who know the truth, it still remains a myth. The actual facts rebut this notion, and are now, as they ever have been, much in evidence.

Ar the last meeting of the trustees of the New York Law School, the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved, That six scholarships be established, of which three shall be awarded at the beginning of each academic year hereafter, beginning with October, 1894. Each scholarship shall entitle its recipient to free tuition during an attendance of two years at the Law School. An applicant for a scholarship shall present satisfactory testimonials of good moral character, and of having made a superior record at the institution where he last studied for faithfulness and progress in his studies. He shall also present satisfactory evidence that the aid requested is absolutely needed, and agree to render such incidental services in connection with Law School work as the Dean may desire of him. The award of scholarships is to be made by the Dean."

The first three scholarships will be awarded in September, 1894, to applicants who intend to enter the Junior Class at the beginning of the academic. year, October 1, 1894. The papers of applicants should be sent to the Dean as early, at least, as September 1, 1894.

It seems both strange and unfortunate that in such an important series of reports as that of the United States Supreme Court, the work of the reporter should be so poorly done. Two late valuable decisions, for example, may be referred to as showing how defective are the head-notes which have been pub

lished. In United States v. Alexander, 148 U. S. 186, the head-note reads as follows: "The owner of a well on land near to but not on the line of the Washington Aqueduct, which was destroyed in the construction of that work, may recover its value from the United States in the Court of Claims, under the provisions of the Act of July 15, 1882." The faulty English of the sentence is manifest, for doubt is left on the point whether the aqueduct was destroyed by the construction of the well, or vice versa. But a more serious defect than this exists in the statement, for it wholly fails to indicate the true nature of the particular question decided by this case, and so the great importance of the case as a precedent is apt to be lost sight of. A reader of the head-note would naturally suppose that the "Act of July 15, 1882," expressly provided that damages should be recoverable for the injury sustained. A lawyer might naturally regard the case as of little consequence, since it only pertained to a special statute and had, apparently, no general application, and so he might, very easily, not trouble himself to read it.

The facts of the case show that the statute read as follows (only the part bearing on this point is quoted): "Any person who, by reason of the taking of his land or by the construction of the works hereinafter directed, shall be directly injured in any property right, may, at any time within one year, file a petition, and the said court shall hear and adjudicate such claims." The precise question was whether the owner of the well which had been destroyed by the construction of the aqueduct, from which the well was separated by a considerable

distance, could recover damages under the statute, as having been "directly injured in any property right." The importance of the question is due to the fact that it is a well-settled common-law rule that if a well is drained by the digging of a deeper well on adjoining land or by other similar lawful act, the owner who has thus lost the use and value of his well is not deemed to have suffered any legal injury in any property right, and, therefore, is not allowed to recover damages. The United States Supreme Court held, however, in this case that, under this statute, the wellowner could recover damages. It determines, therefore, this very important principle, viz., that a form of dainage or injury which, at common law, would not be regarded as an injury to a property right, will, under a statute providing for compensation to an owner "injured" (or as it is sometimes expressed, "damaged") "in his property," be so regarded, and will be a sufficient ground to recover damages. This principle is well settled by a valuable line of Massachusetts decisions, and has been there applied to a variety of cases other than the draining of wells on adjoining land. The U. S. Supreme Court adopted and followed these Massachusetts decisions and added the great weight of its authority to the principle thus established in that State. (Parker v. B. & M. R. Co., 3 Cush. 107; Trowbridge v. Brookline, 144 Mass. 139; Marsden v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 490.) Courts in other States might be led to adopt the same principle, if they understood that the U. S. Supreme Court had accepted it. But how would they ever learn this fact from such a head-note as the reporter has given? The head-note

furnishes no clue or hint to lead the mind to infer that such a principle had becn established.

In the later case of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, the headnote reads as follows: "Whether the engineer and fireman of a locomotive engine running alone on a railroad and without any train attached, are fellow-servants of the company, so as to preclude the latter from recovering from the company for injuries caused by the negligence of the former is not a question of local law,

but is one of general law, to

be determined by a reference to all the authorities, and a consideration of the principles underlying the relations of master and servant. Such engineer and such fireman, when engaged on such duty are, when so considered, fellowservants of the railroad company, and the fireman is precluded by principles of general law from recovering damages from the company for injuries caused, during the running, by the negligence of the engineer. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, explained and distinguished."

In the course of the opinion we find this statement: "Counsel for defendant in error rely principally upon the case of Railroad Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, taken in connection with these portions of Rule No. 10 of the company: Whenever a train or engine is run without a conductor, the engineman thereof will also be regarded as conductor and will act accordingly.'

It is thus manifest that the provisions of this "Rule No. 10" entered as a vital element into the argument and decision of the case. Their importance is clearly recognized, when it is remembered that

the prior case of Railroad Co. v. Ross had decided that "a conductor of a railroad train, who has the right to command the movements of a train and control the persons employed upon it, represents the company while performing those duties, and does not bear the relation of fellowservant to the engineer and other employees of the train.

This decision in the Ross case made "Rule No. 10" in the Baugh case of great consequence, and counsel for defendant in error naturally relied upon this rule, because it made the two cases appear very similar and thus the greatest force was added to his argument. The fact that, notwithstanding this similarity, the court decided the Baugh case differently from the Ross case, is of very great significance. It seems plain, then, that the reporter should have set forth in his head-note that such a rule as this "Rule No. 10" was essentially involved in the case. Only in this way could the ratio decidendi of the case properly appear. And in whatever different forms or by what ever different methods head-notes are prepared, they should always exhibit with entire accuracy the ratio decidendi of every case. If they do not, they become the source of incorrect abstracts in the Digests, and perhaps, also, of inaccurate statements in the text-books, and so the error is perpetuated and lawyers are apt to be misled or painfully perplexed in their search for precedents.

The U. S. Supreme Court ought, certainly, to have a better reporter, or the present reporter should mend his ways.

PRIZES OFFERED TO LAW

STUDENTS.

The editor of "The Green Bag" offers as a prize for the best article written by a law student of the NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL a full set of the bound volumes of "The Green Bag" (five in all and covering the years 1889 to 1893), handsomely bound in half green morocco.

This offer is made subject to the following conditions:

First. The article shall not exceed

3,000 words in length.

Second.-It shall be upon some subject of general interest to the legal profession, but shall in no case be devoted to mere discussion of legal principles or cases. Anything in the way of Legal Miscellany, Legal Cases done into verse, Legal Anecdotes or Legal Biography will come within the scope desired.

Third.-The editor reserves the right to retain and publish any manuscript sent, even though it may not have obtained the prize.

Fourth.-All manuscript must be written in a plain hand, on one side of the paper only, and be mailed to Horace W. Fuller, Editor of "The Green Bag," 15 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass., on or before

March 1, 1894.

Fifth.-The author's name in full should either be written on the manuscript itself, or enclosed in an envelope and sent with the manuscript of each article.

AGENTS OF TOWN-LIABILITY.—Persons employed by a town, acting within the scope of their authority and perform ing work which the town had authority to have performed, are not liable to persons damaged thereby. Proctor v. Stone, 158 Mass. 564.

AGENCY.-In an action to recover commissions for the sale of real estate. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, as he had been in the secret employment of both purchaser and seller. Shepard v. Hill, 34 P. R. 159.

APPEAL-When there is an appeal from the entire judgment and the court orders a general reversal and remand, the appellant is entitled to a new trial of all the issues, as if the case had never been tried. Mattock v. Goughner, 34 P. R. 36.

BILLS AND NOTES.-An acceptance of interest on a demand note is prima facie evidence of an agreement to forbear collecting the note during the period which the interest covers. Skelly v. Bristol Savings Bank, 63 Conn. 83.

CONTRACTS.—In the absence of special circumstances, as where time is of the essence, an imperfect title in the vendor, at the time of entering into the agreement to convey, does not of itself establish a cause of action. The vendor should be allowed a reasonable time to perfect his title. Andrews v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109.

CONTRACTS.--It was stipulated in a contract: that the party of the first part should pay the party of the second part for his work in accordance with the classification of a certain engineer, which classification was to be made at the termination of the work. Held, that a promise made by the engineer during the course of the work, that the classification was or should be at a certain rate, and which was not in fact carried out in the final estimates, was not binding upon either party. Dorwin v. Westbrook, 71 Hun. 405.

transfer of shares for value to T., who received from the company a certificate under seal, stating that he was the owner of the shares. T., acting in good faith, sold the shares, but the company refused to register the new purchasers. Held, that the company was estopped to deny that T. had a good title. Balkies Consolidated Company v. Tompkinson, 1893, House of Lords, A. C. 396.

FELLOW SERVANT.-A person employed to point out to miners the places where holes were to be drilled, and who had authority to hire and discharge workmen, is a fellow servant in a common employ

ment with the miners. Gilmore v. Oxford Iron Co., 55 N. J. L. 39.

GIFTS ARISING BY IMPLICATION.-A devise or gift may arise by implication, but, to justify the conclusion that a gift has been made in that way, the implication in favor of the gift must rest on a probability of an intention, so strong, that an intention, contrary to that which is thus imputed to the testator, cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind. Barnard v. Barlow, 50 N. J. Eq. 131.

GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS.-Delivery of keys by a donor upon her death-bed, when almost in extremis, coupled with an expression of intention to pass the trunk and property contained therein, is a sufficient. delivery to make out a full title in the donee. Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Mass. 592.

INSURANCE.-A policy of insurance provided; that, if certain articles be kept upon the premises, the policy would be void. Held, that the word “ kept,”as used in this connection, implied the use of the

premises as a place of deposit for a considerable length of time. First Cong. Church v. Holyoke Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 475.

LANDLORD And Tenant.-A landlord authorized his tenant to do wrongful acts upon the demised premises. Held, that a third person, injured by the wrongful acts, had a good cause of action against the landlord. Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-The rule, that the measure of damages, in case of a breach of contract to deliver goods, is the difference between the market price at the time. and place of delivery and the contract price, does not apply where the article was to be made for a special purpose, as the article in some cases has no market value. Den Bleyker v. Gaston, 56 N. W. R. 763.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.-An officer cannot lawfully be removed from office on the ground of forfeiture unless he has received due notice of the charge against him and of the time when he may answer to it, nor unless an opportunity be given. him to defend himself and there be a sufficient proof of a legal cause. Markley v. Cape May Point, 55 N. J. L. 104.

RESULTING TRUSTS-EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.--The trusts which rest upon a mere implication of law and those arising on the failure of an express trust for imperfection or illegality can be rebutted by extrinsic evidence. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.-An inlet from the sea or sluice-way, through which the tide