Professor Colegrove traveled all night and did not see the transcript until 10 o'clock this morning.

I would like the record to show that at the outset.

Professor, did you testify before this committee on the 25th of September 1951?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify on that occasion, Professor, that there was a group present at the 3-day round table conference at the State Department that was "sympathetic to Red China," that this group dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Morris. That is in the record. I so testified.

By using that term, I did not say any of these gentlemen were Communists. I said their advice was pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I used your words there, Professor Colegrove.
You said on page 1719:

I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red China dominated the conference.

Mr. COLEGROVE. That is the fact.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, have you had an opportunity to examine the transcript and are you in a position to state now whether or not the transcript does, in effect, show that was the case?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, I have examined the transcript as rapidly as I could since 10 o'clock this morning, at the same time listening to Governor Stassen as he testified. It appears to me that my testimony is consistent with the transcript.

I might also add that the brilliant testimony of Governor Stassen this morning was also consistent with the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, you testified that in that group that did dominate the conference, Prof. Owen Lattimore was the leader of that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you checked on that fact?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I have checked on that fact, Mr. Counsel. My first impression is also my second impression: that Owen Lattimore was the leader of the group well admitted by Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything you can point out to us at this time to support that testimony where Governor Stassen this morning noted that Lattimore had spoken 19 times at the conference? Have you made any such check?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I checked, too. I thought that Governor Stassen's checking was correct. I believe that Governor Stassen indicated that the group which gave pro-Communist advice includes Lattimore, Rosinger, Professor Peffer, William S. Robertson, Professor Reischauer, and Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would it not be better if we took the group you mentioned in your testimony, and I will ask you questions and find out whether or not the testimony actually supports your testimony that occasion. May I do it that way?

'Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose is to determine your testimony coincides with the transcript. May I follow your open testimony?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here page 1716 of your open testimony. Senator Eastland says:

Who was that group?

That is, the group sympathetic to Communist China.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say the leader of that group, if you considered he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore.

May we address ourselves to that? I will go into the other names as they come up.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I checked the transcript, and I would agree that the statements which Mr. Lattimore made in the conference indicate that his views were consistently pro-Communist, and this advice was given on a number of occasions.

Senator SMITH. When you refer to the transcript, you mean the State Department transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Of the conference.

The statement by Mr. Lattimore in volume 3, page C-2, which reads:

On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia

he is asking for early recognition.

Mr. MORRIS. Of Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I won't read the whole passage, but the record of the State Department conference indicates that Mr. Lattimore was in favor of very early recognition of Red China.

There are quite a number of references that could be made to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, but I think that is sufficient.

Mr. MORRIS. You also put in this group, Lawrence K. Rosinger? Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had a chance to look at the transcript to determine whether or not Lawrence Rosinger did take the position you have testified in open session?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Mr. Rosinger, in volume 3 [October 8, 1949], page C-10, used the following words:

I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition.

He means to Red China. [Continues reading:]

My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible

he then says.

Then, on page 59, he again repeats:

As I have suggested, the recognition should come at the earliest feasible moment.

On the same page, Mr. Rosinger proposes that we should end all ECA assistance to the Chinese Nationalists immediately. You recall from the testimony he, of course, made a strong plea for breaking the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai.

There are numerous other references; but, since Governor Stren covered the same material, it would be repetitious to give the whole list.

88348-51-pt. 5- -3

Mr. MORRIS. You say the third person you put in that group with the qualification more or less was Prof. John K. Fairbank. You said he was more or less in that particular prevailing group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you dwell upon that?

I believe
Let me

Mr. COLEGROVE. I included John K. Fairbank in this list. that Governor Stassen did not include him in his entire list. call attention to Fairbank's proposal to abandon Formosa. That is made in volume 1, pages B-10 and B-11. Would you want me to read that?

Mr. MORRIS. If you will, please, Professor.

When Professor Colegrove testified in open session, he did not have the benefit of any notes or any transcript, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. You are trying to confirm what he said by the transcript from the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking him if now that he sees the transcript does it bear out his recollection of the meeting as he testified in open session on September 25, 1951. He had testified previously in executive session.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I dislike to take the time of the committee in checking my notes here. I have had only 2 hours to go over this. I fear that I have made an error in my notations in regard to volume No. 1, pages B-10 and B-11.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a reference to Formosa, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. COLEGROVE. If one of my students at the university made notes such as I have here, I would flunk him.

I guess this is volume 2.

Senator SMITH. I can testify for you. There is a little confusion the way these volumes are numbered. If you need any witness to help you out, let me know.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I must say the State Department has not helped us much in this pagination.

It was volume No. 2 [October 6, 1949, p. m. session] page B-10. Professor Fairbank says:

To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so much ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against The more pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility in return. Then he goes on on the next page to say:

us.

To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in China, just as our military support of Chiang Kai-shek defeated our ends because we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that Chiang would have a lack of support.

I think that indicates clearly enough that Professor Fairbank was in favor of immediate abandonment of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you care to say anything more on that score, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I don't think it is necessary to take the time of the committee. There are other citations that can be made, but that is characteristic.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Stassen this morning?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I listened to that testimony. I thought that was an excellent analysis.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that confirm the testimony that you gave in open session here?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Decidedly so. I thought everything that Governor Stassen testified to, this morning, completely corroborated my testimony when I first appeared before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you feel that your testimony and his originally was very much along the same lines?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You heard him give instances from the transcript today in support of his testimony and you feel they also, ipso facto, would support yours?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, on page 1716:

To some extent Professor Reischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of Columbia University expressed views that were favorable to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. COLEGROVE. As to the views of Professor Reischauer, I must say that I regretted to find that he and I differed so frequently. We are graduates from the same university. Professor Reischauer took the position on October 7, 1949, at the morning conference, on page C-15, where he uses these expressions:

I would certainly agree with Mr. Rosinger about the importance of deeds. He is referring here to the abandonment of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

I think that was somewhat typical of all of the testimony of Professor Reischauer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear Governor Stassen's testimony this morning about Professor Reischauer?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned that Benjamin Kizer of the west coast generally was in that group. Have you been able to find anything in the transcript that would support your testimony along those lines, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Benjamin Kizer, on October 7, 1949 [a. m. session], on page B-23, used the following expression:

I tend to go along with what Mr. Peffer has well said, not that we should go whole hog in recognition-neither Mr. Peffer nor myself meant that-but when it becomes apparent, as I think it has become apparent in Indochina, that the days of France are numbered, and that the revolution is on its way toward control, we ought to be sensitive and not take sides in any such situation.

In other words, he is arguing for recognition of the revolutionary government as soon as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else you would like to have us take notice of on that score?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I thought that characteristic of Mr. Kizer's statement. I have not had opportunity to check every one of them. That is the only one I have been able in my limited time to select.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we are confronted with the problem of what to do about this transcript. Should we put that all in our record, the entire transcript?

Senator SMITH. You mean the State Department transcript?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. It will be available to be included. Why do we not consider that the transcript is available for the record if and when it is decided it should be put in? We can treat it as we treated those other volumes. We will not actually copy it into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. In fairness to everybody,. Mr. Chairman, the whole transcript of what everybody said should be in our records.

Senator SMITH. You mean the State Department transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. That does not mean that we have to print it here in the first instance.

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The material referred to appears in the appendix of this part.) Mr. MORRIS. I think we should have everybody's remarks in the record.

Another point in your open testimony, Professor, you said that a briefing done by Cora Dubois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists. Cora Dubois was the State Department officer who briefed the conferees.

Can you find anything there in the testimony to support that testimony, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Morris, I was disappointed in the briefing by Dr. Dubois. Her briefing occurred at the opening of the second

session.

It was a brilliant and scintillating analysis of the problem situation in southeast Asia, and it presented to the uninitiated every appearance of objectivity, but nevertheless it was a very decided slanted testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you develop that for us?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The briefing played down Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist influence in southeast Asia. It implied that the revolution in southeast Asia was a wholly native spontaneous revolution with no leadership from the Soviet Russian Government or Red China.

I will quote you from volume 3 [October 7, 1949, a. m. session], page A-3. Dr. Dubois says:

Despite the diversity which does occur "in Southeast Asia," a few generalizations, it seems to me, can be risked The first and the broadest is one which was discussed at the very beginning of yesterday's meeting and agreed upon, namely, that there is a revolution in progress in southeast Asia, and that that revolution is not coevil with United States-U. S. S. R. tensions. It is a revolution certainly of 50 years' duration.

I will not go on any further.

We will have to say from the study of history that this revolution was also going on in China probably for a hundred years, the T'ai P’ing rebellion and the revolution under Sun Yat-sen.

But in China, everyone would agree the revolution was captured by the Chinese Communists. They took over the revolution, Mao Tzetung and the Chinese Communists.

In this briefing that Dr. Dubois made, she says nothing about Ho Chi Minh, the Moscow-trained Chinese Communists who has taken over revolution in the Viet-Nam in Indochina. I was amazed at a briefing on southeast Asia that had no mention whatsoever of the Chinese Communist leaders whose personalities men respect as great as Mao Tze-tung and who directs the revolution in southeast Asia. He is a European, Moscow and French-trained Communist and directs that revolution.