times, of which 8 times were substantial, and that Mr. Lawrence Rosinger spoke 11 times, of which 5 times were substantial, and you will not find any twin participation in major degree similar to that on the part of any other of the 30 or so participants. That, of course, is just broad background for the analysis that I now present. Mr. MORRIS. And that shows, Governor Stassen, that they led the conference; is that right, sir? Mr. STASSEN. That is just one factor to consider, of course. The volubility alone would not be proof of leading a discussion, as we all know, but it is one factor. It does, though, bear out the testimony that I gave earlier on your examination at a time when I did not have the transcript. You asked how frequently did Lattimore speak while I was present, and I said, "I would say eight or nine times and Rosinger five or six times," so the transcript now released bears out that testimony of mine and the testimony of Dr. Colegrove, which was given before I appeared on the scene, before you subpenaed me. Mr. MORRIS. And you were present 2 of the 3 days, were you not? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. I testified before you, sir, on October 1 that this prevailing group recommended that the United States should recognize the Communist People's Republic Government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date. The key session of the conference on this subject was on the third day, October 8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m. The transcript has an ink number, No. 15-E-I don't know what that means—but in any event it is the transcript under date of October 8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m., and in this transcript, if you turn beyond where General Marshall was speaking, you come down to the point at which the most important section of the transcript on this particular issue and on some other issues is found. The CHAIRMAN. That is on what page of the transcript, Governor? Mr. STASSEN. We now turn to page 31 of this transcript for the 8th of October, beginning at 9 a. m., page 31 on the right-hand side, B-1 in the center. It has a double label. It has a double label. The chairman who is speaking here is Dr. Jessup, so on top of the page where it says "Chairman" that is Dr. Jessup, and you will see that he says this: Gentlemen, in the time which is left to us, with your permission what I would like to do would be to see if we can get your views rather specifically on a number of issues. And then you run down to the beginning of the second paragraph and he said: I would like to suggest that we might have a few minutes taking up the question of the recognition of the Communist Government in China. * So that this discussion which follows arose as the direct result of the request of Dr. Jessup that we focus on that specific issue. You will recall that many releases and statements have indicated that the discussion of recognition was a sort of incidental thing while 30 men were discussing many problems. This then definitely pins that this discussion came about as the request of Dr. Jessup focusing the whole group specifically on this problem, and I think this record should also show that in the testimony before the Sparkman committee Dr. Jessup testified that the United States had not considered or contemplated-he used both words the recognition of Communist China. Now, then, the key discussion of this follows in these pages and for any real analysis everything from this page 31 on through should be read, but I will now point to high lights in order to focus on what is involved. On page 40 Dr. Nathaniel Peffer on the bottom of the page begins some of the most significant statements. You will see that Mr. Nathaniel Peffer says this: I would also make it a matter of timing and I would wait. I would wait 4 weeks or 5 or 6 weeks * * Then he goes on to say: I don't know when the Communists will get to Canton, but I would guess not over 6 or 7 weeks. The only other Chinese regime will be in Formosa, which is, at least technically, not Chinese territory. It is still Japanese. Then he goes on. On page 43 you find an important thing. Now, some of those who were arguing against recognition as they saw the prevailing opinion developing the other way urged that furthermore, beyond everything else, there was a strong opinion in the country and in Congress against the recognition. This was not the sole basis of opposition to the recognition, but it was one of the arguments advanced, so here you see Mr. Peffer taking up that argument. He says on page 43, the second paragraph, page B-13, second paragraph: If this country-the most powerful in the world at the most dangerous time in the world—is at a stage in which the Government is hog-tied against its better judgment because some people are going to blow up, then God alone help the Republic. That is all. And then the stenographer records applause to that. In other words, this was a sharp rejoinder to those in the minority who had pleaded that there should not be recognition, and the stenographer records applause, and applause was of course rare in fact, almost unheard of-in this kind of a conference with 30 men sitting around the table. Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other occasions where there was an applause? Mr. STASSEN. There was one time. There was a comment of "Hear, hear," or something of a similar vein from the floor. Senator FERGUSON. But no applause like this? Mr. STASSEN. I think there was an applause when General Marshall concluded his report; instances of that kind. I do not know of any other instance than this one and the "Hear, hear" when a substantive statement of policy was greeted with applause as distinguished from greeting some individual with applause or some courtesy with applause. If I may just conclude that, on page 42 you find that Mr. Peffer says: Let us say that there is an American Congress-and I don't know that they are synonymous-and suppose it is true the State of Oregon blows up. Well, it will settle And on page 43, the end of the first paragraph, you will find him saying this: There is no real argument against real recognition except that a lot of people are going to blow up. It is after he has said these things and concludes that there is the applause from this conference. Senator SMITH. I want to ask you about an item on page 41, the beginning of the paragraph on that page: Another matter. Tell me, is not the burden of proving on those who don't want to recognize? The Communists are there. They are going to take 20, 30, 40 years. Who knows? What do you lose by recognizing? I was wondering if that was part of the statement that got the applause. Mr. STASSEN. Those two and a half pages was his statement, and what you just read was included, which winds up with the applause. If I may, I would like to go on to page 48 where Owen Lattimore is speaking, and he opens it up: Mr. Chairman they are addressing Dr. Jessup I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning, which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective attitudes. * The CHAIRMAN. What page is that? Mr. STASSEN. Page 48, C-1. The CHAIRMAN. Some of them are not numbered the same. Mr. STASSEN. It says: CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore. He is being called on, and his first sentence is: Mr. Chairman, I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning, which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective attitudes. I hope the Department feels its hand strengthened, but if we And so on, and then he goes on with his argument. Mr. MORRIS. Does he argue that we should recognize Communist China at that point? Mr. STASSEN. Clearly in the context, and then he goes beyond that. I might say the State Department release this morning admits that Mr. Lattimore did urge recognition. Then on the bottom of page 49, about eight lines up from the bottom, he says: Overhaste in recognizing the new situation might indicate panic And he goes on and discusses that, and then he says: On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia that in the long run would be more damaging to us because there would be the feeling that while a new situation has developed and in spite of the fact, as Mr. Peffer cogently pointed out I might say that refers directly back to the discussion just a few minutes earlier by Mr. Peffer that we have been discussing that that really doesn't alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United Nations; for instance, the veto ratio is changed but the veto situation is not changed In other words, it was another argument against that of those opposing recognition had made, that that was not just a question of recognizing the country, but you would hand to that Communist government a veto in the United Nations as one of the major nations in the world, that that was a serious matter, and this argument, along with the others in here, was— Well, after all, Russia had one veto now. What if you did give the Communists two vetoes? Two vetoes wouldn't do them any more good than one in that we still had one veto so that Mr. Lattimore directly associates himself with the argument that while this would give the Communists two vetoes, that, as he puts it that doesn't really alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United Nations; for instance, the veto ratio is changed which means two vetoes for the Communists instead of one but the veto situation is not changed because they could still veto with only one veto. That is trying to demolish our own insistence that there should not be prompt recognition because it would be very upsetting in the United Nations. Senator SMITH. On page 49, and you read a part of it: Overhaste in recognizing the new situation That meant the recognition of Communist China? Is that what that meant? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Senator SMITH. There is no doubt about that? Mr. STASSEN. As I say, I really would urge that any of you gentlemen, any editor who is going to analyze or comment on this as a student, ought to take this morning's session, and from the time General Marshall finishes to the close of the session, and read every line of it. Senator SMITH. Then he says in the next sentence: On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia That means too much delay in the recognition; is that right? Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, your reference to the veto is to the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council do have the right to veto and that China is one of the five nations with that veto power. Mr. STASSEN. That is right. You see, there had been references in the discussion to the old recognition policy in relationship to South American countries, and so forth, and some of us presented the plea that that did not apply when you were considering a major nation. with two contesting governments and with the matter of a veto seat. We said there was no real precedent for this; this has to be analyzed on the basis of the current world situation and what you knew about China. Senator FERGUSON. You felt that recognition of Communist China by the United States was in effect a recognition that they were entitled to the seat because we would have to break off the recognition of the Nationalist Government, which would give them no place in the United Nations as far as we were concerned? Mr. STASSEN. I not only felt that, Senator, but I said it very specifically before that morning session was over, and you will find it later in the transcript. I said it very directly on that point. Senator FERGUSON. Therefore in effect you had two recognitions. If you recognized them as a nation and as a government, it meant that following that you would by necessity have to recognize them in the United Nations and they would become part of the Security Council with the right of the veto? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Then following through on page 54, you find comments by Mr. William S. Robertson, and he associates himself with those who are recommending recognition, and then on page 55 he reads a letter, which is a significant document. Starting before that, he said: We have in China, as our chief executive, a man named Paul Hopkins, who is known, I think, to a good many of the people here. I think while his chief interest, of course, lies in us, I am quite sure from my knowledge of him that he is a good, loyal, and patriotic American, and he has no particular reason to like the Communists. If I may, I would like to read to you, confidentially, from a letter which I got from him under date of September 21, which gives something of his experience in dealing with the Communists in connection with our own business. I thought it might be illuminating if that sort of thing might be put in the record. After talking about our own affairs, he says: "The authorities are all significantly honest, hard-working individuals who live on the barest essentials of food and clothing. They practice austerity to the point of not using electric fans or elevators in the buildings which they occupy as offices or residences. In my opinion, the extreme privation of these officers will have serious effect upon their health, particularly those with tubercular tendencies. I have found them all intelligent, very frank in discussing problems and most of them with a good sense of humor. "There is no question but that it is a new type of people who, if not subject to outside pressure, will ultimately bring great progress to China. "To my mind, the pessimistic future stems from the increasing breach which has developed between China and America. There are arguments on both sides, but, in my opinion, the passage of time has seemed to confuse the issue and eliminate realistic thinking, which bodes ill for everyone. I may be too close to the picture and has lost perspective. The almost daily bombing activity of the KMT which was the China Nationalist Force "and the increased miseries caused the Chinese people by those activities against nonmilitary objectives constantly irritate an open sore. Grant it be un-AngloSaxon to deny an ex-war partner, but evidence would seem adequate that that partner has for several years served its people so ill that it has been rejected by its own people. America is now contributing indirectly to the miseries of those people. Recognition should be withdrawn that is recognition from the China Nationalists "and the blockade of the coast broken." I thought that might be useful to the committee. Of course, reiterating what I said before, I do not know the motives of the man who wrote the letter. I do not know whether he wrote it while he was himself under Communist domination in a Chinese city, whether he was then mistaken or mistakenly advised, or what. Mr. MORRIS. Would that not appear to be from the expressions of Mr. Rosinger? At the very end there it says, "Thank you very much, Mr. Rosinger." Mr. STASSEN. No. He is calling Mr. Rosinger next. The Chairman is thanking Mr. Robertson and then he calls on Mr. Rosinger. That is the way you interpret that. Mr. SOURWINE. Governor Stassen, are you about to go to a new point? Mr. STASSEN. A new individual on the same point. |