upon the formula of "private enterprise" to which the Committee alludes, but to free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known, and which alone will maximize the energies of the people. Even more, the conclusion of a treaty of peace which would permit the reopening of the channels of trade and commerce to make available essential raw materials to feed the production lines, world markets to absorb the finished products, and food to sustain working energy. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a notebook. I wonder whether or not we could not receive that notebook. You have been reading from it as part of this record.

Mr. VINCENT. That notebook, sir, contains scratched out places and everything else. I would rather keep it to myself, because I have taken practically everything there is out of it. I would prefer to keep it to myself, as my own notes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been reading from it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you do not want the notebook made part of the record?

Mr. VINCENT. I have made all of it that I want to as part of the record, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you let the committee have the notebook for study, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. If I do not need it, I have no objection. But I would rather not have it in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman, I think, was asking for it not to be made as part of the record, but asking for it just as the committee asks for certain other papers to be examined.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel can look at the notebook and may decide on more questioning, if he does.

We will now recess. Is there any particular time to reconvene?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Tuesday at 10 o'clock is the date, Mr. Chairman. Senator FERGUSON. We will now recess until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12: 40 p. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952, the hearing was recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 5, 1952, at 10 a. m.)

APPENDIX I

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL: The following correspondence from the President to the Vice President and attachments thereto are for automatic release at 7:00 p. m., E. D. T., Sunday, September 23, 1951. No portion, synopsis, or intimation may be published or broadcast before that time.

PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION OR ANNOUNCEMENT

JOSEPH SHORT. Secretary to the President.

The Honorable the VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

SEPTEMBER 22, 1951.

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with certain documents, which I recently received from Mr. Henry A. Wallace.

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944, and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its committees. I am there

fore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you deem appropriate.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

FARVUE, SOUTH SALEM, NEW YORK, September 19, 1951.

Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN,

President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the last three weeks there has been considerable newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition you care to make of it the complete file of my reports to President Roosevelt on my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the United States.

The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part of various individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to China but China, where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were contained in two related documents:

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China, on June 26, 1944, but which, because of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first part being a quick résumé of the political situation in China and of my talks in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and the second part, a résumé of the military situation, its implications and requirements.

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944.

These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recommendations of mine resulting from the trip. Mr. Vincent, of course, transmitted to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Department White Paper.

There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Lattimore, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or the formal report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political advice any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of a common interest such as the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes with the settled peasantry.

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi. In Kuoming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presentation and in response to Chinag Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I

decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted, and concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was disturbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections. Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28.

On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican places on the Export-Import Bank Board.

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most important contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that China be separated from the command of General Stillwell, that General Wedemeyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China, and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of "Personal representative" of the President of Chungking. The name and record of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recommendations was the opposite of pro-Communist.

Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared the terrible enfeeblement resulting from the disasters, the chances are good the Generalissimo would have been ruling China today.

The political section of Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the Japs," and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China, but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war." Chiang Kai-shek for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of ChiangKai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand," I was, of course, warning against the possibility of a Communist political triumph in China.

The July 10 report does not recommend any political coalition between the government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinest communists. It was written, however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all positions of political, military, and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely driven from power that Dr. T. V. Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had been dismissed from all command some months before. These factors are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant” that

"T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the Generalissimo) except as interpreter," while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July 10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead President Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the "progressive banking and commercial leaders," the "large group of western trained men," and the "considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I urged President Roosevelt to help the Genelarissimo's government to help itself, by bringing back to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their own feet, were somewhere more independent of the Generalissimo than the extreme pro-Asia groups. Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roosevlt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist government, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity," and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administration. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short my proposed means of avoiding the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control and Dr. Soong and General Chen Chang were brought back to power by the Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to President Roosevelt.

Such were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in 1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roosevelt of July 10 as presented by me to him.

Wishing you health and strength in shouldering the tremendous burdens ahead, Mrs. Wallace joins me in asking you to convey to Mrs. Truman and Margaret our best regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

H. A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

SUMMARY REPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S VISIT IN CHINA Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province. The Governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent (90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension between Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang.

There seems little reason to doubt that the difficulties in the early spring on the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle Kazak nomads who fled into Outer Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer Mongolia stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for Chinese bombings in Outer Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding the situation now.

88348-52-pt. 7- -20

Soviet officials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their difficulties in Sinkiang but our Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willing or unwittingly. Sinkiang is an area which will bear close watching.

Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for 2 hours at the large 20th Bomber Command (B-29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese.

Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were: (1) Adverse military situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo; (2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and requested our good offices in arranging for conference); (3) Chinese GovernmentCommunist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced against the Communists that there seems little prospect of satisfactory or enduring settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in Chungking; (4) Dispatch of the United States Army Intelligence Group to north China, including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much indication of personal interest.

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something. "dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that is was "five minutes to midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half year.)

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated discouragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership in China. Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack of popular support for government; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace to speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China. Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for leadership but the fact that he is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential front for liberals.

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under whom he thought a liberal coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent but not a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself into a race against time; that new hope and help before the end of the year might be effective in holding things together.

Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist. General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-communist, is influential as a political rather than a military general. Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives which he is endeavoring to bring under his control to prevent their becoming a liberalizing social influence.