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in the rear of the former line. Having in the meantime learned of this new disaster on his right, and fearful of further exposure of his right flank, General Thomas reluctantly gave the order to fall back to the old position, which the men did in the most excellent order. . . . On the morning of the 20th (Sunday) General Rosecrans the line stretched in the following order, from right to left right, then Sheridan, with one brigade in reserve; Wood, two brigades of Brannan, with the other and all of Van Cleve in reserve; Reynolds, Palmer, Baird, Johnston and Negley on the extreme left, the latter three divisions furnishing their own reserves.

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Along Thomas' front there had been built during the night a rude breastwork for the protection of the men. . . . Generals Crittenden and McCook had not taken the same wise precautions, or the day might, perhaps, have gone otherwise.

Longstreet still held the right, D. H. Hill had the centre and Polk the left of the rebel line, now well established west of the Chickamauga creek.

The fog on the morning of the 20th lifted slowly . . . when the battle opened with a furious assault on Thomas' left.

. . . the storm, in all its fury, burst along the plain, enveloping the lines of Negley, Johnston, Baird and Palmer no farther and to this part it was confined for nearly two hours. I despair of giving any correct idea of this engagement. . . . For two hours that line never wavered. Can you not guess the result on the other side? . . .

At this time it was noon, and Thomas had not budged an inch from his position. . . .

Lying under Reynolds' works at this hour, my attention was called to evident movements in the thick woods in his front and on his right. The dust revealed that the enemy was there, and soon it was known all along the line that he was pushing forward to attack the right and centre. The fight on the left continued with great fury: but Brannan had arrived in time to save that flank. The danger was now in the front and right. The enemy . . . advanced with great rapidity, and in a moment Reynolds, Brannan, Palmer, Wood and Sheridan were hotly engaged. But the fight was of short duration. The right and centre- I will not attempt to explain how - gave way in ten minutes after the fight began, and fled rapidly across the fields towards the mountains. Davis, struck in flank, was cut off with Sheridan, while Palmer and Wood, making desperate efforts to repel the overwhelming assault of the rebels, made with an

impetus which of itself should have insured success, were forced back in the opposite direction. Van Cleve, struck while en route to aid the left, made no resistance deserving of the name, but was seen flying in mad retreat across an open field, where Rosecrans' headquarters were. I can remember seeing in the distance the vain endeavors of Rosecrans and his staff to rally them. The rebels pushed on after the flying columns, increasing the wild panic which possessed them, and all the personal exertions of the chief and his staff were in vain. The rout of Sheridan, Davis, Van Cleve, and the most of Wood and Palmer, was now complete. General Rosecrans, cut off with Sheridan, Davis and Van Cleve, was forced, with McCook and Crittenden, far to the right, and in three hours after, borne along by the current, and cut off from Thomas, all three were pushed by the flying columns into Rossville and Chattanooga.

Thomas still remained on the field, with remnants of his glorious old corps; and the man who had the day before, in equal contest, defeated the boastful chivalry of Longstreet, now bent all his energies, with an unequal force, to cover the retreat and save the flying army from absolute destruction.

. . . But this abandonment of the field by the centre and right enabled the enemy to do with Thomas' right what he had signally failed, at frightful cost, to do with his left, and soon the rebels were pushing forward upon Wood and Palmer, doubling them up and pushing them back upon Brannan and Reynolds. . . .

. . . The raid had begun at twelve o'clock; the stand of Thomas was made in half an hour, and the repulse and check of the enemy had been effected in a desperate engagement along the whole of this little line of not over fifteen minutes' duration.

Imagine this line a thread without supports-the whole force to the

front line a force not over 20,000 and no one who saw it and who writes of it will put it at so much and you have in your mind's eye the heroic corps which saved the whole army. And imagine the black lines of a powerful enemy marching upon it flank and front, and all the time pressing it closely in front and flank. . . .

General Thomas, near the centre of the army, was engaged, about one o'clock . . . watching a heavy cloud of dust in his rear, in such a direction that it might be General Granger with reinforcements, or it might be the enemy.

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crescent-shaped battle flag of Gordon Granger. . one, Steadman first, and Gordon Granger afterwards, had wrung the hand of the statue Thomas, who had gone all through the terrible scenes of the last two days' battle to be melted and moved at this hour. . . .

. . . Steadman in position, and the others notified as to his purpose, Thomas, with all the assurance of power and strength, assumed the offensive, and, while the enemy were actually moving on his flanks, intending to envelop him, positively made an attack and, in a fight of ten minutes of desperate encounter, knocked the centre out of their line and dislodged them from the position which they had held. . . .

Driven from his pressing position in the centre, the enemy did not fail to continue his manœuvres on our flanks, and at times succeeded in pushing them in, giving the line more and more the appearance of a horseshoe. But a general lull had followed the fight I have last mentioned, and that lull lasted until about sunset. Thomas was not disposed to attack, and the enemy were contented to manœuvre upon the flanks, perfectly confident, as he seemed, of surrounding our little force.

. . . the rebels, as if eager to consummate the victory ere the day should die out, pushed up for a last and overwhelming attack. It was five o'clock when the last combat of the battle began, and the sun refused to look upon its end.

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Our men were short of ammunition, and had orders to make what they had serve the best effect. Yet, despite this precaution, all along our line a most furious fire was kept up. I do not say that ammunition was wasted; for we had reason subsequently to know that the fire had been marked by most deadly effect, and that the last repulse of the battle was one of the most bloody to the rebels. There were but two charges, but each so admirably sustained by the rebels that only the desperate defence of our men could have repulsed them. . . .

. . . The aim of the enemy, persistently pursued from the beginning, was to get possession of Chattanooga. In that he was foiled, foiled for the present and the future; for it is now impossible to gain it. . . .

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During the night of Sunday Gen. Thomas fell back from his position on the field to Rossville, where he held a strong position in the gap of Missionary Ridge, in which the town is situated. The enemy reconnoitered this position the next day, but failed to attack. During the same day the corps fell back to Chattanooga.

New York Herald, September 27, 1863.

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123.

"Battle above the Clouds" (1863)

BY MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE HENRY THOMAS

Thomas, like most of the other successful generals in the Civil War, was educated at West Point. He was a Virginian; but he remained loyal, and through the confidence inspired in his reliability gradually became one of the great generals of the western armies. His claim to fame rests equally upon his sturdy defence at Chickamauga (see No. 122 above) and his skilful attack at Nashville (see No. 138 below). His official report of the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, from which this extract is taken, embraced only the operations of his own army; but his forces were the dominant factor in the victory. For Thomas, see T. B. Van Horne, Life of Major-General George H. Thomas. - Bibliography as in No. 122 above.

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S soon as communications with Bridgeport had been made secure, and the question of supplying the army at this point rendered certain, preparations were at once commenced for driving the enemy from his position in our immediate front on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge....

Major-General Sherman, commanding Army of the Tennessee, having been ordered with the Fifteenth Corps to this point to participate in the operations against the enemy, reached Bridgeport with two divisions on the 15th [November]. He came to the front himself, and having examined the ground, expressed himself confident of his ability to execute his share of the work. The plan of operations was then written out substantially as follows: Sherman, with the Fifteenth Corps, strengthened with one division from my command, was to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on Saturday, November 21, at daylight. . . . After crossing his force, he was to carry the heights of Missionary Ridge from their northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy could concentrate a force against him. I was to co-operate with Sherman by concentrating my troops in Chattanooga Valley, on my left flank. . . . I was then to effect a junction with Sherman, making my advance from the left, well toward the north end of Mission Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with Sherman as possible. . .

. . . In consequence of the bad condition of the roads General Sherman's troops were occupied all of Sunday in getting into position. In the meantime, the river having risen, both pontoon bridges were broken by rafts sent down the river by the enemy, cutting off Osterhaus' division from the balance of Sherman's troops. It was thought this would delay us another day, but during the night of the 22d, two deserters

reported Bragg had fallen back, and that there was only a strong picket line in our front. Early on the morning of the 23d, I received a note from Major-General Grant, directing me to ascertain by a demonstration the truth or falsity of this report.

Orders were accordingly given to General Granger, commanding the Fourth Corps, to form his troops and to advance directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the strength of the enemy. General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, was directed to support General Granger's right, with Baird's division refused and en échelon. . . . The two divisions of Granger's corps (Sheridan's and Wood's) were formed in front of Fort Wood; Sheridan on the right, Wood on the left, with his left extending nearly to Citico Creek. The formation being completed about 2 p. m. the troops were advanced steadily and with rapidity directly to the front, driving before them first the rebel pickets, then their reserves, and falling upon their grand guards stationed in their first line of rifle-pits, captured something over 200 men, and secured themselves in their new positions before the enemy had sufficiently recovered from his surprise to attempt to send re-enforcements from his main camp. Orders were then given to General Granger to make his position secure by constructing temporary breastworks and throwing out strong pickets to his front. . . . The troops remained in that position for the night. The Tennessee River having risen considerably from the effect of the previous heavy rain-storm, it was found difficult to rebuild the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry. Therefore it was determined that General Hooker should take Osterhaus' division, which was still in Lookout Valley, and Geary's division, Whitaker's and Grose's brigades, of the First Division, Fourth Corps, under BrigadierGeneral Cruft, and make a strong demonstration on the western slope of Lookout Mountain, for the purpose of attracting the enemy's attention in that direction and thus withdrawing him from Sherman while crossing the river at the mouth of the South Chickamauga.

General Hooker was instructed that in making this demonstration, if he discovered the position and strength of the enemy would justify him in attempting to carry the point of the mountain, to do so. By 4 a. m. on the morning of the 24th, General Hooker reported his troops in position and ready to advance.

... Hooker's movements were facilitated by the heavy mist which overhung the mountain, enabling Geary to get into position without attracting attention.

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