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under various titles, and might assert various defences, altogether independent of each other. The court might admit or reject evidence applicable to one particular title, and not to all; and in such cases it was the intention of congress to limit what would otherwise have unquestionably attached to the court, the right of revising all the points involved in the cause. It therefore restrains this right to such errors as respect the questions specified in the section; and in this view it has an appropriate sense, consistent with the preceding clauses. We are, therefore, satisfied, that, upon principle, the case was rightfully before us, and if the point were perfectly new, we should not hesitate to assert the jurisdiction.

But the point has been already decided by this court upon solemn argument. In Smith v. The State of Maryland (6 Cranch's Reports, 286) precisely the same objection was taken by counsel, and overruled by the unanimous opinion of the court. That case was, in some respects, stronger than the present; for the court below decided, expressly, that the party had no title, and, therefore, the treaty could not operate upon it. This court entered into an examination of that question, and, being of the same opinion, affirmed the judgment. There cannot, then, be an authority which could more completely govern the present question.

It has been asserted at the bar, that, in point of fact, the court of appeals did not decide either upon the treaty or the title apparent upon the record, but upon a compromise made under an act of the legislature of Virginia. If it be true, (as we are informed,) that this was a private act, to take effect only upon a certain condition, namely, the execution of a deed of release of certain lands, which was matter in pais, it is somewhat difficult to understand how the court could take judicial cognizance of the act, or of the performance of the condition, unless spread upon the record. At all events, we are bound to consider that the court did decide upon the facts actually before them. The treaty of peace was not necessary to have been stated, for it was the supreme law of the land, of which

all courts must take notice. And at the time of the decision in the court of appeals and in this court another treaty had intervened, which attached itself to the title in controversy, and, of course, must have been the supreme law to govern the decision, if it should be found applicable to the case. It was in this view, that this court did not deem it necessary to rest its former decision upon the treaty of peace, believing that the title of the defendant was, at all events, perfect under the treaty of 1794.

The remaining questions respect more the practice than the principles of this court. The forms of process and the modes of proceeding in the exercise of jurisdiction are, with few exceptions, left by the legislature to be regulated and changed as this court may, in its discretion, deem expedient. By a rule of this court, the return of a copy of a record of the proper court, under the seal of that court annexed to the writ of error, is declared to be "a sufficient compliance with the mandate of the writ." The record, in this case, is duly certified by the clerk of the court of appeals, and annexed to the writ of error. The objection, therefore, which has been urged to the sufficiency of the return, cannot prevail.

Another objection is, that it does not appear, that the judge who granted the writ of error did, upon issuing the citation, take the bond required by the twenty-second section of the judiciary act.

If any

We consider that provision as merely directory to the judge; and that an omission does not avoid the writ of error. party be prejudiced by the omission, this court can grant him summary relief, by imposing such terms on the other party as, under all the circumstances, may be legal and proper. But there is nothing in the record by which we can judicially know whether a bond has been taken or not; for the statute does not require the bond to be returned to this court, and it might, with equal propriety, be lodged in the court below, who would ordinarily execute the judgment to be rendered on the writ. And the presumption of law is, until the contrary appears, that

every judge who signs a citation has obeyed the injunctions of

the act.

We have thus gone over all the principal questions in the cause, and we deliver our judgment with entire confidence that it is consistent with the constitution and laws of the land.

We have not thought it incumbent on us to give any opinion upon the question, whether this court have authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals to enforce the former judgments, as we do not think it necessarily involved in the decision of this cause.

It is the opinion of the whole court, that the judgment of the court of appeals of Virginia, rendered on the mandate in this cause, be reversed, and the judgment of the district court held at Winchester be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

1 Wh. 302.

THE BANK OF COLUMBIA v. OKELY.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1819.

[4 Wheaton's Reports, 235-246.]

MARYLAND in 1793 incorporated the Bank of Columbia, and gave it the power of obtaining an execution against its debtors without a trial and judgment. Okely, a debtor, had execution issued against him by the bank, which it was moved to quash as being contrary to the constitutions both of Maryland and the United States, which secure the right of trial by jury. The circuit court for the district of Columbia quashed the writ, and the bank sued out their writ of error. Judge Johnson delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

In this case the defendant contended that his right to a trial by jury, as secured to him by the constitution of the United States, and of the state of Maryland, has been violated. The question is one of the deepest interest; and if the complaint be well founded, the claims of the citizen on the protection of this court are peculiarly strong.

The seventh amendment of the constitution of the United States is in these words:

"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of the trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law."

The twenty-first article of the declaration of rights of the state of Maryland is in the words of Magna Charta:

"No freeman ought to be taken or imprisoned, &c., or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."

The act by which this bank is incorporated gives a summary

remedy for the recovery of notes endorsed to it, provided those notes be made expressly negotiable at the bank in their creation. This is a note of that description; but it is contended, that the act authorizing the issuing of an execution, either against the body or effects of the debtor, without the judgment of a court, upon the oath and demand of the president of the bank, is so far a violation of the rights intended to be secured to the individual, under the constitution of the United States, and of the state of Maryland. And as the clause in the act of incorporation, under which this execution issued, is express as to the courts in which it is to be executed, it is farther contended, that there is no provision in the law of congress for executing it in this district.

We readily admit that the provisions of this law are in derogation of the ordinary principles of private rights, and, as such, must be subjected to a strict construction; and, under the influence of this admission, will proceed to consider the several questions which the case presents.

The laws of the state of Maryland derive their force in this district under, the first section of the act of congress of the 27th of February, 1801. But we cannot admit that the section which gives effect to those laws amounts to a reënactment of them, so as to sustain them, under the powers of exclusive legislation given to congress over this district. The words of the act are, "The laws of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said district which was ceded by that state to the United States." These words could only give to those laws that force which they previously had in this tract of territory under the laws of Maryland; and if this law was unconstitutional in that state, it was void there, and must be so here. It becomes, then, unnecessary to examine the question, whether the powers of congress be despotic in this district, or whether there are any, and what, restrictions imposed upon it, by natural reason, the principles of the social compact, or constitutional provisions.

Was this act void, as a law of Maryland? If it was, it must

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