fowls from trespassing, even though notice of such intention be given to such neighbor. (Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Ct. 1.) The discharge of fireworks in the streets of a populous city, surrounded by buildings on all sides, when the display was an extended one and the explosives were heavily charged so as to be especially dangerous, has been held to be a public nuisance. (Speir v. Brooklyn, 139 N.Y. 6.) The owner of premises owes no duty of active diligence to one going thereon, either with or without license or permission and merely for his own convenience, and is not liable for injuries resulting from an omission to keep a structure thereon in proper repair. (Splittorf v. State, 108 N. Y. 205.)

If the owner of land makes an excavation therein adjacent to a highway, and so near as to make the use of the highway dangerous, he will be liable to a traveller who, while using ordinary care, falls into it and is injured. (Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283.) In this case the excavation was ten feet from the street, but passersby had been in the habit of passing over the lot with permission of the owner; and it was held that there was enough to create a duty on his part toward them. (See Victory v. Baker, 67 N. Y. 366; Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92; Elliot v. Pray, 10 Allen, 378.)

The owner of a building adjoining a highway is under a legal obligation to take reasonable care that it is kept in a proper condition so that it shall not fall and injure persons lawfully in the street; its fall is prima facie evidence of negligence. (Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567.)

Some States adopt the rule of the civil law as to surface waters, but in New York

and several other States this doctrine is modified. Thus in New York, a lower proprietor may lawfully, when acting in good faith, and for the purpose of improving and cultivating his lands, fill them in, although by so doing he prevents the passage of the surface water thereon, to the injury of the upper proprietor, on the principle that surface water is a common enemy, which each proprietor may fight off as best he can. (See Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140; also Peck v. Good berlett, 109 N. Y. 180.) This rule is adopted in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, while the rule of the Roman law prevails in Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, and Louisiana.

As to the right of lateral support for land and buildings, see Dorrity v. Rapp, 72 N. Y. 307; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199.

In New York City there is a special statute in force regulating the duty of persons who excavate more than ten feet below the curb to support the wall on adjoining land, if a license is afforded them to enter on such land. (Ketchum v. Newman, 116 N. Y. 422.)

As to percolating waters and the right to make use of them, see Bloodgood v. Ayres, 108 N. Y. 400; Johnston Mfg. Co. v. Veghte, 69 N. Y. 16.

P. 570. This doctrine of absolute liability for an artificial collection of water has been disapproved in this country in New York, New Jersey, and some other States. (Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476; Marshall v. Welwood, 9 Vroom, N. J. 339.) The rule in these States is that the person collecting the water is not liable unless he can be proved guilty of negligence. But

Massachusetts favors the English' rule.

§ 266. A private person has no right to abate a public nuisance of his own authority, unless it do him special damage, and then only to that extent. (Harrower v. Ritson, 37 Barb. 301; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44.) So he cannot maintain an action to abate a public nuisance, unless he is specially injured thereby. (Adler v. Met. El. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 173.)

§ 279. As to what constitutes private damage from a public nuisance, see Dudley v. Kennedy, 63 Me. 465; Francis v. Schoelkopf, 53 N. Y. 152; Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218; Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Hill v. Mayor, 139 N. Y. 495.

§ 283. Where a contractor does his work in such a way as to cause a nuisance on the employer's premises, and the employer suffers it to continue after the contractor has given up his contract, the employer is liable. (Vogel v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 N. Y. 10.)

While the Legislature may authorize acts which would otherwise be a nuisance, when they affect or relate to matters in which the public have an interest or over which they have control, the statutory authority which affords immunity for such acts must be express or a clear implication from powers expressly conferred. (Bohan v. Gaslight Co., 122 N. Y. 18.)

TRESPASS AND CONVERSION OF CHATTELS.

As to the grounds of equitable jurisdiction in cases of trespass, see Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179.

Trespass may be defined, in a general sense, as a wrongful injury to personal property or a wrongful taking thereof. Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership

over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner's rights. Every unauthorized taking of personal property and all intermeddling with it beyond the extent of the authority conferred, in case a limited authority has been given, with intent so as to apply and dispose of it as to alter its condition or interfere with the owner's dominion, is a conversion. (Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522.) There may be acts of trespass which do not amount to a conversion, as where a chattel is merely injured; acts which constitute both trespass and conversion, as where goods are taken and carried away and appropriated by the wrongdoer; and acts of conversion not involving a trespass, as where a bailee after having received the goods rightfully under his bailment, refuses to deliver them upon proper demand by the owner.

A wrongful intent is not a necessary ingredient in a conversion. Thus, one who purchases goods from a thief innocently and in good faith and afterwards sells them is liable to the owner even without demand. (Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y. 477.)

If one person lawfully acquires the chattel of another, there must be a demand and refusal shown in order to make him liable for conversion. (Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N.Y. 149.) It is also held in New York that a bona fide purchaser of personal property, wrongfully taken from the owner's possession, is not liable for conversion, if he retains it in his possession, until after demand and refusal. (Gillett v. Roberts, 57 N. Y. 28.) So a qualified refusal by one who received the goods rightfully, to enable him to ascertain whether the person demanding the goods has a right to them, does not

A demand upon a bailee who has a lien on the property is not evidence of a conversion, unless accompanied by a tender of the amount due. (Lewis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 395.)

An agent entrusted with property to sell at a price to be approved by his principal, is liable for conversion, if he sells without such approval. (Cornley v. Dazian, 114 N. Y. 161.)

Sale by brokers of a customer's stock, without demanding additional margin or giving him notice that the sale would be made, amounts to a conversion. (Gillett v. Whiting, 120 N. Y. 402.)

Oil in the earth belongs to the owner of the land, and when it is unlawfully taken therefrom by a wrongdoer, the title of the landowner remains perfect and he may reclaim his property wherever he may find it. If the wrongful taker delivers it to others upon storage, who refuse to deliver it to the owner on demand, they are guilty of conversion. (Hughes v. United Pipe Lines, 119 N. Y. 423.)

As to the conversion of notes and bills, see Comstock v. Hier, 73 N. Y. 269; Mayer v. Manley, id. 305; Hynes v. Patterson, 95 N. Y. 1.

It is the general rule in this country, that one co-owner of personal property may sue another for conversion, in case the latter destroys the property or sells it as exclusively his own. (Dyckman v. Valiente, 42 N. Y. 549.)

When there is no question of malice or claim to recover exemplary damages, the proper measure of damages, in cases of conversion, is the market value of the goods at the time of the conversion, with

interest thereon. (Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N. Y. 448.)

In an action against a broker for the conversion of stocks by selling them, plaintiff may recover what it would have cost him to replace the stocks on a day within a reasonable time after the sale, deducting the sum due to the defendant. (Baker v. Drake, 66 N. Y. 518.)

LIABILITIES OF JUDICIAL AND MINISTERIAL OFFICERS.

The general rules in regard to the liability of judicial officers are as follows:

1st. A judge of any court, high or low, is liable in a private action for damages if he acts wholly without jurisdiction in any case, and causes injury to some individual.

2d. If any judge acts within his jurisdiction, he is not liable in a private action for any error or mistake in judgment, even though an individual suffer thereby.

3d. If a judge of a superior court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant, and acting in his judicial capacity, does some act in excess of his jurisdiction, he is not liable in damages therefor. (Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12.)

4th. So, a judge of a superior court, if he acts within his jurisdiction, is not liable in a civil action, even though he acts maliciously and corruptly. (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 351.)

A justice of the peace is also exempt from liability if he acts within his jurisdiction, though he acts maliciously and corruptly. (Pratt v. Gardiner, 2 Cush. 63; Lenox v. Grant, 8 Mo. 254.) Many cases, however, say that a justice of the peace is exempt "if he acts honestly," or "unless he acts maliciously," etc.; but in these cases the precise question as to malice did not

arise, and these statements are dicta. (See Gregory v. Brown, 4 Bibb, 28; Downing v. Herrick, 47 Me. 462.) Justices of the peace are liable civilly if they exceed their jurisdiction, knowing the facts which constitute the defect of jurisdiction; also if they act wholly without jurisdiction. (Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120, 410; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12, 34.)

As to officers who are not judges, but who have judicial power of a certain kind, it is generally stated that they are liable if they act maliciously or corruptly; as, for example, arbitrators, inspectors of elections, etc. (See as to inspectors of elections, Ashby v. White, in Smith's Leading Cases.) But some American cases are laying down a different doctrine even as to these officers. Thus, it is said in a New York case that city officers acting judicially are not liable. civilly even for malicious acts. (East River Co. v. Donnelly, 25 Hun, 614; 93 N. Y. 557.) The law on the subject in this country is in a transition state.

Judicial powers cannot be delegated.

(Roderigas v. Savings Bank, 76 N. Y. 311, 323; Powell v. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396.)

A ministerial officer is protected in the execution of process, whether the same issue from a court of limited or general jurisdiction, although such court have not in fact jurisdiction in the case, provided that on the face of the process it appears that the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and nothing appears therein to indicate that the court has not also jurisdiction of the person of the party affected by the process. (Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170.)

A tender to the sheriff by the judgment debtor of the full amount collectible upon an execution discharges the lien of the execution. If the tender be rejected and the property sold under the execution, an action for conversion will lie. (Tiffany v. St. John, 65 N. Y. 314.)

Where process has been set aside for irregularity, it will afford no justification to the party at whose instance it was issued for acts done under it. (Kerr v. Mount, 28 N. Y. 659.)

CHAS. F. BEACH, Jr. ERNST FREUND, JOHN M. GLover, BRADFORD W. HITCHCOCK, LOUIS C. Ledyard, ROBERT SEWEll, HOWARD A. TAYLOR, SIMON STERNE, S. C. T. Dodd, J. BLEECKER Miller, EUGENE D. HAWKINS, DWIGHT ARVEN Jones, FREDERIC F. HARTICH, EDWARD E. SPRAGUE, A. L. PINCOffs, STEWART CHAPLIN. JOHN BROOKS LEAVITT, ELIHU ROOT, D. J. HOLDEN, Alfred C. Petté, JOHN D. LINDSAY,

HENRY MORRIS HAVILAND, THOMAS G. SHEARMAN.

Now that the misunderstanding regarding Commencement has been cleared away, it is the duty of every Senior to act his part in making our exit from school life a most happy and enjoyable occasion. While perhaps no strong and enduring friendships have been formed among us during our two years' sojourn together, yet a certain good fellowship has pervaded our class life, and this kindly feeling toward one another must not be wiped out nor even diminished at the very end of our course.

Whatever our chosen committee shall deem tends most to make the affair a success, it is not our part to criticise, but to most heartily co-operate in, for we must make our Commencement not only worthy of ourselves, but also of the friends whom we invite to participate with us.

By electing them, we express confidence in our committee. Let them continue to feel that a united class stands behind and encourages them. It is not the province of even young lawyers to allow any petty differences of opinion to affect their actions to any extent, so whatever may have been the individual opinions of the members heretofore, now that the class has spoken for Commencement, let us lay aside our differences and our prejudices, and carry it through together to a successful and happy termination.

IT gives the COUNSELLOR pleasure to endorse the little volume on Corporation. Law, which has recently made its appearance among us.

It is the work of Messrs. Seabury and Pickford, of the third year class, and these gentlemen have evidently spared no pains in its compilation, as the result shows. They have given to us an exhaustive digest of the subject of Corporation Law, and at the same time have put it in the most condensed and practical form possible.

It is to be hoped that the remaining digests which these gentlemen have in process of completion, will follow their fore-runner in rapid succession, as they must prove of inestimable benefit to the class in review, which at best is more or less hurried and incomplete.

IT is sincerely to be hoped that the