satisfied by the giving of a limited faith and credit. And imposing upon a man the unheard-of status of a husband without a wife is not according that validity and effect to the foreign judgment called for by Cheever. Wilson or enunciated in Pennoyer. Neff (95 U. S. 714 & 735).

Whether the Supreme Court of the United States would entertain an appeal in such a case as Davis v. Davis or People. Baker on this constitutional point, and reverse these New York rulings, is of course uncertain, but logically such should be the result, and in the Baker Case itself the Court said "It remains for the Supreme Court of the United States, as the final arbiter, to determine how far a judgment rendered in such a case upon such substituted service of process shall be operative without the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal giving it."

Apparently no such appeal has ever been taken, but if a proper case could once reach our highest tribunal the current of former decisions points to a determination in accord with the reasoning just set forth, and in agreement with the prevalent American view. (State v. Schlachter, Phill. N. C. 520, Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140, Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87. Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12 and other cases cited in Bishop, M. D. & S. Vol. II p. 82 note).

In this way a conclusive and satisfactory settlement of the most urgent phase of the question would be reached by the establishment of a controlling authority. Let each State determine the causes for which, and process by which, the marriage tie may be loosed, and apply them to its own citizens. Then let the Federal Courts lay down a rule by which such determinations may

have the effect guaranteed to them by the Constitution; and then, for the United States at least, these matters of vital importance will be put on a basis logical, constitutional, and reached by that natural development, the results of which are so much more enduring than radical innovations at the hands of legislatures experimentally inclined.

The objection may be raised that a single State might under such conditions set up a divorce colony whither all the discontented of other States, who have found the yoke of matrimony heavy upon their necks, might come and find swift and easy release from their burdens, and forthwith return to their former homes to repeat the process at pleasure until marriage becomes a farce and a system of consecutive polygamy is established. This argument has weight, and the danger is real, but if the requirement of actual bona fide domicil on the part of one of the parties is rigidly insisted upon as a condition precedent to jurisdiction, not only by the divorcing tribunal, but also by all Courts in which the decree is called in question, the danger will be reduced to a minimum, and if the domicil required in the first instance is one good internationally, the conflict will practically disappear. South Dakota's requirement of a mere residence of only 90 days is of course an absurdity, and usually a mere assumption of jurisdiction; and another State would have good right to call for independent proof of actual domicil animo manendi. Fraud also would always be a good answer to a foreign divorce pleaded, and actual notice when possible might be required to show good faith. This was apparently the controlling ground in Champon . Champon (40 La. Ann. 28) and

Doughty v. Doughty (28 N. J. Eq. 581), and what was said in the latter case as to the extra-territorial recognition of a foreign divorce founded on the domicil of one party being a matter of pure voluntary comity, and not required by the Constitution, may be treated as dictum.

An inter-state conference to recommend a system with some sort of uniformity as to causes for divorce, and methods of substituted service of process, would be of great advantage, and for some time there. has been a motion on foot in that direction, but all such action is rather in the line of development and adaptation, than of the solution of fundamental questions.

The inter-state rule will in this way be the same as the international, as recognized in the latest English cases, Turner v. Thompson (13 P. D. 37) and Goulder v. Goulder (1892 Prob. 240) where Lopes L. J. sums up the doctrine in these words. "As a general principle it may be stated that jurisdiction in matters of divorce depends upon the domicil of the parties at the time of the commencement of the proceedings for divorce-independently of the residence of the parties, the allegiance of the parties, the domicil of the parties at the time of the marriage, the place of the marriage, or the place where the matrimonial offence or offences have been committed." In this case the respondent was not heard from and so far as appears from the report, not served, but the English Court granted the divorce. Turner. Thompson, it is true, proceeds on the theory that the domicil of the husband is always the domicil of the wife, and a similar, but more limited, view is taken in Loker. Gerald (16 L. R. A. 497, Mass. 24 June 1892) where a Colorado divorce, obtained by a

husband domiciled there from a wife still actually resident in Massachusetts, the former matrimonial domicil, was held good on this express ground. But this theory gives the husband an undue advantage, and enables him to secure the benefit of less stringent divorce laws which are denied to the wife, or on the other hand might enable him to prevent a divorce altogether, by acquiring a domicil in South Carolina where divorce is not recognized. In the general advance of the wife's legal position to one on an equality with her husband, such partiality cannot be allowed, and this must eventually be recognized in all common law countries as it has been in general throughout the United States.

The reasonable position would seem to be that the husband's domicil is prima facie the wife's and so long as he conducts himself properly must remain so; but when his conduct is such that the wife is held justified in leaving his roof, obliged to do so, in fact, to prevent the plea of condonation if she sues for a divorce, then she may choose what domicil she will, have it recognized as hers by right, and bring her action under its laws and in its tribunals. To rebut the presumption of a common domicil she should be held to prove these facts to the satisfaction of the divorcing tribunal, and an adjudication on this point should be conclusive unless attacked for fraud. This modification of the common law is in fact recognized in Loker v. Gerald where it is said "We are not now required to consider whether the rule of law would not be the same, independently of the legal fiction that the domicil of the wife follows that of the husband."

The various provisions established by

the continental nations, there is much diversity. France now goes as far as Massachusetts in recognizing foreign divorces properly granted in the husband's domicil, (27 Am. L. Rev. p. 8) and Germany takes about the same ground. Italy holds to the indissolubility of its own marriages, in accord with the old view of Lolley's Case, but recognizes divorces in the case of other marriages when valid according to the national law of the parties (18 Am. L. Rev. p. 24). Wherever the right of expatriation is recognized, all the incidents of the new domicil should also be allowed, including any new status therein legally acquired. But the general principles of the conflict are so fully illustrated in English and American jurisprudence that Continental cases can add little but further instances.

Divorce is at best a necessary evil, and a concession to mankind by reason of

infirmity and hardness of heart, but it exists and must be regulated for the safety of society. As to the causes which shall justify it, the proverb "tot homines, tot sententiae" applies with striking force and it has been seen how great a confusion is the result. So long as States are sovereign and opinions differ, the confusion will continue, but it may be rendered tolerable by the application of the universal principles of the jus gentium, so that results once duly obtained are the same everywhere. The worst effects of the confusion are thereby prevented and society is tided over the time which must elapse before substantial uniformity as to the formation and dissolution of the marriage tie, whereby society itself is bound together, is reached by the common consent of Christendom,-"A consummation devoutly to be wished," but still far off.

P. 1. The word "law," whether applied to the action of natural forces or to human conduct, imports (1st) the existence of a supreme power or authority, establishing and maintaining the law, and (2nd) the idea of uniformity or regularity of action which it is the object of the law to secure. The laws governing the action of the forces of nature may exhibit such uniformity that it is possible to predict the events of the future, as when eclipses are foretold and the exact times of their occurrence, or the rising and falling of the tides, etc. But human laws, though designed to secure uniform obedience, are addressed to beings having the power of choice, either to obey or disobey, and hence many violations of law occur. this reason human laws involve a third element, viz., the imposing of a sanction or penalty, to secure obedience by giving forewarnings of punishment to follow disobedience.

For

P. 8. The latter part of Blackstone's definition of law, viz., "Commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong" should be omitted, for there are many laws prohibiting what is not morally wrongful, and, on the other hand, a law may even command something which is not right. The fugitive slave law of former times would now be generally so regarded.

A definition of law by a modern writer on jurisprudence is that law is a "general rule of external human action enforced by a sovereign political authority" (Holland on Jurisprudence, p. 36). Another writer says, "Law is a command proceeding from the supreme political authority of a state and addressed to the persons who are subject to that authority" (Amos on Science of Law, p. 48).

International Law hardly falls within these definitions, since the nations observing its requirements are under no superior authority controlling them. Still, the obligations created by such a system of law may be deemed analogous to those arising from laws which owe their authority to established customs. International Law consists of "those rules of conduct in accordance with which, either in consequence of their express consent or in pursuance of the usage of the civilized world, nations are expected to act. It is law only by analogy." (Holland, Jur. p. 111).

P. 11. For a valuable recent decision in regard to ex post facto laws, see Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, which declares that any law is ex post facto which is enacted after a criminal offence is committed, and which, in reference to it or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.