and Bullock's transactions were surrounded with the utmost secrecy, screened by the employment of intermediate agents; and what the Government of the United States knew or suspected about them appears to have been derived from reports which they were unable to authenticate. After the departure of the Alabama, Bullock does not appear to have succeeded in sending to sea a single vessel intended for a Confederate cruiser. After the arrest of the Alexandra and the defeat of the scheme for procuring the two rams, he seems to have transferred his operations to France, where he contracted for six iron-clads, and succeeded in obtaining one. It does not appear, nor does the British Government understand the United States to allege, that he had anything to do with the Georgia or Shenandoah. 91. It must be observed, further, that schemes and operations, such as are attributed to Bullock, can in England be repressed by the interposition of the Executive, only when and so far as they take the form of actual infringements of the law. The law selects those acts which it is practicable and expedient to prohibit and punish as criminal, and these it prohibits and punishes; the Executive can act only by enforcing the law, and it has not the power to expel from its territory persons whose proceedings it may disapprove, or whom it may regard with suspicion. Nor does Her Majesty's Government understand that such a power exists in the United States. The numerous expeditions which have been fitted out in the United States against friendly countries have been organized systematically by persons residing in the United States, sometimes resident there for that special purpose. But the Government of the United States has admitted no liability on that account,2 and has not interfered, unless or until it had reason to believe that the law was being broken. The payment of money to the families or relatives of men serving in Confederate ships was not a breach of the law. On the other hand, enlisting men for that service, or inducing them to go abroad for that purpose, was an offense; and, whenever evidence of this could be obtained, prosecutions were instituted against the persons incriminated.* 3 In a letter, dated January 27, 1865, from Mr. Morse, the Consul of the United States in London, communicated by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, mention was made of the "head of the Confederate Navy Department in Europe, Commodore Barron." This officer was resident at Paris, from whence he appears to have issued instructions to officers commanding Confederate ships of war. A letter of instructions from him to the Commander of the Florida, dated Paris, 25th January, 1864, was found on board of that vessel when captured at Bahia. Her Bri1 Appendix to Counter Case of the United States, pp. 850, 857; British Counter Case, p. 122. * In a correspondence which has recently passed between the Governments of the United States and of Nicaragua, and which has been published in the Official Gazette of the latter Republic, the United States have distinctly declined to agree to the reference to a Commission of the claims of Nicaraguan citizens arising out of the acts of filibustering expeditions from the United States, and the bombardment of Greytown, declining all responsibility in regard to these claims, and stating that, as regards the acts of Walker, the filibustering chief, they felt conscious that they had fulfilled all that could be required of them, either by the laws of the United States or by international law. 3 British Counter Case, pp. 25-47; pp. 82-85, (note.) 4 See the trial of Messrs. Jones and Highatt, for enlisting men for the Georgia; of Mr. Rumble, for enlisting men for the Rappahannock; of Captain Corbett, for enlisting men for the Shenandoah; of James Cunningham, Edward and James Campbell, and John Seymour. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. iv, pp. 550–618. 5 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. ii, p. 175. 6 Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 150. tannic Majesty's Government is not aware that any proceedings were taken against Commodore Barron by the Government of France. 92. It would be extravagant to contend that the want of power to prevent a belligerent from having agencies in a neutral country for the purpose of making mercantile contracts for such articles as it needs, or for the payment and receipt of money on its account, (although some of such contracts and payments may have been connected with ships intended for, or actually in, its service,) is equivalent to a permission to that belligerent to employ the neutral territory as "a base of naval operations." 93. Upon this subject it seems necessary to observe that, although, in the diplomatic correspondence, during the war, of the American Government with Mr. Adams, its minister in Great Britain, and of Mr. Adams with the British Government, allegations were frequently made that Great Britain and her colonies were used as a " base of operations" against the United States, that "war was virtually carried on,” and that hostile "expeditions" were prepared from and in British portsthe same correspondence, when examined with care, and with a due regard to the order of events, proves that these and similar phrases were really employed to describe what the Government of the United States regarded as the combined and aggregate effect of a great variety of matters-the existence of Confederate agencies and agents in Great Britain, the supplies of arms, munitions of war, and ships, by blockade-running and otherwise, to the Confederate States, and the negotiation of the Confederate cotton loan-with each and all of which the British Government was continually urged to interfere, although (except as to such of them as could be brought within the terms of the Foreign-Enlistment Act) they were neither enabled by their own municipal law, nor bound by international law, to do so. 94. Of this statement, the following proofs will suffice. On the 12th May, 1862, Mr. Adams wrote thus to Earl Russell: "It is very certain that many British subjects are now engaged in undertakings of a hostile character to a foreign State, which, though not technically within the strict letter of the enlistment act, are as much contrary to its spirit as if they levied war directly. Their measures embrace all the operations preliminary to openly carrying on war-the supply of men, and ships, and arms, and money, to one party, in order that they may be the better enabled to overcome the other;" and he, immediately afterward, speaks * * of "this virtual levying of war from the ports of a friendly power."1 On the 9th March, 1863, (many months after the Alabama had commenced her cruise,) Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams on the subject of a recent capture by the Florida, and of the question, then under consideration by the President, whether letters of marque should be granted to protect the commercial marine of the United States against the confederate cruisers. "The argument," he said, " as it is put in American commercial circles, is, that war is carried on against the United States by forces levied and dispatched from the British Islands, while the United States are at peace with Great Britain. Though we may regard this statement of the case as extravagant, if not altogether erroneous, it cannot be concealed that it has sufficient appearance of truth on this side of the ocean to render it necessary to protect our commerce by employing every possible means of defense." 2 This dispatch was read by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell on the 26th March, 1863.3 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 663. In replying to these and similar letters, the distinction between what had actually been done, and a virtual carrying on of war from Great Britain, or the use of British territory as a base of warlike operations, was well pointed out by Earl Russell, in letters dated the 12th June, 1862, 27th March, 1863, and 2d April, 1863;1 at the same time that he declared the determination of the British Government to use all the means in its power to prevent any breaches of the Foreign-Enlistment Act. The good faith with which those declarations were acted on was on many subsequent occasions acknowledged. Mr. Adams, on the 6th of April, 1863, with reference to certain American authorities which had been appealed to by Earl Russell and the soundness of which he (Mr. Adams) admitted, thus put his argument: "The sale and transfer, by a neutral, of arms, of munitions of war, and even of vessels of war, to a belligerent country, not subject to blockade at the time, as a purely commercial transaction, is decided by these authorities not to be unlawful. They go not a step further; and precisely to that extent I have myself taken no exception to the doctrine. But the case is changed when a belligerent is shown to be taking measures to establish a system of operations in a neutral country, with the intent to carry on a war from its ports much in the same way that it would do, if it could, from its own territory; when it appoints agents residing in that country for the purpose of borrowing money to be applied to the fitting out of hostile armaments in those very ports, and when it appoints and sends out agents to superintend in those ports the constructing, equipping, and arming ships of war, as well as the enlisting of the subjects of the neutral country, to issue forth for the purpose of carrying on hostilities on the ocean."2 The doctrine suggested in this letter, that the existence of a blockade gives to a trade in articles contraband of war with the blockaded belligerent a character different, in the view of international law, (so far as the duties of a neutral Government are concerned,) from that which it would otherwise possess, is (as Her. Majesty's Government conceives) entirely unwarranted, either by reason or by authority. 3 On the 14th November, 1863, Mr. Seward, communicating to Mr. Adams information which he had received from the Canadian authori ties, as to certain designs of emigrant insurgents in Canada against the territory of the United States, and expressing the satisfaction of the President at the friendly proceedings of those authorities, followed up a suggestion as to some possible amendments of the laws of the two nations, by the inquiry: "Could we possibly avoid conflicts between the two countries, if British shores or provinces should, through any misunderstanding, be suffered to become bases for military and naval operations against the United States ?" He then, apparently, still considered the suggestion that they had already become so, (in the language of his former letter of the 9th March, 1863,) as "extravagant, if not altogether erroneous." Yet, on the 6th of January, 1864, he wrote to Mr. Adams as if certain papers, showing "that the belligerents have a regularly constituted treasury and counting house, with agents in Lon don for paying the wages of the British subjects who are enlisted there in this nefarious service," were sufficient to "prove, beyond a possible doubt, that a systematic naval war has been carried on for more than a year, by subjects of Her Majesty, from the British Islands as a base;" and that, by means of this evidence, the difficulty previously felt by Her Majesty's Government in acting upon remonstrances, which were Appendix to Case of United States, vol. i, pp. 665, 584, 589. 3 Ibid., p. 576. 2 Ibid., pp. 591, 592. "held inconclusive and unsatisfactory, because it was said that they were not attended with such clear, direct, and conclusive proofs of the offenses complained of as would enable the Government to arrest the offenders, and apply judicial correction to the practices indicated," had been "fully and completely removed."1 This was followed up, on the 11th of March, 1864, by another letter from Mr. Seward, in which he said: "It was seen, as we thought, early in the month of December last, that British ports, at home and abroad, were becoming a base for operations, hostile and dangerous to the United States; and, on the 2d of July, 1864, by a further letter, saying (with manifest reference to the trade of blockade-runners, carried on from the Bahamas and elsewere,) "You can hardly omit to inform Earl Russell that the whole of the British West India Islands are practically used by our insurgent enemies as a base for hostile operations against the United States; and the profits derived by British subjects from these enterprises are avowed in every part of the British empire with as much freedom, and as much satisfaction, as if the operations were in conformity with international law, and with treaties." 3 It is satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to be able to add to these extracts another, from a letter written by Mr. Seward on the 28th of the same month of July, 1864: "During the latter part of the year 1863, the Government of Great Britain manifested a decided determination, not only to avoid intervention, but also to prevent unlawful naval intervention by British subjects. This manifestation produced a very happy effect in the United States." 4 95. What was, from time to time, actually and successfully done by Great Britain to prevent any unlawful equipments, or augmentation of the naval force of the Confederate Government within her territory, has been sufficiently stated in the British Case. The Arbitrators also know in what instances, and under what circumstances, the vigilance of Her Majesty's Government is said to have been insufficient, or to have been eluded. But a still more adequate conception of the difference, between the plans which, according to the information from time to time obtained by the agents of the United States, were formed or supposed to have been formed, for obtaining ships useful for war purposes of the Confederate States from British territory, and the actual results of those plans, (and, therefore, a more adequate conception of the general efficacy of the attitude assumed and the means used by the British Government for the maintenance of Her Majesty's neutrality.) may be arrived at from some other parts of the same correspondence, contained in the first volume of the Appendix to the Case of the United States. 96. In August, 1861, Mr. Seward heard, through what he considered "a very direct channel," that Captain Bullock had "contracted for ten iron steamers-gun-boats-all to be armed, at $750,000 for all, and all to come out as war-vessels." In February, 1862, he received information from Mr. Morse, the United States Consul in London, that the Confederate Agents in London and Liverpool were "engaged in preparing a whole fleet of piratical privateers," to depredate on American commerce in European waters. Mr. Adams had heard in April, 1862, that as many as fifteen vessels" were preparing to sail from British waters "to assist the insurgents." On the 28th of April, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote: "Captain Bullock, of Georgia, is understood to have written 66 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p 609. 2 Ibid., p. 358. 4 Ibid, p. 508. 6 3 Ibid., p. 613. 5 British Case, pp. 31-50. Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, pp. 517, 518. 8 Ibid., p. 240. that he has five steamers built, or bought, armed, and supplied with material of war in England, which are now about being, or are on their way to aid the insurgents." In May, 1862, Mr. Dudley, the United States Consul at Liverpool, gave information to Mr. Adams and Mr. Morse of "the purchase of thirty steamers, for the purpose of making a combined attack on our coasts.2 On the 8th September, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote: "We hear, officially and unofficially, of great naval preparations which are on foot in British and other foreign ports, under cover of neutrality, to give the insurgents a naval force. Among the reports is one that a naval armament is fitting out in England to lay New York under contribution." In certain intercepted letters of Confederate Agents, of August and October, 1862, it was stated that a person (an American) named Sanders had contracted with the Naval Department of the Confederate States for six iron-clad steamers from England; with respect to which he said, "great skill and diplomacy must be exercised to avoid the interference of European Governments.": On the 30th December, 1862, Mr. Dudley informed Mr. Seward of the preparation of a most formidable ram at Glasgow, and two iron-clad rams in London, and three other suspected vessels, (besides the Alexandra, and the rams at Birkenhead.) In April, 1863, information came of privateers fitting out in Vancouver's Island: and at a later date, February, 1865, of an expedition against New York, to consist of "five ironclads, on their way from French and English ports," with the aid of "five blockade-running steamers, to be converted into privateers, armed with two guns each.”8 4 97. This series of reported designs, which were never accomplished, at once proves how impossible it was for the British authorities to act indiscriminately, and without evidence, upon every alarming report and rumor which might be conveyed to them by the Agents of the United States in this country, and shows what might actually have been done, if those authorities had really been careless or negligent as to the enforcement of the law, or had really permitted Her Majesty's territory to be used as a base of hostile operations against the United States. such designs were formed, Mr. Adams merely spoke the truth, when, writing of the Confederacy on 21st of July, 1864, he said "its audacious attempts to organize a navy in this kingdom (Great Britain) have utterly failed."9 If Complaint that Confederate cruisers, visiting British ports, were not seized and detained. 98. An answer has been given to the complaints which the United States make against Great Britain in respect of the alleged equipment in British ports of vessels intended for the Confederate service, and of the original departure from British territory of vessels alleged to have been specially adapted with in it to warlike use. But it is further urged, on the part of the United States, that the four vessels now in question, (the Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Shenandoah,) after having been procured from British ports by agents of the Confederate Government, and converted into ships of war, entered, whilst cruising in that character, several ports within the Colonial possessions of Great Britain; and it is contended that, when that occurred, the British authorities were under an obligation to seize and detain them; and that for the non-performance of this obligation Great Britain is liable to the United States. 'Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 243. |