across the Pacific, and over $150 billion. We won our object of establishing a free and independent China. Now we have lost it-lost not only what we fought for and won but more. We're much worse off than we were on December 7, 1941. Much criticism has arisen in the United States regarding this peacetime defeat. The State Department, feeling itself under attack, has published a white paper. most papers of that kind are published by one government vis-à-vis other governments, in which, naturally, they set forth everything in the best light possible. But this paper is one that is directed internally. It's pointed to the people of the United States. When the lawyer consults with his own side he necessarily must not, or should not, hide or blink any of the facts. In the letter of transmittal of this paper to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State includes this statement: "That nothing that this country did or could have done affected this result. Nothing that this country failed to do contributed to it in any way." This statement adds up to the fact that we have suffered a catastrophic defeat, but we did not contribute to it, that we were not at fault in the least particular. I quote this statement of view because if it should be literally accepted, if it is true, then, it is not much use for us to try to find means of doing something in the Far East under the conditions that now exist. Because if we, in fact, did not help bring this thing about, if, in fact there was nothing we could do when the Nationalists were on top, which they were 22, 3 years ago, then what can we do now? My feeling is that before we resign ourselves to such a state of helplessness we must look into the picture of of what brought this on, of how it came about, of our commitments and obligations, in order to determine what we could do or should do, or must do at this time, late as it is. An examination of what has taken place is necessary but we must do more than merely to look in the past. In Europe we looked into the past and we looked into the future. Can we in the Far East afford to be like the fabulous "futalive" bird which always flew backward in order that he could always see where he had been, and not look where he was going. We will have to look back first to seek the answers to some of the questions I have raised. We go back to 1922. Most people consider that World War II had its genesis in the seizure of Manchuria by Japan in 1931. With this I agree, but we must go back a little further for the foundations of the situation which led the Japanese to its seizure. World War I came to be declared to be a war to end all wars. After it was over, peace and justice were to reign without support of power and force. Along that line, the United States, which you might say at that time was first entering its position as being a world power, exerting influence all over the world-we were novices, there was much we didn't know, there was much idealism-proposed scrapping half our Navy. The ratio of our naval strength to that of Japan was about 10 to 3. We said, "Well reduce it to 5 to 3." Even that the Japanese didn't want to accept. They said, "If we agree to such a fixed disparity we will forever more be at the mercy of the United States." They said "You, as well as the British, must agree to the nonfortification, nondevelopment of all bases in the western Pacific." So we said, "We can agree to that except that it would leave China at your mercy." They replied, "Oh, no! we will guarantee by solemn treaty to respect the integrity and welfare of China." So we bought this treaty of nonaggression against China with a quid pro quo of scrapped ships that would cost over a billion dollars at this time, and thereby we sacrificed a balance of power that had been a major controlling force in east Asia. There are many people who even yet condemn the "balance of power" principle. Many even say that World War I was caused by it. World War I came in spite of it. Balance of power is an instrument of peace and justice and freedom, properly used. Balance of power is something that applies domestically, as Well as internationally. You have a police force that's balanced to meet the incidence of and inclination toward crime. If you withdraw your police force, as happened in the Boston police strike in 1919, the criminal elements, the rowdy elements, the hooligans, take charge. They are the minority but they take charge. On the other hand, if you have too large a police force, you get a police state. You can overbalance it either way. The balance of power that we had exercised for over 20 years in eastern Asia had prevented unrestrained aggression by Russia and Japan, in turn. They had taken some parts of China, but they were kept from taking north China by the international balance of power, the main element of which was provided by the United States. We gave that up. I am not so much concerned about the limitation of the Navy, but by the reduction of our power, which caused an unbalancing of power in the western Pacific and laid the foundation for the seizure of Manchuria, for World War II, for Pearl Harbor. China, at this time, was going through very strenuous rebirth pains. Sun Yat-sen had died in 1925. Chiang Kai-shek had taken over. He was making much headway toward unifying China, educating China, eliminating communism-making great progress in spite of the Japanese attack and the Japanese partial closing of the "open door." He kept going ahead, improving, headed hopefully toward an eventual restoration of a balance of power through the strengthening of China itself. But Japan was not going to let any such thing happen, and in 1937, as you know, she attacked China in the so-called incident. Chiang Kai-shek, the unifying force, the motivating force of China, held China against this totalitarian attack for 4 years after the invasion started. Mind you, France in 1940 had folded after 2 months of invasion. I'm not talking about France-I'm only answering the criticisms of those who feel very critical of what the Chinese don't do now and what Chiang Kai-shek doesn't succeed in doing now. After 4 years of this one-sided struggle came Pearl Harbor. We came into the war. When we did so a major problem confronting us was keeping Great Britain, Russia, and China in the war. We gave Great Britain $31 billion worth of lend-lease, Russia, $11 billion, China $1 billion-we couldn't get more to China. But in spite of the meagerness of help, China held on for 4 years more-once more, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, good or as bad as it might be-only to end up in 1945 confronting a dangerous enemy that had been built up in China's midst-communism. Now I must go back to indicate how communism got there. After World War I a few Communists had trickled into China. Sun Yat-sen, recognizing that the big problem was that China must be westernized and would require western help in the way of men and money and materials of every kind, sought help in the United States and in Western Europe. He could not get it and, at the suggestion of Russian agents, in China at the time, he brought in a Russian mission. That is the way that communism got started in China. The mission was there from 1923 to 1927, under the direct orders all the time of Moscow as to the development of the Communist movement in China and in detail as to what they should do. In those days, Russia feared Japan. As a counter against Japanese power Russia wanted a fairly strong China. The Chinese Communists were directed to enter the Kuomintang under whatever terms they could arrange with Sun Yat-sen. This they did. Of interest is that the Trotskyites, who were in China as well as Russia, opposed this Moscowdirected policy. They did not want to compromise even in the small degree of joining the Kuomintang-they were all purged on Moscow orders. But in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek decided he could not go along with communism any longer. He evicted the Russian mission, he liquidated many of the Chinese Communists. Those that escaped bedded down in Kwangsi Province in south China. If the Japanese had not attacked in 1937, he would probably eventually have ended communism because there were not too many Communists in China. However, in 1934, in a celebrated trek, the Communists moved from Kwangsi to north China, Shensi Province, where they were to be close to Russia and could get Russian help and Russian guidance. They were not then spread over north China, and they were not, of course, in Manchuria, which was controlled by Japan. On their invasion of China, the Japanese occupied the railroads and the cities but did not try to occupy the pockets in between. The Nationalist armies fell back to the westward while the Communists infiltrated into the vacated pockets no longer susceptible to Nationalist control, developed their cells, developed their guerrilla warfare groups, throughout north China during this period of 1937 to 1945. During part of the war, particularly around 1942 when Russia was still weak, under Russian direction the Chinese Communists fought the Japs. In the latter part of the war, when Russia was stronger and Japan was approaching defeat, the Communists fought the Japs only intermittently and just enough to support their claim for American arms. At this juncture, a number of our representatives in China, including Mr. Wallace, said that the Communists were fine people, that they were the regenerative power for China, that they must be brought into the Chinese Government. Some of our people even went so far as to say that the United States should get aboard the Communist bandwagon. General Hurley was our Ambassador to China. He first thought that we could do business with the Communists. Later he changed his mind, but some of his subordinates did not change their minds. He had them detached. But they went to Washington, returning to duty in the State Department itself, and were there in a position to issue directives guiding General Hurley himself. As you know, General Hurley resigned and was replaced by General Marshall. General Marshall brought with him to China the statement of policy of the United States, which was that the United States desired to rehabilitate China, to restore it to prosperity, establish a unified, peaceful, strong China, under a government composed of all elements. And, of course, the major element outside of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party itself, was the Communist element. This policy went on to say that the United States stood ready to assist any government so constituted. Of course, the Communists would never have a government so constituted except on their own Communist terms. China had ended the war with its armies in the south, the economy disrupted by 8 years of war, no transportation, no merchant marine, no navy. She had to handle all the jobs of rehabilitating, of receiving the surrender of the Japanese armies throughout China, had to try to reestablish the economy, try to take over areas that had fallen into Communist hands during the war, all in a very short space of time. We helped them somewhat. We equipped some of their armies. We transported some of their troops north. We helped feed some of the famine areas such as Hunan in central China. But we contributed to the infliction on China of a very serious situation in Manchuria. There were no Communists in Manchuria at the end of the war, except the Russians. Manchuria was a great arsenal. The industrial capacity of Manchuria is much greater than that of all of China. At Yalta, as you know, we had agreed to Russia's taking over certain parts of Manchuria-the railroads and to a certain extent Dairen and Port Arthur. Just before VJ-day, we more or less directed the Chinese to negotiate a formalizing treaty with the Russians, which they did, in early August 1945. We said-and I quote again from the white paper-we said that in the treaty being negotiated between the Chinese and the Russians, the agreements established in Yalta must be followed, no more, no less. The treaty that was negotiated guaranteed sovereignty in Manchuria to the Nationalist government, including sovereignty over Darien and over all Manchuria. So, it's hard to see how we were not a party to it. Of course, the treaty was never observed by the Russians. There's been much criticism of the strategical error of the Nationalist government in entering Manchuria. But the Nationalists faced a dilemma. The Communists were not yet in Manchuria. If the Nationalists did not go immediately to take over this, their own area, the Communists would, and would come into possession of Japanese arms and ammunition and arsenals. So, if the Nationalists went to North China and not to Manchuria they would allow to fall to the Communists in Manchuria, a supply of arms and ammunition to carry on the war. Naturally the Nationalists rushed to Manchuria. But what the Russians were doing at that time was ostensibly patting the Nationalist government on the back with one hand, while with the other hand they were beckoning the Communists to make all haste to come in and occupy Manchuria themselves. That this was going on was reported at the time by our Embassy in Moscow to our Government-according to the white paper. General Marshall, as the President's special envoy, operating under the directive of the State Department, and making a strong effort to solve the situation by bringing the Communists into the Government found himself confronted with Communist negotiators who needed to stall for time to build up and arm their armies and to get their armies into Manchuria. From time to time, as hostilities continued the Nationalist armies succeeded in placing an effective squeeze on the Communists. At such times the Communists would dangle forth hopes of their coming into the Government under the proposed conditions, and General Marshall would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to accept a truce. This happened a number of times. Since then Chiang has made the observation that he. Chiang Kai-shek, had made many blunders, but that the greatest blunder that he had made was when he was persuaded to stay his hand when he was winning. As I have said, the arms and ammunition of the Japanese, and the arsenals in northern Manchuria were being passed over to the Communists. At the same time we, whose declared policy was to avoid participation in fratricidal warfare in China-which was a controlling policy, you might say-declared an embargo on ammunition to the Nationalists. During the war we had armed and equipped 30 divisions, trained them, had American advisors for them, in order to fight the Japs. They were the best Chinese divisions. They were equipped with American arms, required American ammunition. General Marshall himself observed to me, at the time we declared this embargo, that we had armed the Chinese and then we had disarmed them. These factors had a decisive effect on the situation during the critical years of 1946 and 1947. The Chinese had some inept leadership. There was some corruption, it is true. Much has been said about the corruption. Who is free from corruption? Probably the Chinese are somewhat on a par with the Greeks. We decided to help Greece. We found that the help we gave them-materials, the financial help was not sufficient. We had to send advisory help. In any country of this kind the most important help that we can send is men-men of experience, ability, force, integrity. Such advisors are able to place a premium upon performance, on efficiency, and on honesty, of the best Chinese or best Greeks, and at the same time to put a damper on nonperformance and dishonesty. The furnishing of advisory help is the one thing that we have not done at any time. We withheld help for China for a long time, but finally passed an act in 1948, providing military help which began to arrive in China in November, 1948, when the battle was practically over. But even that act had the string tied on it that there should be no advisory help-added to the House bill by the Senate at the State Department's behest. Another thing I might mention is the frequently asserted "billions poured down the rathole to help the Chinese fight the Communists but it didn't do any good." Included in the claim of "billions" is UNRRA. UNRRA went to relieve the destitution left by the war, and also to feed the hundreds of thousands of refugees that moved ahead of the Communist advance, wherever it took place. I helped feed 300,000 in Tsingtao. When the Nationalists advanced there was no movement ahead of them. When the Communists advanced many were driven out and much of the UNRRA supplies had to go to feed them and to feed famine districts. Some of it actually went to feed the Communists. With my planes I dropped a million pounds in the Communist area, an operation arranged with the Nationalist permission. It was all taken by the Communist armies and did not any of it go to the destitute for whom it was intended. We know that. The State Department knows that. Acually, what we have contributed to fight the Communists, is less, in my opinion, than the contributions made to fight the Communists in Greece. The white paper states that "We could not extend the same kind of help to China that we did to Greece because China was many times bigger"-therefore, though it was right for Greece, it was wrong for China. I personally consider that effective help to China was never in conflict with what we did in Europe. It was complementary to it. If we put $10 billion to stop communism, which we have done, it's better to expend it both in Europe and in Asia, mostly, maybe, in Europe. Our efforts in Europe would have been reenforced and supported if we had wisely directed purposeful help to China. So, the Communists moved on. They have taken over most of China. I'm convinced they could have been stopped in 1946 and 1947 if we had provided ammunition and advisory help. General Wedemeyer is convinced of that. Many, both in the military and outside of the military, have considered that if we had committed ourself to a definite objective, and supported it as we had in Greece, the fall of China to the Communists did not need to take place. The Communists will probably take over practically all of China-mainland China. There will be a question about Formosa. Communism will probably move on to the borders of Burma and Indonesia. The letter of transmittal of the white paper ends up: "If the Communists should decide to undertake aggression against their neighbors, then we, ourselves and the other nations in the United Nations, will be confronted with a situation violative of the United Nations Charter." What that is intended to add up to, if anything, I don't know. It's not clear because there has already been Communist aggression against these neighboring countries. It got under way during the Japanese occupation. The United States, ending up the war, adopted the policy of favoring the termination in large degree of the colonial regimes that existed in Indochina, Indonesia, and so forth. That was a worthy objective. The question always arises, though: "Just how do you get from one place to another?" "What kind of and how long a transition period is needed?" Japanese authority directed only to the support of the Japanese war, replaced the French, the British, and the Dutch authority. When the Japanese authority was suddenly terminated a chaotic condition ensued in which the greatest danger was the Communist cells that had been built up during the war. It's always a question, How fast can a country move from a condition of complete dependence into complete independence? In the Philip pines we took a period of 1916 to 1946, 30 years, and I think that long a period of transition is needed under the conditions that existed. Many people say that if a country is going to attain the liberty status, it must learn to walk, and even though it may fall, that's the only way it can learn to walk. When a child learns to walk, he falls now and then. We must expect that he will fall. But we don't have to let him get out in traffic by himself. So, I feel that when we want to do our best for the movement of these people, these populations of Indonesia and Indochina, into a free world that is going our way instead of the Communist way, we should not foster too rapid a transition period. Now, to return briefly to Japan. Japan, a nation of 80 million people, must depend on an outside food supply of about 20 percent; that is, food for 16 million people. They must get it from somewhere, and the normal place to get it is from east Asia. Japan, on the other hand, must pay for that by industrial production and by services. They've got the know-how, they can produce and ship manufactured goods. They must get food. We cannot continue indefinitely to supply the food they need. If all the Chinese in Indonesia and Indochina join in with the Chinese Communists to establish a Communist regime throughout Far East Asia, then the pressure on Japan to enter the Communist orbit will be tremendous. It will be very difficult to resist it. I was at Pearl Harbor, in com- Many people say the Chinese have always absorbed or driven out aliens. That is true. They have. But they, those they absorbed or drove out, were of an inferior culture and it took time to absorb them. The absorption or expulsion required generations to complete, and the movement had to have a starting point. Those who are going to oppose communism need a rallying point. I consider that we still have to support the only rallying point possible; namely, the Nationalist Government, We must do it primarily with advisors. We should not send a dollar to China, or any material, without the guidance of American advisors We never should send divisions of troops. That wouldn't work. Now, I have one more observation to make. mand of the Pennsylvania. I was in drydock. ship. Two destroyers were in there with me. stroyers were hit. Both of them burned up. in the dock got on fire. Ships were rolling over and sinking and blowing up around me. A tremendous ordeal to you and the country, but more to us who were witnessing it. Pearl Harbor took about 2 hours. The commanders in chief could do nothing after it started other than what they did do. Suppose Pearl Harbor had taken 4 years, and that these commanders had done nothing-how much more culpable would they be? And I assure you that I consider the disaster that has overcome us in the Pacific during the past 4 years is far greater than Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was but the culminating climax of something that had been going on before, and was really a blessing in disguise because, if it had not brought us into the war at that time, we would have gotten into the war much later. Under much more adverse conditions we would not have won it. During the period before Pearl Harbor, to use a biblical expression, we were "looking into a glass darkly," and Pearl Harbor brought us "face to face." With what is going on now, the people must look at it, but not continue to look at it "darkly." We want to bring it "face to face" before a catastrophic explosion much greater than Pearl Harbor takes place at some future date. I thank you. Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, these are put in the record to show that Admiral Cooke's views have been uniformly the same on the subject. Mr. COOKE. The only thing I have record of that I can recall at the moment is that I was called on to represent the negative on Town Hall in December 1949 as to whether the United States should recognize Communist China. Mr. MORRIS. Who also was on the negative? Mr. COOKE. Senator Bridges. Mr. MORRIS. Who was on the affirmative side? Mr. MORRIS. May that be made a part of the record? |