Henshaw . The Mutual Safety Ins. Co.

ments of the contract, set forth in the declaration, we think that no stronger form of stipulation can be necessary, to render it palpable that the underwriters intended, by their agreement, to insure all the interest, to the extent of $15,000, which should be owned in the vessel at the time of her loss within the policy, and to pay the loss to the plaintiffs for the benefit of the actual owners. The authorities are abundant to show that such a contract is legal, and that the plaintiffs, in their own right, or as trustees, are competent parties to enforce it. (Cox v. Parry, 1 T. R. 464; 2 Duer on Ins. 10, § 9; Id. 17, § 15; 1 Phillips on Ins. ch. 4, note a; The Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72; Buck v. The Chesapeake Ins. Co., 1 Peters, 151; Sutherland v. Pratt, 11 Mee. & W. 296.) If the suit is avowedly in the name of an agent, it is only necessary for the declaration to disclose who the real parties in interest are. (Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 259; 2 Duer on Ins. 48, § 30.) In this case, however, there is a positive averment that, at the time of the loss, the interest was in the plaintiffs, and that fact stands admitted by the demurrer.

It was conceded, on the argument, that a policy upon an interest to be acquired after the execution of the contract is valid. This is the ordinary, and, perhaps,,the most serviceable class of insurances. Cargoes can be purchased and laden from port to port, on trading voyages, under the protection of policies already in existence, without waiting for the means of obtaining satisfactory insurance after the interest is acquired. The same principle applies to the changeable proprietorship of vessels; and we have no difficulty in expounding the present policy as contemplating a succession. of ownerships in the steamer, and as intended by the underwriters to cover the interest in the vessel, in whomsoever it might be vested when a loss should occur. Such a contract, explicitly entered into, is, as we have already shown, recognized as valid both by the English and American law. (Rogers v. Traders' Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 583, 596; 2 Duer on Ins. 29, §§ 21, 22, 24; Id. 41, § 28; Id. 49, § 31; Hughes on Ins. 54, Am. ed. 42.)

The United States v. Parsons.

There would be no incongruity in this case in construing the policy as intending each separate trip of the vessel to be a distinct voyage, the risk on which would commence at its inception, because it is a time policy, in reference to a succession of voyages or passages, each of which is subject to its separate average. That interpretation of the contract would satisfy the formal rule indicated in some of the cases, that the insured must be interested at the commencement of the risk and at the time of the loss. (Seamans v. Loring, 1 Mason, 127; Hancox v. Fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 132, 140; Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co., 20 Pick. 259.) We are not, however, prepared to say that the propositions of law laid down in the cases just cited, necessarily flowed from the points involved in those cases. But, in our view of the present case, it is not important to scan the force of those decisions, as the defendants here are responsible upon their express undertaking, and not upon any liability implied from the relation of the parties or the subject-matter of the contract.

We think that the plaintiffs are not bound to set forth with more particularity the nature and extent of their trust. They aver that they are trustees, that the insurance was for them, and that they were interested in the vessel at the time of her loss. (Grant v. Howard Ins. Co., 5 Wend. 200, 202.) The amount of the interest and the value of the trust are matters of evidence only, when it becomes important to inquire into either of those facts.

Judgment for plaintiffs.

THE UNITED STATES VS. CHARLES H. PARSONS.

The 22d section of the Post-Office Act of March 3d, 1825, (4 U. S. Stat. at Large, 108,) which makes it an offence for any person to open any letter which shall have been in a Post-Office, or in the custody of a mail-carrier, before it shall be delivered to the person to whom it is directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence, and for any person to secrete, embezzle or destroy any

The United States v. Parsons.

such letter, does not look beyond a possession of letters obtained wrongfully from the Post-Office or from a mail-carrier.

After the voluntary termination of the custody of a letter by the Post-Office or its agents, the rights of the real proprietor of the letter are under the guardianship of the local law, and not of that of the United States.

Where a letter, mailed at Boston and directed to a person at New York, reached the Post-Office there, and was taken by a letter-carrier for delivery: Held that, under § 41 of the Act of July 2d, 1836, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 89,) such letter-carrier was a mail-carrier within § 22 of the said Act of March 3d,

1825.

But, the letter-carrier having given the letter to a person in the defendant's house, the defendant not being present, and not participating in the delivery, and that person having subsequently and at a different place delivered it to the defendant, and the defendant having opened it and embezzled money from it, it not being intended for him, but for another person of the same naine, the letter, however, not having come into the possession of the defendant within view of the letter-carrier, or with his knowledge, or while he remained at the place where he left it: Held, that the defendant was not liable to indictment under § 22 of the said Act of March 3d, 1825.

All action and authority of the Post-Office Department, in respect to the letter, terminated with its delivery to the third person, and § 22 of the Act applies only while the letter is within the power and control of that Department. Whether Congress has power to pass laws governing the conduct of persons in respect to letters which have been mailed, after such letters have become strictly disconnected from the Post-Office Department, quære.

(Before NELSON and BETTS, JJ., Southern District of New York, April, 1849.)

THE defendant was indicted under § 22 of the Post-Office Act of March 3d, 1825, (4 U. S. Stat. at Large, 108,) which provides that any person who shall open any letter or packet which shall have been in a Post-Office, or in custody of a mail-carrier, before it shall have been delivered to the person to whom it is directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into another's business or secrets, or shall secrete, embezzle or destroy any such mail, letter or packet, shall, on conviction, be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months.

At the trial, a special verdict was found by the jury, that a letter was put into the Post-Office at Boston, directed to Charles H. Parsons, at the city of New York, and containing another letter addressed to Ann M. Parsons; that in the

The United States v. Parsons.

letter were inclosed thirty-three dollars in bank bills; that the mailed letter reached the Post-Office in New York, was taken by a letter-carrier for delivery, and was given by him to a person in the house of the defendant, the defendant not being present, and not participating in the delivery; that that person subsequently, and at a different place, delivered it to the defendant; that the defendant opened both letters, and embezzled the money enclosed; that the letter addressed to Charles H. Parsons was not intended for the defendant, but for another person bearing the same name; and that the letters did not come into the possession of the defendant within view of the letter-carrier, or with his knowledge, or while he remained at the place where he left them.

Lorenzo B. Shepard, (District Attorney,) for the United States.

Alanson Nash, for the defendant.

BETTS, J. The facts found by the special verdict are within the letter of the statute. The letters had been in a Post-Office, and were opened, and their contents embezzled by the defendant, before they had been delivered to the persons to whom they were directed. The special verdict, however, raises the question, whether the intent and proper construction of the 22d section of the Post-Office Act of March 3d, 1825, embraces the case.

The 41st section of the Act of July 2d, 1836, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 89,) gives to persons entrusted with the delivery of letters the character of mail-carriers, within the meaning of the 22d section of the Act of 1825. Therefore, the letters in question in the present case, while in charge of such lettercarrier, are to be regarded as in the Post-Office, or in the custody of a mail-carrier. What, then, is the true import and force of the phrase, "shall have been in a Post-Office or in custody of a mail-carrier," and of the phrase, “before it shall have been delivered to the person to whom it is direct

The United States v. Parsons.

ed"? Are they of unlimited extent, covering every condition of a letter, until it reaches its rightful destination? To give the language this construction, would be to continue letters which had been once in the mail still under the power and control of the Federal Government, in every change and transfer from person to person and place to place, and without limitation of time. Legislation of such scope and extent would clearly not be in furtherance of the functions and duties of the Post-Office Department, but in protection of the private property of individuals, after it had become detached from that Department, and was wholly out of the charge of its agents. Such legislation would thus necessarily take the quality and form of a municipal regulation, governing the relations and responsibilities of individuals to each other, in respect to letters and their contents which had been in the Post-Office, although not obtained from the Post-Office or any of its agents, or in the possession of a party through any act of fraud or deceit against the Post-Office laws. And Congress would thus in effect be invested with the power to compel every person into whose possession a letter which had been in the Post-Office should come, to take upon himself the responsibility of carrying and delivering it to the person to whom it should be directed.

We think that the object of this 22d section does not look beyond a possession of letters obtained wrongfully from the Post-Office or from a letter-carrier. Its design is to guard the Post-Office and its legitimate agents in the execution of their duties, in the safe-keeping and delivery of letters. After the voluntary termination of the custody of a letter by the Post-Office or its agents, the property in and right of possession to it belong wholly to its real proprietor, and his rights are under the guardianship of the local law, and not of that of the United States.

The delivery of the letter in the present case by the lettercarrier was to a person at the house, as was supposed by both, of the person to whom it was directed. The defendant was not then at the house, and in no way participated in