in said stock yards, and from enforcing certain rules, etc. The order was taken by appeal to said Circuit Court of Appeals and the entire record removed therefrom to this court for final disposal. Order reversed, aud case remanded to said Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, with directions to dismiss the action, with costs. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: [605] *This suit is somewhat similar to the Hopkins suit, just decided, and was brought by the United States against the defendants named, who were citizens and residents of the western division of the western district of Missouri, and members of a voluntary unincorporated association known and designated as the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, the suit being brought for the purpose of obtaining a decree dissolving the exchange and enjoining the members thereof from entering into or continuing any sort of combination to deprive any people engaged in shipping, [606]selling, buying, and handling *live stock (received from other states and from the territories, intended to be sold at the Kansas City market), of free access to the markets at Kansas City, and to the same facilities afforded by the Kansas City stock yards, to defendants and their associate members of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange. The bill was filed under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States by the United States district attorney for the western district of Missouri. It alleged in substance that the exchange was governed by a board of eight directors, who carried on the business thereof with the consent and approbation of the defendants, they person ally being members of the exchange. It then made the same allegations in relation to the stock yards being partly in Kansas City, Kansas, and partly in Kansas City, Missouri, that are contained in the bill in the Hopkins Case, reported ante, 290, and also as to the sales of herds or droves of cattle which were at the time of the sale partly in one state and partly in another. It is further alleged that the Kansas City stock yards is a public market, and, next to the market at Chicago in the state of Illinois, is the largest live-stock market in the world, and vast numbers of cattle, hogs, and other live stock are received annually at the market, shipped from various states and from the territories, and are sold at the market to buyers who reside in other states and territories, and who reship the stock; that the stock is shipped to the market under contracts by which the shipper is permitted to unload the stock at the Kansas City stock yards, rest, water, and feed the same, and is accorded the privi. lege of selling the stock on the Kansas City market if the prices prevailing at the time justify the sale, and many head of such stock are so sold; that prior to the month of March, 1897, as alleged, the defendants herein were engaged as speculators at the Kansas City stock yards, and were buying upon the market and reselling upon the same market and reshipping to other markets in other states the cattle so received at the Kansas City stock yards; that all the live stock shipped to and received at these stock yards is consigned to commission merchants, who take charge of the stock when it is received, and who sell the same "to packing houses lo- [O cated at Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas City in the state of Kansas, and they sell large numbers of cattle to the defendants herein. The bill then alleges that the defendants "have unlawfully entered into a contract, combination, and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states and with foreign nations, in this, to wit, that they have unlawfully agreed, contracted, combined, and conspired to prevent all other persons than members of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, as aforesaid, from buying and selling cattle upon the Kansas City market at the Kansas City stock yards as aforesaid; that the commission firm, person, partnership, or corporation to whom said cattle are consigned at Kansas City, as aforesaid, is not permitted to and cannot sell or dispose of said cattle at the Kansas City market as aforesaid to any buyer or speculator at the Kansas City stock yards unless said buyer or speculator is a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, and these defendants, and each of them, unlawfully and oppressively refuse to purchase cattle, or in any manner negotiate or deal with or buy from any commission merchant who shall sell or purchase cattle from any speculator at the said Kansas City stock yards who is not a member of the said Traders' Live Stock Exchange; that by and through the unlawful agreement, combination, and conspiracy of these defendants the business and traffic in cattle at the said Kansas City stock yards is interfered with, hindered, and restrained, thus entailing extra expense and loss to the owner, and placing an obstruction and embargo on the marketing of cattle shipped from the states and territories aforesaid to the Kansas City stock yards." It is further alleged that, acting in pursuance of the unlawful combination above described, the board of directors of the exchange have imposed fines upon certain members of the exchange "who had traded with persons, speculators upon the markets, who were not members of the said live-stock exchange, and within three months last past have imposed fines upon members of said live-stock exchange who have traded with commission firms at said Kansas City stock yards *which said [600] commission firms had bought from, and sold cattle to, speculators upon said market who were not members of the said live-stock ex change." It was further stated in the bill that in carrying out the purposes and aims of this exchange and by the conduct of its members engaged in this alleged combination, conspiracy, and confederation, they were acting in violation of the laws of the United States, and particularly in violation of section 1 of the act of Congress, approved July 2, 1890, entitled "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and Mo nopolies," and in the prosecution of this un- defendants, and copies of the articles of as lawful combination they had agreed to hinder and delay the business of buying and selling cattle at the market named, and had confederated together in restraint of trade and commerce between the states, and that the object of the defendants in organizing the exchange was to prevent the sale by any commission merchant at the Kansas City stock yards of any cattle to any person who might be a buyer and speculator upon the market who is not a member of the exchange. Accompanying this bill were several affidavits of individuals not members of the exchange, but who were traders or speculators at the stock yards, and those persons said that they were acquainted with the association in question and with the officers and members, and that they did everything in their power to prevent other persons who were not members from trading at the stock yards, and a number of instances were given in which the affiants who were not members of the exchange were endeavoring to do business with commission merchants and others at the exchange in question, when the affiants were notified that they could not continue in business unless they became members of the association, and where partnerships were engaged in business where one partner was a member of the association, the partner who was a member was notified that he could not continue in the partnership business with the other unless such other also became a member; that they had attempted to buy cattle from a great many commission firms and from their salesmen at these stock yards, [609]*but as soon as they went into the yards where the cattle were that were consigned to commission firms, and attempted to purchase them, some of the defendants would appear, call the salesman aside, and, after having a conversation with such salesman, the latter would invariably return to affiant and say that he could not price cattle to the affiant or sell the same to him, as he had been warned by members of the exchange not to do so; that the Traders' Live Stock Exchange would not permit other traders and speculators upon the market, and that the exchange does not permit commission firms at the stock yards to sell cattle consigned to them to any trader or speculator upon the market who is not a member of the exchange, and that commission firms had been notified by the officers of the stock exchange not to sell to speculators on the market who were not members of the Live Stock Exchange, and where commission firms sold cattle to traders and speculators upon the market who were not members of the exchange, the association and members thereof would boycott the commission firm making such sales, and refuse to purchase any cattle from them, and refuse to go into the lots and look at cattle which had been consigned to them. Upon the bill and affidavits application was made to the circuit court for the western division of the western district of Missouri for an injunction as prayed for in the bill, in opposition to which application various affidavits were read on the part of the sociation and by-laws of the exchange were Among other affidavits was that of the gen- Other affidavits were presented to the same effect. Also the affidavit of the president of the exchange. The president denied all allegations in relation to conspiracies to prevent other persons than members of the exchange from buying and selling cattle upon the Kansas City market, and on the contrary alleged that in buying cattle the defendants were in competition with each other, with the representative buyers of all the packing houses, with the representatives of the various commission merchants, who buy constantly on orders from a distance, and with others who buy on orders on their own account, none of whom are menibers of the exchange, and that with these various classes of buyers the defendants constantly deal, and that in selling cattle they compete with each other and with shippers and commission merchants offering stock for sale on the market, that the business in which these defendants are engaged is that of buying and selling cattle known as "stockers and feeders;" that the business is purely local to that market; that the defendants do not deal in quarantine cattle subject to government inspection or cattle shipped through to other markets, with or without the privilege of the Kansas City market, nor in fat cattle sold on the local market shipped to other states or to foreign countries; that except in rare instances both purchases and sales made by the defendants [611] are made from and to persons not members of the exchange, and that in the judgment of the president about ninety-nine per cent of the transactions by the defendants are with | Live Stock Exchange, 143 III. 210, 18 L. R persons not members of the exchange. A copy of the articles of association is annexed to the affidavit, which contains the following preamble: "We, the undersigned, for the purpose of organizing and maintaining a business exchange, not for pecuniary profit or gain, but to promote and protect all interest connected with the buying and selling of live stock at the Kansas City Stock Yards, and to cultivate courteous and manly conduct towards each other, and give dignity and responsibility to yard traders, have associated ourselves together under the name of Traders' Live Stock Exchange, and hereby agree, each with the other, that we will faithfully observe and be bound by the following rules and by-laws and such new rules, additions, or amendments as may from time to time be adopted in conformity with the provisions thereof from the date of organization." Rules 10, 11, 12, and 13 are as follows: "Rule 10. This exchange will not recognize any yard trader unless he is a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange. "Rule 11. When there are two or more parties trading together as partners, they shall each and all of them be members of this exchange. "Rule 12. No member of this exchangeshall employ any person to buy or sell cattle unless such person hold a certificate of membership in this exchange. "Rule 13. No member of this exchange shall be allowed to pay any order buyer or salesman any sum of money as a fee for buying cattle from or selling cattle to such party." These are the rules which are specially obnoxious to the complainants, and are alleged to be in their effect in violation of the Federal statute above mentioned. Messrs. R. E. Ball, I. P. Ryland, and John L. Peak, for appellants: A. 190; Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co. 35 U. S. App. 16, 66 Fed. Rep. 637, 14 C. C. A. 14; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 78 Fed. Rep. 712. The decree is violative of the rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, forbidding that any person be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law; and, if the act of July 2d, 1890, is correctly construed by the circuit court, it is itself violative of said amendment. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 123, 24 L. ed. 83; Kuhn v. Detroit, 70 Mich. 534; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 108, 29 L. R. A. 79; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 697, 34 L. ed. 818; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832. Messrs. John R. Walker and John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for appellee: The transportation of persons from one state into another is interstate commerce. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Pennsylva nia, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999; State, Wolf, v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 193. Telegraph messages passing over lines from one state to another constitute a por tion of interstate commerce. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ratterman, 127 U. S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 59; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. Conceding all the facts charged in the bill, even those in which the bill contradicts itself, the appellants are not engaged in, and ed. 708; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, their organization does not relate to, inter state commerce. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257; Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. Rep. 468; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 60 Fed. Rep. 306; Re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. ed. 539, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 30. No act or agreement of appellants, charged in the bill, and no act or agreement not so charged, but from the doing or enforcing of which they are enjoined, constitutes any violation of the act of Congress, or is otherwise unlawful. Prescott & A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 73 Fed. Rep. 438; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 544; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 19 L. R. A. 387; American Live Stock Commission Co. v. Chicago 122 U. Ş. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Norman, 77 Fed. Rep. 13; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 59. The right to import from one state into another carries with it, by necessary implication, the right of sale at the place where the importation terminates. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. ed. 150, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 143; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 In ters. Com. Rep. 36; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 58; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347. Not until merchandise in the original packages is once sold by the importer does it be come subject to taxation by the state. Wering v. Mobile, 8 Wall. 110, 19 L. ed. 2. The right to bring an article into a state carries with it the right to sell it. Spellman v. New Orleans, 45 Fed. Rep. 2, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 575; Re Harmon, 43 Fed. Rep. 372. The buying, selling, and transportation incident thereto, constitute commerce. United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325; Lehigh igh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. ed. 672, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 87; Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 392; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; W. A. Vandercook Co. v. Vance, 80 Fed. Rep. 786. The statutes of the state intended to regulate or tax, or to impose any other restrictions upon, the transmission of persons or property, or telegraphic messages from one state to another, are void. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 117 U. S. 34, 29 L. ed. 785. No state can impose a tax on persons engaged in the sale of goods in such state, which are introduced into the state from other states. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 29 L. ed. 691; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Re Lebolt, 77 Fed. Rep. 587. No state can, under any pretense whatever, interfere with the right of any person who engages in interstate commerce, whether in the sale of goods introduced into the state from other states, or in soliciting orders for goods to be so introduced. Ex parte Loeb, 72 Fed. Rep. 657; Southern R. Co. v. Asheville, 69 Fed. Rep. 359; Ex parte Hough, 69 Fed. Rep. 330, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 327; Re Minor, 69 Fed. Rep. 233, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 329; Aultman, M. & Co. v. Holder, 68 Fed. Rep. 467; Ex parte Scott, 66 Fed. Rep. 45; Rc Schechter, 63 Fed. Rep. 695, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 849; Re Mitchell, 62 Fed. Rep. 576, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 767; Re Worthen, 58 Fed. Rep. 467, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 484; Re Rozelle, 57 Fed. Rep. 155; Re Ware, 53 Fed. Rep. 783; Re Sanders, 52 Fed. Rep. 802, 18 L. R. A. 549, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 305; Re McAllister, 51 Fed. Rep. 282; Re Nichols, 48 Fed. Rep. 164; Re Tyerman, 48 Fed. Rep. 167; Re Houston, 47 Fed. Rep. 539, 14 L. R. A. 719; Re Kimmel, 41 Fed. Rep. 775, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 114; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. ed. 683; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 41 L. ed. 586: Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658; Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396, 37 L. ed. 216; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595; Ash er v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 32 L. ed. 368, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 241; Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502, 30 L. ed. 699, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 50; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 28 L. ed. 653; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 16 L. ed. 243; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702; Re Bell, 25 U. S. App. 379, 68 Fed. Rep. 183, 15 С. С. А. 360. The conduct and method of doing business by the members of this Traders' Live Stock Exchange is an interference with interstate commerce, and the association is illegal. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007; Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572. *Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the [612] facts, delivered the opinion of the court: There is really no dispute in regard to the facts in the case. Although the bill contains various allegations in regard to conspiracies, agreements, and combinations in restraint of trade and in violation of the Federal statute, yet there is no evidence of any act on the part of the defendants preventing access to the yards or preventing purchases and sales of cattle by anyone, other than as such sales may be prevented by the mere refusal on the part of the defendants as "yard traders" to do business with those who are also yard traders, but are not members of the exchange, or with commission merchants where such commission merchants themselves do business with yard traders who are not members of the exchange. In other words, there is no evidence and really no charge against the defendants that they have done anything other than to form this exchange and adopt and enforce the rules mentioned above, and the question is whether by their adoption and by peacefully carrying them out without threats and without violence, but by the mere refusal to do business with those who will not respect their rules, there is a violation of the Federal statute. This case differs from that of Hopkins v. United States, ante, 290, in the fact that these defendants are themselves purchasers of cattle on the market, while the defendants in the Hopkins Case were only commission merchants who sold the cattle upon commission as a compensation for their services. Counsel for the government assert that any agreement or combination among buyers of cattle coming from other states, of the nature of the by-laws in question, is an agreement or combination in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. The facts first set forth in the complainants' bill, upon which to base the claim that the business of defendants is interstate commerce, we have already decided in the Hopkins Case to be immaterial. The particular situation of the yards, partly in Kansas and 1898. ANDERSON v. UNITED STATES. partly in Missouri, we there held was a fact without any weight, and one which did not [613]make business interstate *commerce which otherwise would not partake of that character. There remain in the bill of the complainants the allegations that the cattle come from various states and are placed on sale at these stock yards which form the only available market for many miles around, and that they are sold by the commission merchants and are bought in large numbers by the defendants who have entered into what the complainants allege to be a contract, combination, and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states, which contract, etc., it is alleged is carried out by defendants unlawfully and oppressively refusing to purchase cattle from a com with its conditions of membership, and may The defendants are engaged in buying what mission merchant who sells or purchases cat-tween them and all buyers not members tle from any speculator (yard trader) who There is no evidence that these defendants In regard to rule 10, the question is whether, without a violation of the act of Congress, persons who are engaged in the common business as yard traders of buying [614]cattle at the *Kansas City stock yards, which come from different states, may agree among themselves that they will form an association for the better conduct of their business, and that they will not transact business with other yard traders who are not members, nor will they buy cattle from those who also sell to yard traders who are rt members of the association. thereof, who are not also yard traders. Have the defendants the right to agree to Whether there is any violation of the act of Congress by the adoption and enforcement of the other rules of the association, above referred to, will be considered hereafter. It is first contended on the part of the apstate commerce or trade, and that therefore pellants that they are not engaged in inter-[615] their agreement is not a violation of the act. They urge that the cattle, by being taken from the cars in which they were transported and placed in the various pens hired by commission merchants at the cattle yards of Kansas City, and there set up for sale, have thereby been commingled with the general mass of other property in the state, and that their interstate commercial character has ceased within the decisions of this court in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 [29: 257], and Pittsburg & S. Coal Company v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577 [39:538]. On the other hand, it is answered that the cases cited involved nothing but the general power of the state to tax all property found within its limits, by virtue of general laws providing for such taxation, where no tax is levied upon the article or discrimination made against it by reason of the fact that it has come from another state, and it is maintained that the agreement in question acts directly upon the subject of interstate commerce and adds a restraint to it which is unlawful under the provisions of the statute. In the view we take of this case we are not called upon to decide whether the de fendants are or are not engaged in interstate It will be remembered that the association with others who are not members, for the 20 by the by-laws is not one in restraint of that It has already been stated in the Hopkins 305 1 |