sengers and luggage he is clothed, as regards the conveyance of the luggage, with the obligations and responsibilities of a common carrier of goods for hire, whether the hire is paid by the passenger or by some other person on his behalf or for his benefit. Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218; Marshall v. The York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Co., 11 Com. B. 655; 21 L. J., C. P. 24; Addison on Torts, Ch. 10, s. 1.

Every person who comes under the denomination of a common carrier is bound to accept and carry indifferently for all the Queen's subjects who are ready and willing to pay his customary and reasonable charges, provided he has room for the purpose, all such descriptions of goods as he publicly professes himself willing to carry; and when once his character of a common carrier is established, it follows, as a legal consequence, that he is an insurer of the goods entrusted to him to carry, and for which he is responsible in all events with the sole exceptions of loss or damage by the act of God, or the Queen's enemies.

With reference to this very extensive measure of responsibility, Lord Holt, in Coggs v. Bernard, observes: "The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king. For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is a politic establishment contrived by the policy of the law for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sorts of people

that they may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves, &c., and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon in that point."

As it is the purpose of this treatise to consider alone the liability of parties for negligence, it will not be expected that the rights and duties of common carriers should be further considered than is necessary to elucidate that liability.

At common law a common carrier is an insurer in all cases, except in those of loss or damage by the act of God, or the Queen's enemies. As regards the immunity from liability for injury arising from the act of God, such damages are to be included as arise from such uncontrollable phenomena as, without being necessarily either supernatural or preternatural, arise from such an interruption of the ordinary course of nature, as a prudent and an honest man cannot reasonably be expected to provide against or anticipate. By inevitable accident, commonly called the act of God, is meant any accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as a loss by lightning or storms, by the perils of the sea, by an inundation or earthquake, or by sudden death or illness. Story on Bailments, sect. 25. Lord Mansfield defined the act of God to mean "something in opposition to the act of man," such as "could not happen by the intervention of man, as

storms, lightning, tempests." Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term Rep. 33; Powell on Carriers, Ch. 6.

Respecting the immunity from liability where the loss arises from the Queen's enemies,-these must be understood as the inhabitants of a country with which this realm happens to be at war, and the exemption does not extend to losses sustained at the hands of ordinary robbers or other criminals of this country, except in the case of pirates, who (as it is said) being the enemies of all mankind, are upon the footing of the commonly understood enemies of the Queen. In Palmer v. Naylor and others (8 Ex. 739; 23 L. J., Ex. 327), it was held, that a robbery by a crew, who murdered their captain, was an act of piracy, within the meaning of a policy of insurance against piracy.

If the consignor has been guilty of any fraud or unfair concealment of facts towards the carrier, so that his risk has thereby been increased, the latter will not be liable. As, where a man hid a hundred pounds of money in some hay in an old nail bag, and delivered it to a common carrier to be carried to a banker, and the money was lost, it was held, that the carrier was not responsible for the loss, as the consignor had neglected to inform him of the exceeding value of the bag, and had thereby prevented him from taking proper care of it. Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298. Again, where the consignor concealed a quantity of guineas in an ordinary brown paper parcel tied with a string (Clay v. Willan, 1 H. Bla. 298), and a number of sovereigns in a packet of tea (Bradley v. Waterhouse, 3 C. & P. 318),

and several hundred pounds' worth of bank notes and gold in an ordinary schoolboy's box, and the money so sent was lost by the way,-it was held, that the carrier was not responsible for the loss. Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald. 37; Mayhew v. Eames, 3 B. & C. 601. See also Bradley v. Waterhouse, Moo. & Mal. 154. "If," says Lord Mansfield, in Gibbon v. Paynton (supra), "the owner of the goods has been guilty of a fraud upon the carrier, such fraud ought to excuse the carrier."

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A bare concealment, however, of the contents of a package, or even a distinct refusal to disclose its contents, will not absolve the carrier from liability. In Walker v. Jackson (10 Mee. & Wel. 168), Parke, B., said: “I take it now to be perfectly well understood, according to the majority of opinions upon the subject, that if anything is delivered to a person to be carried, it is the duty of the person receiving it to ask such questions about it as are necessary; if he ask no questions and there be no fraud to give the case a false complexion in the delivery of the parcel, he is bound to carry the parcel as it is. It is the duty of the person who receives it to ask questions; if they are answered improperly, so as to deceive him, then there is no contract between the parties; it is a fraud which vitiates the contract altogether." It must not, however, be supposed that if the consignor refuse to disclose the contents of a package, the carrier is either absolved from responsibility for negligence or can refuse to carry it. Crouch v. The London and North Western Railway Co., 14 Com. B. 255 ; 23 L. J., C. P. 73.

To render a carrier liable for the loss of goods, it must be affirmatively shown that they were delivered to and accepted by him; and if a delivery and an acceptance have been duly made, the carrier's liability commences from that moment. In such a case the delivery to an authorized agent is of course sufficient, and if any question arise as to the actual delivery or the authority to accept, it is one for the decision of a jury. Griffiths v. Lee, 1 C. & P. 110; Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. & Kir. 61; Quigger v. Duff, 1 Mee. & Wel. 174; Selway v. Holloway, 1 Ld. Raym. 46; Gilbert v. Dale, 5 Ad. & Ell. 543.

Upon this subject the 5th section of the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 68 (The Carriers' Act), enacts: "That "for the purposes of this act every office, warehouse or

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receiving house which shall be used or appointed by "any mail contractor, or stage coach proprietor or other "such common carrier as aforesaid for the receiving of

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parcels to be conveyed as aforesaid, shall be deemed "and taken to be the receiving house, warehouse or "office of such mail contractor, stage coach proprie"tor or other common carrier; and that any one or "more of such mail contractors, stage coach proprietors

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or common carriers shall be liable to be sued by his, "her or their name or names only; and that no action or "suit commenced to recover damages for loss or injury "to any parcel, package or person shall abate for the "want of joining any co-proprietor or co-partner in "such mail, stage coach or other public conveyance by "land for hire as aforesaid."