the seal of secrecy upon their proceedings." These remarks were made in a case where the evidence to impeach the proceedings was offered on the trial, a mode much less exceptionable in arriving at the truth, than upon ex parte affidavits. In the administration of criminal justice, confidence must be reposed somewhere; and it must be admitted that there are few bodies concerned in it that may be more safely trusted than the grand inquest of the county. They are selected for their intelligence, probity and character, from the whole body of the county. In the county of Erie, whence this jury were drawn, the list out of which it was selected is limited to the number of three hundred, in a population of some one hundred thousand; a fact that more strongly illustrates the high character and qualifications of the grand inquest of the county for the discharge of the important duties devolved upon them, than any remarks we could make. But, assuming that we may be mistaken in these views, there is another, which it is proper to notice, equally decisive of this motion. We have already stated that this indictment contains two classes of counts, and that one of them rests upon a statement of facts showing that the magistrate had jurisdiction of the case to issue the warrant, the issuing of the same, the arrest, &c. If this class of counts is well founded, and of which we entertain no doubt, then the indictment must be sustained, even conceding the absence of the evidence as alleged by the affidavits upon which the motion is founded. By section 6 of the Act of September 18th, 1850, (9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 463,) it is provided, that when a person held to service, &c., shall escape, &c., the person to whom such service is due, &c., may pursue and reclaim such fugitive, either by procuring a warrant from some one of the Courts, |