but I am not fool enough not to know that there is a college of experience out of which men graduate sometimes, who haven't had the chance of going to the other college, and a university of knowledge of public affairs out of which some men graduate who have never been able to go to a university; and I believe fully, threfore, that it is wise that men should be allowed to begin the study of this great profession of the law, in offices or law schools, no matter what their previous training has been. I believe, that is to say, that the sieve through which people are sifted for the beginning of the study of the law may be of as coarse meshes as a sieve can be made of; but I believe also the sieve through which men are sifted for final admission to the practice of this splendid profession, ought to be fine enough, to say the least, to separate straw from wheat, and chaff from grain. And I say this not from any particular knowledge of the profession of the law itself. I admire it from a distance.

But

I say it, because, as has been most admirably said by Professor Hutchins here this afternoon, this is a question that concerns not lawyers and the profession or judges alone, but concerns all intelligent citizens throughout the country. So far as the mere professional distinctions are concerned, I am very glad to furnish an illustration of the fact that the old theory that lawyers and parsons never meet, except when doctors have got through with a case, in order that they might commend either the property or soul of the man to its final position, has been abandoned; and lawyers and parsons are constantly meeting together now with the doctors, and I think it is a very good thing so far as my share in the com

bination is concerned. This is not a technical question; if it were, then I should be perfectly safe and free in taking the ground that no man ought to be allowed to practice as a specialist, who has not a knowledge of general practice. I wouldn't trust my eye to a man who didn't know anything but the specialty of an oculist; he must have some knowledge of the treatment of the whole body. And so I believe no man ought to be admitted to the special profession of the law who has not been sufficiently trained in a general knowledge that goes to make up an all-around man. And simply because this is not a technical question, but a general question, I plead for the uniformity and for the severity of examinations for final admission to the bar; because I feel quite as strongly as any lawyer in America can feel the enormous importance, the great dignity, the wide range and scope of the value of the legal profession. It is not merely that they are called upon constantly to deal with the great moral distinctions between right and wrong. That would be enough to make it dignified and important. It is not merely that they are the people to whom we look for the maintenance of great questions of the safety both of life and property. It is not a thing that lies within the horizon or circumference of merely professional life. It is the simple fact that the members of the legal profession to-day are constantly called upon to deal with the great social and moral and national and political questions, not only of the country, but of the world. It is true that in all matters connected with legislation, the men who are looked to for counsel and advice, for wise and large views in deal

ing with questions, are men learned in the law.

It is true also, in dealing with the great subject which bears the noble name that is most ignobly used when it is perverted from its original meaning and from its intense power; I mean the word "political." We have the right and reason to look to lawyers to take the lead in everything that should dignify the true position of the politician-that is to say, of the man who is concerned in a wise administration of public affairs. It is perfectly true that in the great questions that touch social reform to-day, the clergyman may come, and ought to come, to look at it both from the human and the divine side. It is also true that the leading, and guiding, and directing, and shaping, and moulding, must come from the men that belong to the legal profession. And when you reach out beyond a narrow circle, and remember that in the progress and advance of Christian civilization today, the disputes and differences between nations are being referred to great tribunals of international arbitration; when you remember it isn't the pen, but the

gown, that is going to be more and more mighty than the sword; when you realize that the peace of the world is coming more and more to depend upon the ability of men of the legal profession to strip themselves of narrow, limited, personal association, and take broad and big views of broad and big questions; it goes without saying that it is absolutely necessary that the men that are to deal with questions like these must be men not narrowly and imperfectly trained in Coke on Littleton or Littleton on Coke, or in Blackstone, or anything else, but in the whole, round, wide range of sound moral and intellectual training. I believe, sir, that no man ever said a truer thing, and it is because I believe it, that I hold in such high honor the profession of the law, and that I desire it shall always be difficult to win admission to this most admirable profession, than that great immortal sentence, with which the ecclesiastical Hooker immortalized-almost apotheosized-the profession of the law, in saying that it had its seat in the bosom of God.

For

I take pleasure in expressing my hearty concurrence in the plan for establishing a uniform system of bar examinations. In fact the plan carries on its face the assurance of its essential reasonableness. if examinations are to be held at all, what conceivable reason can be suggested why they should be lax at one time and severe at another, or why they should vary, as a test of qualifications, according as they

are held in one part of the State or in another? True patriots, it is said, know no North, no South, no East, no West, and law examiners should be guided by the same principle. Moreover, if equity should not vary with the length of the chancellor's foot, the test of a student's legal acquirements should not vary with the breadth of the examiner's mind or the depth of the examiner's knowledge.

By the appointment of a single examining board for the entire State, these variations will be eliminated as far as may be possible. In the experience of the last few years instances have occurred in which examiners, interested in special branches of the law, have embodied in their examination papers an undue proportion of questions relating to such branches. Sometimes it has seemed as if certain examiners based a goodly portion of their questions upon the particular cases they had been studying in their own practice. Again, some boards of examiners have made too easy question papers, while others have prepared papers unreasonably difficult. With five different boards, as we have hitherto had, acting independently of each other, and composed of lawyers immersed in the cares of active practice, such differences of method are naturally to be expected. There appears to be no reason to believe that any of them have been guided by any other purpose than to faithfully and honestly discharge the duty intrusted to them. But none the less have such differences in practice resulted, sometimes in unfairness to students, sometimes in consequences prejudicial to the best interests of the profession. It is certainly time to make a change, so that candidates for admission to the bar in any part of the State may be subjected to examinations that shall be, in their general character, substantially equal in their rigor and comprehensiveness. It is essentially important also that such examinations should be alike fair, just and reasonable. These objects will be most likely to be secured by having one board for the entire State, whose members will have to devote the greater part of their time to this single purpose. They

will have time to exercise care and deliberation in the preparation of question papers, instead of making them up hurriedly in the brief intervals snatched from active professional labors. This of itself will be a manifest gain, and tend to more thorough and satisfactory examinations.

The proposed bill which is to be submitted to the Legislature seems well calculated to accomplish these desirable objects. The framing of the substantial regulations for conducting the examinations is to be intrusted to the Court of Appeals, and thus the weightiest guaranty is afforded for the appointment of an examining board of high character and ability, and for the establishment of rules which shall hold high the standard of legal education.

I am glad also to see that, by the proposed bill, the board of examiners will not only decide as to the relative merits of the examination papers, but will also determine the fact whether the applicant has "in other respects complied with the rules regulating admission to practice." Uniformity in these respects is as important a thing to be secured as in regard to the examination concerning legal attainments. Heretofore the rules relating to place of residence, fact of clerkship in a lawyer's office, term of legal study, either in a law school or in an office, etc., have been differently construed and applied in the different departments, and this state of affairs has been unfortunate. It has tended to attract students to those parts of the State where the rules have been most liberally construed. In all such matters, however, it is plain that there should be uniformity of construction.

In one or two minor points the bill may, it seems to me, need modification.

It says, e. g., that "only one examination fee shall be required." This is ambiguous. It may mean that at a particular examination the applicant is not to pay a special fee for each subject, but one entire fee for all subjects. But, on the other hand, it may mean that if a student comes up at two or more successive examinations, he shall still only be required to pay one examination fee. The intention of the framers of the bill might, it would seem, be made more clear and certain.

Again, the bill says that every applicant "shall pay such fee as may be fixed by the Court of Appeals as necessary to cover the cost of such examinations." If this bill becomes a law, the Court of Appeals will be bound by its terms, and may therefore in this connection consider that it has no discretion as to the amount of the fee to be charged, since a sum "necessary to cover the cost" must in every case be paid. The difficulty of fixing beforehand the size of any such fee is apparent. If the examiners are to be paid salaries, then such salaries, plus expenses, will be the total cost, and this amount would need to be divided by the annual number of applicants, in order to determine the necessary fee for each man. As the number of applicants will necessarily vary, the fee, therefore, could hardly be fixed in advance.

The bill fixes a specific term of residence in a particular department, and so eliminates the troublesome questions which have hitherto arisen as to what

constitutes a sufficient residence, and how long it is necessary to live in a place to acquire such residence. Another analogous point will need careful attention in the new rules that are to be framed by the Court of Appeals. This relates to clerkships in a lawyer's office. The present rules require that the law student shall serve a clerkship in an office for at least one year, and that the clerkship may be proved by the certificate of the attorney with whom the same was served. I have known of cases in which a lawyer has been willing to certify to such a clerkship, and the student has been willing to gain his admission to the bar on such certificate, though the young man's attendance in the office has not been more than an hour or two per week. Some provision ought to be made in the rules for a careful inquiry, in order to detect and circumvent any such practices.

Would it not be well also to provide that when the first board of three examiners is appointed, one shall be appointed for one year, another for two years, and the third for three years, and that whenever any one retires from office, his successor shall be appointed for three years? In this way, whenever a new appointee takes office he will have two associates who will be familiar with the duties of the position, and who have had the benefit of practical experience in the performance of such duties.

I submit these few suggestions to your thoughtful consideration.

§ 340, subd. 3. In an action in the County Court for money, the complaint must allege that defendant is a resident of the county, this court being one of inferior and limited jurisdiction. (Gilbert v. York, 111 N. Y. 544.)

§ 365. Continuous adverse possession of land long enough to bar an action for its recovery not only cuts off the owner's remedy, but divests him of his estate, and transfers it to the party holding adversely; the adverse possession is conclusive evidence of title in the latter. (Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16.)

Anything which amounts to an actual taking possession of property by the owner, a substantial assertion of right, accompanied by the actual possession and occupation of the property, exclusive in its nature, would amount to the breaking of the adverse possession, then running, and would render it necessary to begin it anew. (Landon v. Townshend, 129 N.'Y. 166.) In this case, however, the mere building of a fence around the premises by the owner was held not to terminate the adverse possession then maturing.

The statute does not run against the beneficiary of an express subsisting trust, until the trustee has openly, to the beneficiary's knowledge, renounced or repudiated the trust. But as against a trustee ex maleficio or by implication of law, the statute begins to run from the time the

wrong was committed by which the party became chargeable as such trustee. (Lammer v. Stoddard, 103 N. Y. 672; Zebley v. Farmer's L. & T. Co., 139 N. Y. 461.)

Possession does not begin to be adverse, as against a person entitled after the determination of a prior estate, during the continuance of that estate. (Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1.)

§ 369. These are called cases of entry under color of title. Adverse occupancy of part of the land, in either of the ways described in § 370, will give title to the whole parcel of land described in the decree, deed, or other conveyance, under which entry was made. Thus a grantee of land whose deed was dated earlier, but was recorded later, than that of another grantee of the same premises, acquired, for that reason, no title to the land. Held, that he might, nevertheless, gain title by twenty years' adverse possession by improving a part of the land, and that this title would cover the whole estate, though the tract had been, before the transfer to the occupant, owned separately in different lots. (Northport Co. v. Hendrickson, 139 N. Y. 440.)

375. See Howell v. Leavitt, 95 N. Y. 617.

§ 376. This section does not apply to a foreclosure judgment, as this is not for the payment of any sum of money, a judgment for money only being authorized in case of a deficiency after a sale.