(The article referred to is as follows:) SFORZA HINTS SOVIET OFFERED ITALY-CHINA U. N. ENTRY DEAL ROME, November 10.-Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza told the Chamber of Deputies today that the Italian Government had been considering recognition of Mao Tse-tung's regime, but that after the intervention of Communist Chinese troops in Korea it had postponed a final decision. The Italian attitude on that question, Count Sforza indicated, also had been influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him by "very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September. These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto Italy's admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member States would not veto the admission of Communist China. Count Sforza abstained from saying who was the author of the suggestion, but he made it clear that the Italian Government had not yet abandoned the hope of overcoming the Soviet opposition. Italy, he said, felt that the Peiping regime was "undoubtedly the government representing the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people." There were two other reasons, he continued, that had determined the Italian attitude: commercial interests and plight of Roman Catholic missions in China. Commercially, Italy had an appreciable volume of trade with China that she would like to reestablish, Count Sforza said. He did not explain why diplomatic relations with Communist China would affect the religious missions, but it was assumed that he was concerned with the fate of many Italian-born n.embers of the Catholic clergy who are now without protection of any kind because of the lack of Italian representation in China. A motion by the extreme left wing designed to reopen the whole question of Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty caused today's foreign policy debate. The motion was defeated, 268 to 132. The Foreign Minister denied Communist contentions that the Italian Government has assumed new political and military commitments during Atlantic Pact meetings held recently in Washington. Both he and Randolfo Pacciardi, Minister of Defense, merely acted in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Treaty, he said. Italy, be continued, was one of the countries most exposed in case of aggression and she therefore was deeply interested in promoting European defense. Count Sforza asserted the Communist idea was that in case Italy or any other Atlantic nation were attacked the Italian Parliament should decide whether aggression really existed. This would enable the Communist parliamentary minority to use obstructionist tactics and permit the aggressor to take advantage of Italian military inactivity, he added. "If there is aggression, it is clear that the first task and the supreme duty of the Government is that of defense, both individual and collective, in accordance with the treaty," he said. "Parliament, of course, will discuss the situation and the political decisions that must be made, as envisaged by the Italian Constitution, which gives it that supreme right. But this cannot retard-as the Communists desire the deployment of military forces, which alone would enable us not to be defeated immediately at the opening of hostilities." Mr. MORRIS. The point here is this paragraph which reads: The Italian attitude on that question, Count Sforza indicated, also had been influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him by "very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September. These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto Italy's admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member states would not veto the admission of Communist China. That is the pertinent paragraph. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Mr. STASSEN. I further stated as one of the 10 points, in fact No. 10 of the points, that no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas as were in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off. That was another one of those 10 points urged by this prevailing group. Mr. Chairman, you have already picked up this comment of Mr. Rosinger on page 60 of the October 8 transcript. At the bottom of page 59: I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public, opinion for recog nition there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists we lay the basis for recognition. As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering through ECA supplies to Formosa― and so on. We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement, from the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions and the problems of carrying out some of these actions, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists. That is Lawrence Rosinger on the top of page 60 of this transcript. I say here again: You can search this prevailing group through this conference, and you will find no dissent from this that is advanced by Mr. Rosinger. Mr. MORRIS. Governor, do you recall that Paul Hoffman, who was the head of ECA, had made a similar recommendation publicly? Mr. STASSEN. No. Senator FERGUSON. Did you know he made a speech in which he advocated the furnishing of aid to Communist China? I would like to get the date and put it in the record. Mr. STASSEN. I do not know of that. I do not know that I want to associate myself with that comment because I don't recall it. I think there was a conference. Senator FERGUSON. I will put the date in later, Mr. Chairman. (The information referred to is as follows:) December 13, 1948. Mr. STASSEN. Are you sure that was not part of the earlier situation? Senator FERGUSON. In 1948. Mr. STASSEN. There were some major conferences at different times about aid to China. I don't recall it in this period. I was watching things very closely in this period. Senator FERGUSON. I think it was December 1948. Mr. STASSEN. I want to be sure not to associate myself with that characterization. Senator FERGUSON. I just take it as part of the policy that was being advocated. Mr. STASSEN. I am not sure it was in the period subsequent to October 1949's conference. Senator FERGUSON. I would like to get that information and put it in, as I said before. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Governor Stassen, do you know of your own knowledge or from any information given to you that is authentic as to how Dr. Jessup came to be chairman of this meeting that took place? Mr. STASSEN. It was publicly announced that on July 27, 1949, Dr. Jessup would be in charge of a review of our policy in China and the Far East, and the announcement was by Dean Acheson. Then a few days later it was announced that Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Case would assist him as a committee of three in the review. The CHAIRMAN. But as to his presiding over the meeting, did you know anything further as to how it was brought about? In other words, was there any action? Mr. STASSEN. There was testimony from Jessup in the Sparkman hearings on it. I would prefer you get that testimony of his as to how the conference was developed and how he chairmaned it. Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the fact there had been another conference on this question where members of labor were called in and consulted? Mr. STASSEN. I had no information on that until I was informed here at the committee hearing the other day there had been another conference with labor. I had never heard of it. Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask counsel if we have received the statements taken at that conference? Mr. MORRIS. We have asked the State Department to make that transcript available, but as yet we have not had a reply. That letter, I believe, went out someday last week. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, the chairman must go on the floor. Would you kindly take the Chair? Mr. STASSEN. You will recall as the first two points that I said that the prevailing group had developed in the recommendations was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe and, second, that an aid to Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism. Then further, to evaluate that part of the transcript, the transcript does show, as I stated, that I had urged a prompt aid to Asia program with the headquarters in Bangkok and a parallel to the Marshall plan to fill the vacuum that existed in south Asia and had expressed the view that the Communists would be pushing in if any such vacuum were left. Mr. Nathaniel Peffer on October 7, 1949, in the a. m. session directly begins to counter my proposal. Mr. Lattimore had also begun to counter it the day before. Mr. Peffer steps in on October 7, 1949, in the a. m. session, page E-9, the third paragraph. I might say the discussion sort of varied between the matter of an association together and an economic group like the Marshall plan, the forming of some kind of an alliance, but there was considerable discussion of some positive action linking together in some way the non-Communist nations of south Asia and strengthening them against the Communist threat. Here is what Mr. Peffer said: Would there be any chance of such an alliance? He goes on to discuss it. He says, at the bottom of the page: You ask yourself: "Would there be any such a pact without our encouragement and support?" He means American encouragement and support. If there would not be, I should say that would fairly well define it as unnatural and not very likely to survive, in which case we are associated with something that is going down. I think we ought to give up. If it goes on its own momentum, if it grows out of its Asian Congress, well and good; but otherwise, no. We ought to keep out until it is started under its own genius and power. I recall the whole beginning of the Marshall plan because of Secretary Marshall's address at Harvard that gave the impetus and the push to that development there. Here is the opposing statement that we should stay out unless it develops, et cetera. Following that through on page E-11 immediately after that Dr. Coons says this: May I conclude that this discussion with reference to regional association is almost entirely at the political level and that we really haven't discussed the question of the economic side that there is conceivably much to be said on the aspect of a regional economic approach, somewhat after the manner of what we were talking yesterday in reply to Mr. Stassen's discussion. Chairman Jessup said: We might come back to that after lunch. Then after lunch Mr. S. C. Brown is brought in as an official of the State Department to breif the conference on this matter of the regional-economic-aid approach. You will find that on the p. m. session of October 7, page A-3. Here, of course, I am very greatly concerned because here we are moving right over into the Indian situation, which is the matter that gives me the greater concern at this time. Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Governor. You did not testify concerning this particular phase. Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I did. I said that the prevailing group recommended 10 points. Mr. MORRIS. But this afternoon session of the 7th, were you present at that time? Mr. STASSEN. No; but in the subsequent discussions, and of course in the briefing that I received as I would come back from being out of the room, there were men, Dr. Talbot particularly, so then I kept a sequence of the development of the whole discussion, even though I had to move out and in a bit. On page A-3 as Mr. Brown begins his briefing, down at the bottom he says: Now, the other thing which has appeared to us in our consideration of the matter is this this is now talking about south Asia regional economic action That, as Mr. DuBois said this morning, the economies of those areas are not interdependent in the same way that economies of Europe are, for instance, and you would not in all probability get in those areas through the expenditure of aid funds on a large scale the accumulative and multiplying effect that you get by expenditure of similar funds in Europe? Then I continue on page A-5. He gives a considerable discussion of reasons and down on line 9 he says: Now for these reasons, among others, we have been inclined, I think, to go slow in that concept of an over-all program of the Marshall type in that part of the world. The reasons may not be conclusive. I don't know. But I just wanted to indicate that we have given that type of thing some consideration. There was the "go slow," and you will find it in the expressions of "It is very complex, and it is very confused," that you must go slow, and the total transcript read will confirm that the prevailing opinion was to go slow on aid and the organization of a regional program in the south of Asia against communism. Of course, as I countered that, I directly pointed out while we were going slow the Communists were going fast, and that was the thing that bothered me so much at that time. My recollection of the point that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire had its origin in Mr. Kennan's briefing on the first morning, page 19. He says: I think there is a distinction between these Russian leaders and people like Hitler and the Japanese leaders of the twenties and thirties. On page B-17 he said: never in Russian history have the Russians ever, that I can remember, been enthused about any deliberate aggressive action of their own outside of Russia. Then he discusses the different ideologies and the policies in relation thereto. Then you will find in my response to Mr. Kennan at that time I said that I felt that they were just as aggressive as Hitler and would prove to be so. On the Indian point, page 8, that Prime Minister Nehru had shown. reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia, we find in October 8, 1949, the a. m. session-I would first like to point out that Mr. Talbot, beginning on page 110 makes a brilliant presentation, I feel, of the India situation and of the policy we ought to have toward India; that his presentation goes on through a number of pages. Then as he concludes, Mr. Murphy, on page 122, says this: As a minor note of warning with respect to Mr. Nehru's visit here next week I would like to say that, in my opinion, and it is an obvious remark, the Indian people are not strong and practical people in our definition as we define it here and that despite Mr. Talbot's glowing presentation of the opportunities and the resources and the potentialities in India, nevertheless * And he goes into an international-bank question, and so on. Yet with respect to the three problems that they now have at issue with Pakistan, of Kashmir, of the refugee properties and the water rights in west Punjab, in each of those three preponderantly it seems to me the Indians are acting in an arbitrary manner, reactionary and arbitrary manner. Then I say I want to associate myself with Dr. Talbot, and so on. Then on the top of the page 122 you will find that after that discussion by Dr. Talbot of the importance of moving affirmatively on India and of developing a favorable Indian reaction, Mr. Lattimore says: In Mongolian in the expression of gratitude a grateful man is practically indistinguishable from the expression "a pack animal loaded with a burden." Mr. MORRIS. What is the point of that? Mr. STASSEN. It is a very negative kind of comment regarding Dr. Talbot's very able presentation. That is the only response that came at that time to that plea for moving forward in India. Then Mr. Murphy follows up with this note of warning and this comment about reactionary and arbitrary. |