Catharine Burkloe died in 1833, intestate, and leaving one daughter her surviving, who afterwards intermarried with Frederick Plummer. In 1841, Plummer and his wife, by a conveyance in accordance with the Act of Assembly, for the purpose of barring the entail, granted the premises in question to one Kockersperger, who the next day reconveyed them to his grantors. Mrs. Plummer died without issue, in 1848, having first made her will, by which she devised all her estate to her husband. Frederick Plummer died in 1854, having first made his will, by which he devised the premises in question to the plaintiffs in error, who were defendants below.

The plaintiff below claimed as the only son of Rebecca Ferguson, who was the eldest child of Rachel Cannon, the daughter of John Dickinson.

The learned judge charged the jury, that the plaintiff, as heir in tail of John Dickinson, was, by virtue of the will of William Dickinson, entitled to recover one moiety of the premises in question. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for the said one moiety. A new trial was moved for, but refused. The opinion of the Court refusing the new trial was delivered by

STROUD, J.-Both parties claim under the last will of Doctor William Dickinson, dated March 11th, 1780. He left a widow and two children, John and Catharine, all of whom are dead. At the time of the death of the testator, he was seised of the property in dispute.

By the first devise in his will a life estate was given to his wife; the remainder in fee equally to his children.

The next clause is in these words-"In case of the death of either of my said children, they being without issue, it is my will, and I do order, that the surviving one shall hold and for ever possess the whole of my estate, real and personal.”

In England there are conflicting decisions on devises similar to this. The difference of opinion turns upon the expression dying without issue, or leaving no issue, or as here, being without issue, all of which manifestly import the same thing. The earlier and the later decisions in England hold that such expressions imply as to real estate an indefinite failure of issue, and consequently

create an estate-tail in the first takers, with vested cross-remainders in tail, depending on survivorship.

But a train of decisions in our Supreme Court, beginning with Clark v. Baker, 3 S. & R. 470, has established conclusively here that such a devise gives an estate-tail to the immediate devisees. See Lapsley v. Lapsley, 9 Barr 130, and the cases there cited. But whether or not, we might have entertained doubt as to this clause, were the question here an open one, the succeeding clause upon, perhaps, all the authorities, renders it quite certain that the testator's son, under whom the plaintiff claims, took but an estate tail in a moiety of the property in dispute. The clause reads thus:-"Should my daughter Catharine marry and have issue, then, in the case of her death, and the death of my said son John, it is my will and order that the whole thereof devolve on and descend to the heirs of her body, male and female, to be divided share and share alike. And in case of the death of my said children, John Dickinson and Catharine Dickinson, they nor either of them, leaving issue of their bodies, that the whole of my estate shall devolve on and descend to William Dickinson and Margaret Dickinson, children of my brother Thomas Dickinson, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike, and in case of their death, then to the heirs of their body equally."

The general intent of the testator shows that after the words, "the death of my son John," we must supply, as an unintentional omission, "without issue," or an equivalent expression, is a matter so obvious that no stress has been laid on the omission by counsel.

We have then the estate devised over to his nephew and niece, in case both his children should die, they nor either of them leaving issue of their bodies.

That the testator had no clear conception of the import of the different phrases he has used-"without issue," "heirs of her body," "issue of their bodies,"—is quite probable. Indeed, the provision in respect to the heirs of the body of his daughter Catharine renders this certain enough.

But his purpose was not to leave his estate absolutely and in the full control of his children, and it matters not whether the words of limitation are children, or issue, or heirs of the body, &c. These are in such a connection, all restrictive, and were so

intended to be: Wilde's Case, 6 Co. 16; David v. Stevens, 1 Doug. R. 307, 310."

The defendants took this writ of error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

LOWRIE, J.-It seems to us that the opinion of the learned Judge who decided this cause in the District Court, expresses all that need be said in order to show that the devise to John Dickinson confers an estate tail.

Judgment affirmed.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

HOAG v. DESSAN.

(Vol. V., p. 302, 1858.)

1. Statutes of Limitation affect the remedy; and in their application the lez fori, and not the lex loci contractus, is regarded.

2. The contract itself is to be interpreted and enforced according to the law of the country, or state in which it was made.

3. In a suit on a note made in California, calling for interest at three per cent. per month, which rate is consistent with the laws of that state, a Court in Pennsylvania will enforce a recovery for interest according to the terms of the note; but the judgment of the Court will only bear interest at six per cent. from the date of its entry.

4. The right of the plaintiff to recover in such action is not affected by the statute of California limiting the period for the commencement of action on a contract in writing to four years, although that time has fully elapsed before the institution of the suit.

ERROR to the District Court of Allegheny County.

This was an action on a promissory note, dated San Francisco, September 17, 1851, for $490, at one day after date, with interest at three per cent. per month. The suit was commenced April 22, 1857.

The affidavit of defence set forth the Statute of Limitations of California, which is a bar to actions on written contracts which are not commenced within four years from the date at which the right of action accrued.

The Court below entered judgment June 25, 1857, against the defendant for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence-the judgment to bear interest at three per cent. per month. The defendant, Hoag, took this writ of error.

The case was argued by G. P. Hamilton, for the plaintiff in error, and by Shinn, contra.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

WOODWARD, J.-The nature, validity and construction of contracts are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made; the remedies enforcing such contracts are regulated by the law of the place where the remedies are pursued. Statutes of Limitation, which take away every legal mode of recovering a debt, are not considered as effecting the contract like payment, release, or judgment, which in effect extinguish the contract; but as affecting the remedy only, by determining the time within which a particular mode for enforcing the contract shall be pursued. They belong to the lex fori, and not to the lex loci contractus. This is strikingly illustrated by the rule that permits a recovery in our Courts, at any time within our own Statute of Limitations, on a contract made in another state or a foreign country, although by the law of the place where the contract was made the right of action was gone before either of the parties left that jurisdiction.

These principles will be found so fully discussed and applied in the following authorities, that I content myself with this brief statement of them.

Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caines 402; Andrews v. Heriett, 4 Cowen 410; Bulger v. Roach, 11 Pick. 36; Le Roy v. Crouninshield, 2 Mason C. C. 151; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters 312; Watson v. Brewster, 1 Barr 385; Story's Conflict of Laws 576; Angell on Limitations 69.

And it follows from these principles that the defendant had no defence, for though the note in suit was made at San Francisco payable one day from date, and by the Statute of Limitations in force in California, action thereon was barred after four years, yet as suit was brought in Pennsylvania, within six years after

the note fell due, the defendant is liable. It was his misfortune to be found within our jurisdiction. Whether he left that of California before or after their statutory bar attached, is not stated, and is immaterial, for even if it was after, the authorities cited show it could not avail him.

But though he had no defence to the action, he has a right to complain of that part of the judgment, which allows interest from the 25th of June, 1857, the date of the judgment, at the rate of three per cent. per month. The plaintiff was entitled to this rate up to the time of judgment, for the contract stipulated for it, and the law of California allowed it; but when judgment was entered in our Courts, the contract and all that was peculiar to it was extinguished. Thenceforth the judgment would draw interest like all other Pennsylvania judgments, at the rate of six per cent. per annum and no more.

The record is remanded, with instructions to amend the judgment accordingly, and when so amended it is affirmed.

Ruggles v. Kesler, 3 Johns. 263; Foster v. The Cumb. V. R. R., 11 Harris 371; Evans v. See, Id. 88; Bock v. Lauman, 12 Id. 435.

In the District Court of Allegheny County. In Equity.

THE PITTSBURGH, FORT WAYNE AND CHICAGO RAILROAD COMPANY v. PITTSBURGH ET AL.

(Vol. V., p. 374, 1858.)

1. A charter of a railroad corporation must be construed liberally in favor of the public, and most strongly against the grantees.

2. If the powers or privileges be coupled with conditions, they must be strictly complied with; but if no conditions be annexed, the powers granted may be exercised in a reasonable manner, having due regard to the rights of others whose interests may be affected thereby.

3. By the Act of 1854, the plaintiffs were authorized to build their bridge across the Allegheny river, and to connect their road with the Pennsylvania Central on Liberty street, in Pittsburg. Held: that their right to cross Penn street, was implied.

4. An ordinance of the city of Pittsburgh, gave to the plaintiffs an option of routes, but required them to complete their road within two years from the passage of the ordinance; the plaintiffs proceeded at once, executed con