Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This is an appeal on the part of the consul general of the Republic of France from the judgment of the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, discharging the defendant Moisan from imprisonment.

petitioner was admitted to bail by the district court.

Messrs. Walter V. R. Berry and Benjamin S. Minor submitted the cause for appellant:

The language of the treaty is so plain and unambiguous that there is no room for interpretation or construction.

17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 4, Interpretation and Construction; 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 488, 489; 2 Phillimore, International Law, § 70; 1 Halleck, International Law, p. 297, chap. 8, § 39; 2 Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, § 263; Calvo, Droit Interna

Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 601, 15
Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law,
p. 598, Statutes; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183
U. S. 424, 437, 46 L. ed. 264, 270, 22 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 195.

A treaty should be carried out in a spirit of uberrima fides, and construed so as to give effect to the object designed.

The proceeding arises on habeas corpus, to inquire into the validity of the detention of defendant in the city prison of San Francisco, in the state of California. His application for the writ was addressed to the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, and it showed that he was a citizen of France, and was imprisoned by virtue of a requisitional, § 1650; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. tion in writing, signed by the French consul general residing in San Francisco, and addressed to the chief of police of San Francisco, California, requiring his arrest as one of the crew of the French ship Jacques, then in that port, on account of his insubordinate conduct as one of such crew. (The requisition contained all the averments of fact which would warrant the arrest of the petitioner under the provisions of the treaty of 1853 between the United States and France.) The petitioner also averred that, at the time of the making of his application for the writ, the ship was not in the port of San Francisco, but had departed therefrom some time before. The petitioner was arrested by the chief of police, under such requisition, on the 1st day of May, 1903, and since that time had been confined in the city prison of San Francisco. He asserted that his imprisonment was illegal, because the facts set forth did not confer jurisdiction upon the consul or the chief of police, or either of them, to restrain complainant from his liberty, or to imprison him.

[171] *The petition was dated the 26th day of

Re Ross (Ross v. McIntyre) 140 U. S. 453, 475, 35 L. ed. 581, 589, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897.

The court should find an interpretation, if it can be done, which will involve no violation of the pledged faith of the government of the United States to the government of another country, and should give that interpretation without hesitation.

Ropes v. Clinch, 8 Blatchf. 304, Fed. Cas. No. 12,041.

Mr. William Denman submitted the cause for appellee:

Congress could not impose a tax on the salary of a judicial officer of the state. The Collector v. Day (Buffington v. Day) 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122.

In an attempt by a state to tax the salary

Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L.

May, 1903, and the writ was issued, return-of a Federal officer the converse was held to
able before the district court on the 28th be true.
day of May, 1903. The chief of police pro-
duced the body of the defendant, pursuant | ed. 1022.
to the command of the writ, and justified
the imprisonment, under the requisition re-
ferred to.

The district court, after hearing counsel, made an order discharging the defendant from arrest, on the ground that it appeared to the court that the bark Jacques, of the crew of which the defendant was a member, had departed from the port of San Fran cisco, and was no longer in that port. It was further ordered that the execution of the order should be stayed for the term of one day. Immediately thereon the consul general filed with the district court his petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the judgment discharg ing the defendant from imprisonment, which appeal was duly allowed, and thereupon the

Any instrumentality employed for carrying on the operation or state government is beyond the reach of Federal interference.

United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 17 Wall. 329, 21 L. ed. 600; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 583, 39 L. ed. 820, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673.

The same principle of the inviolability of the machinery of a state from Federal interference has been laid down where national stamp duties were attempted to be imposed upon the process of state courts.

Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279; Jones v. Keep, 19 Wis. 390; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385.

The state official cannot be granted a funetion the exercise of which is forbidden by the laws of his state.

Rep. 326. As to the objection that there was any statute, or any constitutional provision of the state, prohibiting the execution of the power conferred by the treaty upon the state officer, we think it unfounded. We find nothing in the Constitution or in the statutes of California which forbids or would prevent the execution of the power by a state officer, in case he were willing to execute it. The provisions in the Constitution of the state, cited by coun

Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 sel for defendant, relate, in substance, only

to do.

The important question remains as to the true construction of the 8th article of the treaty, with reference to the limitation of the imprisonment of the person coming within its terms. The district court has held that the imprisonment must end with the departure of the vessel from the port at which the seaman was taken from the vessel. This we regard as an erroneous construction of the terms of the article.

tions in the Waters and Ports of the United | cuting the warrant was not authorized so
States," full provision was made for the
execution of such treaties. It was therein
provided (§ 2) that application for the ar-
rest might be made "to any court of record
of the United States, or any judge thereof,
or to any commissioner appointed under the
laws of the United States." The act then
provided for the issuing of a warrant for
the arrest of the individual complained of,
directed to the marshal of the United
States, and requiring him to arrest the in-
dividual, and bring him before the court
or person issuing the warrant for examina-
tion; and if, on such examination, it ap-
peared that the matter complained of con-
cerned only the internal order or discipline
of the foreign ship, the court should then
issue a warrant committing such person to
prison, etc. It was further provided that
no person should be detained more than
two months after his arrest, but at the end
of that time he should be allowed to depart,
and should not again be arrested for the

same cause.

The act was carried forward,

The provisions of that article seem to us plain, and they refer to the imprisonment of the seaman and his detention during the time of his stay in port, and the language does not refer, in that respect, to the stay of the ship in port. The treaty provides that the local authorities shall lend forcible aid to the consuls when they may ask for the arrest and imprisonment of persons composing the crew, whom they may deem it necessary to confine. The language has no reference whatever to the ship, and they (the persons arrested) are held during their stay in the port "at the disposal of the consul." Surely the ship is not held at the disposal of the consul. It is the persons arrested who are held, and they are to be released at the mere request of the consul, made in writing, and the expenses of the arrest and detention of the persons arrested are to be paid by the consul.

From the

in substance, into the Revised Statutes of
the United States, as §§ 4079, 4080, 4081.
See also U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2766.
This statute, having been passed by the
United States for the purpose of executing
the treaties it had entered into with foreign
governments, must be regarded as the only
means proper to be adopted for that pur-language of the treaty the departure of
pose. Consequently, the requisition of the the ship from the port need have no effect
consul general should have been presented whatever upon the imprisonment of the[177]
to the district court or judge, etc., pursuant persons arrested. The statute (Rev. Stat.
to the act of Congress, and the arrest should§ 4081, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2767)
have been made by the marshal, as therein provides that the imprisonment shall in no
provided for. Therefore the arrest of the case last longer than two months, and at
seaman by the chief of police was unau- the end of that time the person arrested is
thorized. When, however, the defendant to be set at liberty, and shall not again be
was brought before the district court of the arrested for the same cause.
United States upon the writ of habeas cor- makes no reference to the stay of the vessel
pus, that court being mentioned in the stat-in port, and the legislative construction of
the treaty is that the imprisonment is not
limited by the departure of the ship. There-
fore the statute provides that such impris
onment shall not last, in any event, longer
than two months. That term might end
while the vessel was still in port. This con-
struction not only carries out the plain lan-
guage of the treaty, but, it seems to us, it
is its reasonable interpretation. A
may arrive in port with a mutinous sailor,
whose arrest is asked for under the treaty.
When imprisoned pursuant to the terms of
the treaty, he ought not to be discharged
without the request of the consul

ute as one of the authorities to issue war

.176jrants for the arrest of the *individual complained of, and having power under the statute to examine into the question, and to commit the person thus arrested to prison, according to the provisions of the act, it would have been the duty of the court, under such circumstances, upon the production of the defendant under the writ, and upon the request of the consul, to have made an examination, and to have committed the defendant to prison if he were found to come under the terms of the treaty. It was, therefore, but a formal objection to

The statute

Vessel

while

the regularity of the arrest, which would within the limit of the term of imprisonhave been obviated by the action of the ment provided by the statute, simply be

court in examining into the case, and the
defendant would not have been entitled to
discharge merely because the person exe-

cause the vessel from which he was
has left the port. If that were so,
slt would be either that the sailor

taken the re

would U.S.

be discharged as soon as the ship left the port, or, in order to prevent such discharge, he would be taken on board the ship again, and probably be placed in irons. The ship might then continue a voyage which would not bring it back to France for months. During this time the sailor might be kept in irons and in close confinement on board ship, or else the discipline and safety of the ship might be placed in peril. By the other construction, although the ship had left the port without the mutinous sailor, he would not be entitled to his discharge from imprisonment within the two months provided for by the statute, and this would give an opportunity to the consul to send the sailor back to France, at the earliest opportunity, and at the expense of the French govern ment, by a vessel which was going directly to that country.

2.

tion, on the ground of diversity of citizenship, of a suit brought against a municipality by the mortgagee of a waterworks company, to enforce the municipality's contract with that company, where there is no diversity of citizenship between the municipality and the waterworks company, and the interests of the latter and its mortgagee are not antagonistic, it obviously being made a defendant instead of plaintiff solely for the purpose of reopening, in the Federal courts, a controversy which had been decided against the waterworks company in the state court.

The formal repudiation by a municipality of its contract with a waterworks company, and its refusal to perform its obligations under it, cannot give rise to a suit under the Federal Constitution, of which a Federal circuit court can take jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of the parties.

The district court erred in discharging Argued the defendant before the expiration of the [178] two months provided for in the act of *Con

gress, and against the protest of the French

consul. Less than one of the two months of

imprisonment permitted by the statute had expired when the defendant was discharged. The order discharging him must be reversed, and the defendant remanded to imprison ment in a prison where prisoners under sentence of a court of the United States may be lawfully committed (Rev. Stat. § 4081), subject to the jurisdiction of the French consular authority of the port of San Francisco; but such imprisonment must not exceed, when taken with the former imprisonment of the defendant, the term of two months in the aggregate.

Reversed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.

CITY OF DAWSON, Appt.,

v.

COLUMBIA AVENUE SAVING FUND,
SAFE DEPOSIT, TITLE, & TRUST

COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 178-182.)

[No. 154.]

January 26, 27, 1905. Decided
March 6, 1905.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the

United States for the Northern District

of Georgia, to review a decree in favor of complainant, in a suit brought against a municipality by the mortgagee of a waterworks company, to enforce a contract between that company and the municipality. Reversed, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdic

tion.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Charles A. Douglass and Dupont Guerry argued the cause, and, with Mr. Homer Guerry, filed a brief for appel

lant:

If the water company is the real party, and complainant's interest nominal, the bill should have been dismissed.

Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 216, 12 L. ed. 673.

A mortgage given by a water company covering rentals accruing under a contract with a city cannot clothe the mortgagee with the right to maintain an action against the city in a Federal court, where the mortgagor and the city are both corporations of the same state.

American Waterworks & G. Co. v. Home Water Co. 115 Fed. 171; New York Guar

Jurisdiction of Federal courts-diversity of anty & Indemnity Co. v. Memphis Water Co. citizenship-suits under Federal Con

107 U. S. 205, 27 L. ed. 484, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; Eau Claire v. Payson, 46 C. C. A. 466, 107 Fed. 552, 48 C. C. A. 608, 109 Fed. 676. It was the duty of the court below to have

ascertained the matter in controversy, and to have arranged the parties according to in- | terest; and, when so arranged, if it appeared that citizens of the same state were parties on both sides of the controversy, the court had no jurisdiction.

ed. 641; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197, 4 L. ed. 549.

The Constitution intended to protect the obligation as it existed and was recognized by the laws in force when the contract was made.

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 327, 6 L. ed. 645; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612, 11 L. ed. 399; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 317, 11 L. ed. 145.

The obligation, then, protected by the Constitution, is the binding force of any contract as recognized and sustained by the law when incurred, since it is the law and its remedies which obligate a person to perform his agreement.

Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 298, 25 L. ed. 936; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 211, 26 L. ed. 516; Removal Cases (Meyer v. Delaware R. Constr. Co.) 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. ed. 593; Walsh v. Memphis, C. & N. W. R. Co. 2 McCrary, 156, 6 Fed. 797; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. 529; Covert v. Waldron, 33 Fed. 312; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 20, 22 U. S. App. 359, 61 Fed. 709; Tug River Coal & Salt Co. v. Brigel, 14 C. C. A. 577, 31 U. S. App. 665, 67 Fed. 629; Oberlin College v. Blair, 70 Fed. 414; First Nat. Bank v. Radford Trust Co. 26 C. C. A. | 403. 1, 47 U. S. App. 692, 80 Fed. 572.

A breach is not the impairment of the binding force of a valid contract within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution, and the remedy therefor and for refusal to pay accrued rentals would be a suit at law.

Texas & P. R. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393, 34 L. ed. 385, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846; Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 358, 19 L. ed. 961; St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; Raton Waterworks Co. v. Raton, 174 U. S. 360, 43 L. ed. 1005, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 392, 30 L. ed. 1060, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916; Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 C. C. A. 212, 36 U. S. App. 480, 72 Fed. 873.

A right of action against a city to recover water rentals claimed to be due under a contract is at law, and a Federal court of equity is without jurisdiction to enforce the payment of such rentals, even where it has acquired jurisdiction to determine other matters in controversy between the parties. American Waterworks & G. Co. v. Home Water Co. 115 Fed. 172.

The general rule that a court of equity, naving once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, should retain it, does not apply in causes of this kind in the Federal courts.

Ibid.

The Constitution used the word "obligation" advisedly (Sturges v. Crowninshield,

McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612, 11 L. ed. 399; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 302, 6 L. ed. 636; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed.

The means for the enforcement of the obligations of the contract, viz., the laws and remedies which existed when the contract was made, constitute the breach of the contract (Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 600, 24 L. ed. 796), and they have remained changed.

un

So long as the state law has not destroyed or diminished the legal duty to fulfil the obligation of a contract it cannot be said that there has been any state impairment of such obligation, and the issues raised by complainant do not arise under the Constitution (Fergus Falls v. Fergus Falls Water Co. 19 C. C. A. 212, 36 U. S. App. 480, 72 Fed. 873), and to entertain jurisdiction would constitute an encroachment upon the province and prerogatives of the state courts.

St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 392, 30 L. ed. 1060, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916.

Mr. Olin J. Wimberly argued the cause, and, with Mr. John I. Hall, filed a brief for appellee:

There is no improper joinder or arrange ment of parties, and jurisdiction may properly be invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Seymour v.

Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 128 Fed. 907;
doin College v. Merritt, 63 Fed. 213;

Bow.

Beld

4 Wheat. 197, 4 L. ed. 549; Ogden v. Saun- ing v. Gaines, 37 Fed. 817; Omaha Hotel Co. annulments or breaches of contract were not ers' Loan & T. Co. v. Sioux Falls, 131 Fed.

ders, 12 Wheat. 269, 6 L. ed. 625), and mere

within its purview.

A contract is the meeting of the minds,

v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 24 L. ed. 917;

890.

Farm

If the present suit were an action at law, but the obligation resulting therefrom does brought by the trustee for the recovery of

not depend upon the will of the parties, but the hydrant rentals, we think, even

in that

upon the law and its remedies as they exist-case, that the fact that in the waterworks contract the city undertakes and agrees to

ed when the contract was entered into.

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 317, 6 L. pay the hydrant rentals either to the

water U. S.