Mr. VINCENT. No; I mean this: From the best that I can recall, the attitude in the State Department at that time was not to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese in coming to an agreement. Therefore, it could have been put in a telegram quite easily. I have asked that I would like to refresh my memory with the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago, when you used the phrase "it might have been", as referring to words of approval of such mediation, were you discussing that as a possibility or as a probability, or as a likelihood, or were you discussing it merely as something which theoretically could have happened, all other considerations aside?

Mr. VINCENT. I was discussing it as something that would have been a logical position to take in the State Department at that time, that it was not desirable to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember saying that this message in response to Hurley's telegram might have approved his mediation, might have told him to go on with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall making that testimony, Mr. Sourwine. If I did, it is incorrect, because I said it approved the idea of discussing the matter with Soong, and expressed appreciation, if I can recall it at all, of getting these five points. But so far as I can recall, it did not approve the idea of mediating.

Mr. SOURWINE. All that concerned me was the semantics problem. We have a record here which is full of your saying "this might have been" or "that might have been." I wanted to find out clearly whether, when you used that phrase, you meant something which in your opinion was likely, something which in your opinion was logical under the circumstances.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you have meant here when you used that phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. That it was logical?

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say "it might have happened," did you mean that to you it seemed logical under the circumstances?

Mr. VINCENT. That Hurley would have been advised not to mediate. Mr. SOURWINE. At any time when you used that phrase, you used it to mean something that to you was logical?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And something that you did not know did not occur?

Mr. VINCENT. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the text of a cable to Ambassador Hurley in August of 1945, signed by Grew, conveying the idea or instruction that Hurley was not to advise, mediate, or otherwise assist in Chinese-Russian negotiations?

Mr. VINCENT. In August 1945? I do not recall any such telegram. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall such a cable at any time prior to August 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just recalled this cable that we are speaking of here, the exchange of cables which took place in the spring. Mr. SOURWINE. Was that signed by Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know whether it was signed Grew or not without seeing the telegram, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Byrnes was Secre

tary of State at that time, and if Byrnes was there it would have been signed by Byrnes. If Mr. Grew was acting, it would have been signed by Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or approval of that cable?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I have said that I don't recall the telegram, and therefore I can't say whether I had anything to do with the preparation of it. I just don't recall those circumstances. I do the earlier one, but I don't recall this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was composed by Under Secretary Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would be unable to testify further with regard to it unless we can get the document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have an opportunity or means for refreshing your memory by access to the document, other than through this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I could ask the State Department if they would let me see the telegram, if you will give me the date of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Áll I can ask you about is a cable on or before August of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. That could easily have been the telegram we have been discussing, if it is on or before August. It could be the one of the spring we have just discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was one in the spring and there was none later, that is what this committee would like to establish. If there was a telegram in the spring and a reiteration of the policy later in response to a specific request from Hurley, that is what the committeewould like to establish.

Have you any thought of what the fact might be in that regard? Mr. VINCENT. My thought would be that when you are speaking of this telegram, we are speaking of the same telegram, just on a knowledge that by the 8th or the 10th of August the Sino-Soviet agreement or treaty had already been signed, or maybe the 15th of August. But the first half of August the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed, and there would be no need for mediation then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your best recollection is that there was only one such cablegram?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in the spring of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you advised about sending that cable? Mr. VINCENT. The one I have testified to originally?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I knew about that exchange.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise against mediation or Hurley having anything to do with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably would have advised against mediation. I have no distinct recollection of whether I advised or not, but I knew it was the policy in the State Department at that time not to interfere in these negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. We thought it was better for the Russians and the Chinese to work out their own arrangement. I had no knowledge at that time

Senator FERGUSON. You said you were violently opposed to what happened to China. Notwithstanding that, you were against any change?

Mr. VINCENT. At the moment of this telegram, Senator, I had no knowledge of the Yalta agreement. I didn't have any knowledge of the Yalta agreement until June or early July, just before Potsdam. There were presumably other officers in the State Department who did know about the Yalta agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the message in May had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. If it was in May-it would be earlier than that, I think, because I think Soong himself was already advised. This was early in spring, or May.

But to answer your question, it is that the message at that time had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement. It was a plan of Soong's, as I recall it, to go to Moscow to discuss with them, at a time when I was ignorant, and I believe Soong was ignorant, of the existence of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to mediation: would such a question of policy, established at that time, with regard to mediation, necessarily have controlled at a conference subsequent and after it had been made necessary by the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it would, sir. You mean after the Yalta agreement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. We had ourselves so completely, you might say, laid down a line for China to follow that it would have, to my mind, altered the situation completely.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it did, in fact, control, and that policy was adhered to and persisted in, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Susumu Okano?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess, and convene again at 1 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 11: 15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, the last question asked before the recess was whether you knew Susumu Okano, and you replied "No." Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is or was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Susumu Okano is a Japanese Communist leader. Did you, Mr. Vincent, know that Susumu Okano had been flown from China to Japan after the conclusion of hostilities in the Japanese war?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having knowledge of that; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you have to do with the preparation or approval of a paper entitled "The United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan"?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to these notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir [reading]:

Mr. Dooman, before this committee in September, discussed the policy entitled "The United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan." He said that this paper was adopted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 29, 1945, but that the paper had been reported reopened prior to its release on the 22d of September by the White House.

Actually, the records show that the paper was reviewed by the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC, of which Mr. Dooman was chairman, not by SWNCC itself, on August 29, and the paper was not finally adopted by the top-level over-all SWNCC committee until August 31, 1945.

Both Mr. Dooman and I attended this meeting on August 31, although it was Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, who officially represented the State Department.

Mr. Dooman has placed particular significance on the fact that he had retired as chairman of the Far East Committee and had been replaced as chairman by me prior to September 6, when the paper was approved by the President.

His principal charge was that I had primary responsibility for this paper and that certain important changes were made in it following its approval during the last days of his tenure as chairman of the Far East Committee.

In connection with these statements, Mr. Dooman had read into the record several paragraphs taken from this document which he said subsequently were used as the basis of work undertaken to destroy and eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

When asked by Senator Eastland whether this was the work of John Carter Vincent, Mr. Dooman replied that I was chairman of the Far East Subcommittee at the time, and the implication clearly was that I had instigated the changes in this important document that would pave the way for communism in Japan.

First, I wish to inform the committee that the paragraphs which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes were not written by me. Secondly, I am prepared to testify here on the basis of an examination of the record that the language which Mr. Dooman implied had been changed following his resignation as chairman of the subcommittee was not changed, but, in fact, appeared in the document when it was before the subcommittee under his chairmanship on August 29, and again when it was approved at a meeting of SWNCC which he attended on August 31.

Finally, I would like to show that the paragraph read by Mr. Dooman, far from being intended to destroy capitalism in Japan, was an expression of general policy to foster the peaceful and democratic development of Japan's postwar economy.

Here is the language from the document entitled, "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan," which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes made in the paper after its adoption in the last days of August 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SURREY. We have the document that was released on September 22.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade To this end it shall

be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for place of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic efforts solely toward peaceful ends; and

"(b) To favor the program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry."

I should like to refer to a photostatic copy of the press release of United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan, dated September 22, 1945. Beginning at the bottom of page 4, under the heading of "Promotion of democratic forces," the first sentence reads:

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis.

Immediately following this sentence appears the first sentence quoted by Mr. Dooman:

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Following this sentence there appears another important sentence which Mr. Dooman did not Lee fit to use in this quotation. I shall quote it here because I believe that the entire substance of the paragraph which he has quoted relates very closely to this sentence. The sentence reads:

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activities in support of military ends.

The remainder of the language quoted by Mr. Dooman then follows.

I do not place special significance on the fact that Mr. Dooman did not quote in full from the document, but I think it is important that the committee have the full text. What is of utmost importance for this committee to know is that this very language which Mr. Dooman alleged was changed, in fact appeared in this document as early as mid-August 1945, and remained unchanged when released by the White House September 22, 1945.

I have reviewed the changes made in the document. The changes made in the document subsquent to its approval on August 29 by the subcommittee, chairmaned by Mr. Dooman, were:

1. In the first paragraph headed "Purpose of this document" minor changes were made by the subcommittee after I became chairman, but these changes were made at the request of the SWNCC committee at the meeting at which Mr. Dooman and I were both present, that is the meeting on August 31.

For example, the original document contained the clause, "Following Presidential approval", and the revision made by the committee, of which I was chairman, read: "It has been approved by the President."