of the furnace and would tend to produce less smoke than coal that is distributed unevenly by hand, and this is true even if firing by hand is carefully performed. Since there is a reasonable classification between how the same coal is burned, and it applied equally and uniformly to all coal users in the city of St. Louis, we cannot say that it is an arbitrary classification." In Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines (239 U. S. 486; 60 L. Ed. 396, 401; 36 S. Ct. 206, 208), the court said: "So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, we have no doubt the State may by itself, or through authorized municipalities, declare the emission of dense smoke in cities or populous neighborhoods a nuisance and subject to restraint as such; and that the harshness of such legislation, or its effect upon business interests, short of a merely arbitrary enactment, are not valid constitutional objections. Nor is there any valid Federal constitutional objection in the fact that the regulation may require the discontinuance of the use of property, or subject the occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the law or ordinance. Recent cases in this court are Reinman v. Little Rock (237 U. S. 171, 59 L. Ed. 900, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511); Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Tranberger (238 U. S. 67, 59 L. Ed. 1204, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, decided December 20, 1915 (239 U. S. 394, ante, 348, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143). "That such emission of smoke is within the regulatory power of the State has been often affirmed by State courts. Harmon v. Chicago (110 Ill. 400, 51 Am. Rep. 698); Bowers v. Indianapolis (169 Ind. 105, 81 N. E. 1097, 13 Ann. Cas. 1198); People v. Lewis (86 Mich. 273, 49 N. W. 140); St. Paul v. Haughbro (93 Minn. 59, 66 L. R. A. 441, 106 Am. St. Rep. 427, 100 N. W. 470, 2 Ann. Cas. 580); State v. Tower (185 Mo. 79, 68 L. R. A. 402, 84 S. W. 10); Rochester v. Macauley-Fein Mill Co. (199 N. Y. 207, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 554, 92 N. E. 641). And such appears to be the law in Iowa. McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co. (140 Iowa, 429, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, 118 N. W. 786)." See also: Judson v. L. A. Suburban Gas Co. (157 Cal. 168), where an injunction was granted at the request of a neighbor closing a gas plant where it was shown that, although it had the most modern equipment, it could not operate without emitting objectionable smoke and fumes. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co. (161 Cal. 239), where an $800,000 cement plant was closed under similar circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was willing to buy up all of the property affected by its cement dust. People v. Selby Smelting and Lead Co. (163 Cal. 84), where the court in Solano County enjoined the operation of a smelter in Contra Costa County during the 8 months of each year when the winds blew toward Solano County. Rules of the air-pollution-control district are effective throughout the district. The district's boundaries are coextensive with those of the county (sec. 24201, Health and Safety Code). Thus, the rules of the district are enforceable within cities as well as in the unincorporated areas of the county. (See secs. 24247– 24250, Health and Safety Code.) Section 24246, health and safety code, authorizes the air pollution control officer to “*** stop, detain and inspect any vehicle designed for and used on a public highway but which does not run on rails." Failure to stop for such inspection is a misdemeanor (sec. 24246, health and safety code). Clearly, the Air Pollution Control Act applies to motor vehicles the same as to other sources of air contamination. The question might be raised as to whether the vehicle code has occupied the field so as to prevent the air pollution control board from adopting further regulations as to what equipment a motor vehicle must bear. Because of the different purposes involved, and because of the more recent and more specific authorization of the Air Pollution Control Act, we think that doctrine does not apply and the air pollution control board may require the use of such a device, if that is reasonable and practicable. Furthermore, division 9 of the vehicle code is entitled "Traffic Laws." It refers "*** exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon the highways ***" (Sec. 457, vehicle code.) It includes such matters as stop signs, reporting accidents, drunk driving, theft of a vehicle, speed limits, passing, turning, right of way, pedestrians, safety zones, parking, etc. Section 458 (a part of division 9) vehicle code, reads as follows: "The provisions of this division are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this division unless expressly authorized herein.” Division 10 of the vehicle code deals with equipment, such as lights (sec. 618, et seq.), brakes (sec. 670), horns (sec. 671); mufflers (sec. 673), mirrors (sec. 674), windshields (sec. 675), safety glass (sec. 675.5), windshield stickers (sec. 676), and radiator ornaments (sec. 683). None of these provisions deal with smog control devices. There is no provision in division 10 similar to the prohibition of local regulation in division 9. "*** Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed" (23 Cal. Jur. 778, statutes, sec. 154); People v. Buster (11 Cal. 215 at 221); Estate of Garthwaite (131 Cal. App. 321 at 326, 21 p. 2d 465); People v. Valentine (28 Cal. 2d 121 at 142, 169 P. 2d 1); Weil v. Superior Court (97 Cal. App. 2d 373 at 377, 217 P. 2d 975 at 978); People v. Town of Corte Madera (97 Cal. App. 2d 726 at bottom of page 729, 218 P. 2d 810); Richfield Oil Corporation v. Crawford (39 Cal. 2d 729 at 735, 239 P. 2d 600 at 604). We think it may be inferred that the legislature did not intend to occupy the field in connection with equipment required in division 10. Thus, the district may require additional equipment not in conflict with provisions of State law. The classification of motor vehicles in division 10 of the vehicle code for the purpose of requiring certain equipment frequently distinguishes between new and old vehicles. For instance, section 619, as to the location of headlamps, provides: “* * * except as to vehicles registered prior to January 1, 1930." Section 621.5 requires vehicles to carry certain red reflectors after January 1, 1941, unless a different type was installed as original equipment prior to January 1, 1941. Section 625 formerly provided that certain clearance lamps be used on or after January 1, 1940, but that "vehicles sold or operated prior to January 1, 1940, may be equipped with ***" lights of another type. (See also secs. 645, 648, 670.4, 675.5, and 683, vehicle code.) Section 660 provides: "No dealer shall sell a new or used motor vehicle without first testing and, if necessary, adjusting the lights and brakes on such vehicle to conform with the provisions of this code unless such vehicle is sold for the purpose of being wrecked or dismantled." Prior to 1951, this section provided: "No dealer shall sell a used motor vehicle ***" Section 676 provides: "*** Every new motor vehicle first registered after December 31, 1949, *** shall be equipped with two such windshield wipers ***" A regulation such as this is not invalid because it classifies the subject matter of the regulation. However, the classification must be reasonable in view of the purpose of the act. (Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co. (240 U. S. 342, 357; 60 L. Ed. 679); People v. Western Fruit Growers (22 Cal. 2d 494, 506-507).) Thus, treating new cars differently than other cars is a valid classification if reasonable under the circumstances. The ease of enforcement and the practical advantages of having the air pollution control device installed either at the factory or by a responsible new car dealer would seem to be sufficient to justify a distinction between new cars and old cars. This is particularly true if the device is difficult to install or requires replacement of major parts of the motor vehicle. Details of the proposed rule can best be worked out after some such device has been made available and its possibilities and limitations known. It may work on certain types of vehicles and not on others, or only with certain fuels. From its very nature it may have to be factory-installed. Or it may be so simple that anyone can install it in a few minutes, in which case it might be unreasonable not to apply it to all motor vehicles. If it is practicable to add the device to vehicles not so equipped at the factory, the rule could set a time limit after which the use of the device would be required on all motor vehicles. The rule should exempt vehicles sold here for use elsewhere. It is not necessary that the legislation extend to all possible cases (Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 383; Ballentine v. Nestor, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S. W. 2d 378, 383). In the Miller case, the Supreme Court said (236 U. S. at 393-394): "*** The contention as to the various omissions which are noted in the objections here urged ignores the well-established principle that the legislature is not bound, in order to support the constitutional validity of its regulation, to extend it to all cases which it might possibly reach. Dealing with practical exigencies, the legislature may be guided by experience. (Patsone v. Pennsyl vania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 58 L. ed. 539, 543, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281.) It is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. As has been said, it may 'proceed cautiously, step by step,' and ‘if an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business' it is not necessary that the prohibition 'should be couched in all-embracing terms.' However, we are informed by the air pollution control district engineers that there is no device on the market as yet which will reduce or eliminate the emission of fumes from motor vehicles. One device is being tested, another is still in the designing stage. It is not known whether either will work. Neither is it known how long it will be before some such device, after being proved practicable, will be available commercially. Until such a device is perfected and on the market, any rule requiring the use of the device is arbitrary, capricious, and void, unless the hazard to life and property is so great that a rule would be justified forbidding the sale or use of motor vehicles in this county. From the facts given to us, the board could conclude that there is no such emergency now in Los Angeles County. Once a satisfactory device is perfected, shown to be effective for the purpose and practicable in operation, then the regulation proposed could be adopted, allowing sufficient time before it becomes effective to get the device on the market in reasonable quantities. As it is impossible to tell when such a device may be invented, or, if invented, when perfected for motor vehicle use and shown to be practicable, no such regulation could be adopted now to be effective at a future date. We conclude that the rule you suggest, with certain modifications, can be adopted when the required device is available, but not until then. Yours very truly, Noted and approved: HAROLD W. KENNEDY, County Counsel. Mr. KENNEDY. I am the county counsel of the county of Los Angeles. We have an air pollution control district created by the 1947 California Legislature. I was making reference to the situation as it exists, not only in Los Angeles County, but in other parts of the State and would not want the committee to believe that the air pollution problem was exclusively confined to the county of Los Angeles. STATEWIDE PROBLEM I recently attended and testified at a public meeting called by the board of supervisors of Alameda County, which is a large industrial county in the San Francisco Bay area. At that meeting they were determining whether or not to activate an air pollution control district under the 1947 State statute which I had been asked to draft for the board of supervisors of the county of Los Angeles in 1946, and its author Assemblyman A. I. Stewart of Pasadena. At this public meeting in Alameda County, the testimony was that as Alameda County became a large industrial community with a greater aggregate of pollutants, they, too, in time would have a serious air pollution problem. The meteorologists testified at the Alameda County hearing that the whole Pacific coast area is affected by what the meteorologists call an "inversion ceiling." It is a high-pressure area or mass of warm air reaching out into the Pacific Ocean. Apparently, you are familiar with it. In a very practical way, at certain times of the year it creates what might be called a canopy of warm air that holds the colder air, together with the aggregate of pollutants, close to the earth. Sometimes the ceiling will be as low as several hundred feet. Maybe it will be a thousand feet, or fifteen hundred fet. Until there is enough air activity that will create a hole in this ceiling and in effect blow out the basin, then this pollutant is there for an extended period. Two years ago, there was one sustained period of inversion weather where for 21 days there was this peculiar meteorological condition. Last week I addressed a public meeting in the city of San Diego at the invitation of the board of supervisors and the district attorney. The county of San Diego is considering creating an air pollution district, and several civic organizations are recommending one before the problem becomes acute. Here is a copy of the Pasadena Star News of only last Saturday, April 10, 1954. They reported a story that came out of a report from the scientists from Stanford Research Laboratory where a Mr. Paul A. Magill, the technical director, gave the figure at a statewide meeting of the State chamber of commerce, "that smog is costing the Nation $1,500 million a year, or about $50 a family." I would like to have placed in the record this story from the Pasadena Star News. Senator GOLDWATER (presiding). That will be received and made a part of the record. (The article referred to follows:) [From the Pasadena (Calif.) Star-News, April 10, 1954] SMOG COSTS NATION $50 PER FAMILY-INDUSTRY DECLARED HARDEST HIT-STANFORD STUDY POINTS OUT STAGGERING LOSS OAKLAND, CALIF.-Scientists from Stanford University have estimated that smog is costing the Nation $1.5 billion a year, or about $50 a family. Paul A. Magill, technical director at the Stanford Research Laboratory, gave these figures concerning air pollution at the State chahmber of commerce convention here yesterday. Magill said industry had the most to lose by letting the air pollution problem continue without a solution. Valuable industrial materials, especially sulfuric acid went up in smoke every day, he said. He also pointed out that smog has given industry some poor public relations and some people have gone as far as legal action. Surveys in the Los Angeles area, Magill stated, showed that 2,600 tons of materials were going up in smoke daily. Of this amount, 1,000 tons came from auto and truck exhausts. Magill recommended that industry take the lead in air pollution control and then educate the public how best to combat it. LOS ANGELES COUNTY HAS TAKEN MANY STEPS TO ABATE SMOG Mr. KENNEDY. I would like to also make the point that as far as the county of Los Angeles is concerned, we have not come to Government for a grant-in-aid without having taken very stern steps to try to find our own solutions. Up to the present time, since the activation of the air pollution control district in October of 1947, the county of Los Angeles has spent more than $2 million out of its general fund. At the present time, we have 126 employees in the air pollution district. I recite that because in a practical way the pro visions of the Capehart-Kuchel amendment to the bill as a whole will not change the principle that it is the responsibility of government to move forward under its own police power to abate, and as far as activation and enforcement it is a inatter for local determination. FLEXIBILITY UNDER CAPEHART-KUCHEL AMENDMENT The things that would be made possible under the proposed amendments to this bill would fit in very well in not disturbing the principle of local autonomy, in not changing the local responsibility, in not putting the Federal Government in the enforcement business, but the Federal Government would be giving very great assistance to cities, counties, States and special districts. I would like to read into the record a statement from Gordon P. Larson, the director of the Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District, in support of Senate bill 2938: The following information is submitted to show the cost of control equipment installed to reduce atmospheric pollution in Los Angeles County in the past 5 years. The amounts include total costs for a great variety of control devices on virtually every type of industry in this community. NEED OF COOPERATION FROM INDUSTRY As of March 1954, there has been spent, because of the strict enforcement rule of the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District, a large amount of money by industry for abatement devices exclusively (these figures which I will give do not include any revised operating costs where they reconstructed their plant, the effect of which might be to reduce the smog pollution). These figures represent cost of special devices such as scrubbers, cyclones and different types of mechanical equipment where industry has been forced, under the strict enforcement policy of the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District to make an expenditure from which they receive no revenue. The total to date is $21,104,000. I will ask that that also be placed into the record. Senator GOLDWATER. That will become a part of the record. (The information referred to follows:) Statement in support of S. 2938. CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIRS: The following information is submitted to show the cost of control equipment installed to reduce atmospheric pollution in Los Angeles County in the past 5 years. The amounts include total costs for a great variety of control devices on virtually every type of industry in this community: GORDON P. LARSON, Director. I trust this material will be of value in your consideration. |