Eyre et al. v. Potter et al.

did the complainant appear to be grieved during the illness of her husband nor after his death. In a conversation with witness some three or four days before decedent's death, the complainant asked the witness if she thought the decedent could live, and upon the reply of the witness that she did not think he could, the complainant observed that she was provoked at Samuel (the defendant) for forcing him to take first one thing and then another, "and make him live any how." Afterwards, on board of the steamboat returning from Smithville from the funeral of the decedent, the complainant told the witness, that she had made over her property to Samuel R. Potter, or intended so doing, on account of his wife Marian; that she was very fond of her, and wished to stay with her the residue of her life, though she did not know that her friends at the north would be willing that she should do so.

Without a farther and more protracted detail of the testimony adduced on the part of the defendants, it may be sufficient merely to advert to the depositions of Julia and Caroline Everett, of Edwin A. Keith, and of Sterling B. Everett, (the last for many years the physician in the family of the decedent,) and of the complainant herself, as fully sustaining the averments in the answers of the defendants, and the statements of the witnesses previously named, in relation to the capacity of the complainant, to her disposition and deportment towards her late husband, the effect of his illness and death upon her health and spirits, her knowledge of her rights and interest in the subject of her transactions with the defendants, the origin and fairness of those transactions, the objects for which, and the means and instrumentality by which, they were consummated. Nor can it escape observation, as a circumstance of great if not of decisive weight, that all this testimony is derived from persons familiar with the parties, living upon the immediate theatre of the transactions in controversy, many of them more or less acquainted with the subjects embraced by them, witnesses, all of them free from imputation on the score of interest, and against whose veracity or intelligence no exception is even hinted.

Against an array of evidence like this, the question of equivalents or of exact adequacy of consideration cannot well be raised. The parties, if competent to contract and willing to contract, were the only proper judges of the motive or consideration operating upon them; and it would be productive of the worst consequences if, under pretexts however specious, interests or dispositions subsequently arising could be made to bear upon acts deliberately performed, and which had become the foundation of important rights in others. Mere inadequacy of price, or any other inequality in a bargain, we are told, is not to

Eyre et al. v. Potter et al.

be understood as constituting per se a ground to avoid a bargain in equity, for courts of equity, as well as courts of law, act upon the ground that every person who is not, from his peculiar condition or circumstances, under disability, is entitled to dispose of his property in such manner and upon such terms as he chooses; and whether his bargains are wise and discreet or otherwise, or profitable or unprofitable, are considerations not for courts of justice, but for the party himself to deliberate upon. Vide Story's Equity, § 244, citing the cases of Griffiths v. Spratley, 1 Cox, 383, Copis v. Middleton, 2 Maddox, 409, and various other cases.

Again, it is ruled, that inadequacy of consideration is not of itself a distinct principle of equity. The common law knows no such principle. The consideration, be it more or less, supports the contract. Common sense knows no such principle. The value of a thing is what it will produce, and it admits of no precise standard. One man, in the disposal of his property, may sell it for less than another would. If courts of equity were to unravel all these transactions, they would throw every thing into confusion, and set afloat the contracts of mankind. Such a consequence would of itself be sufficient to show the injustice and impracticability of adopting the doctrine, that mere inadequacy of consideration should form a distinct ground for relief. Still, there may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain, as to demonstrate some gross imposition or some undue influence; and in such cases courts of equity ought to interfere, upon satisfactory ground of fraud; but then, such unconscionableness or such inadequacy should be made out as would, to use an expressive phrase, shock the conscience, and amount in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud. Vide Story's Equity, § 245-246, and 9 Ves. 246; 10 Id. 219; and other cases there cited.

But the contract between the parties in this case should not be controlled by a comparison between the subject obtained and the consideration given in a mere pecuniary point of view; added to this, were the motives of affection for the wife of the grantee, the granddaughter of the grantor, a conviction in the latter of what justice dictated towards the children of the decedent in relation to his property; the prospect of ease and independence on the part of this elderly female; her exemption from the expense, the perplexities, and hazards of managing a species of property to the management of which expense and energy and skill were indispensable; property to the tenure of which she entertained and expressed insuperable objections. Here, then, in addition to the sums of money paid, or secured to be paid, we see considerations of great influence which,

Eyre et al. v. Potter et al.

naturally, justly, and lawfully, might have entered into this contract, and which we think cannot be disregarded in its interpretation, upon any sound construction of the testimony in the cause. Upon the first view of this case, it may, in the spectacle of the widow and the son bargaining over the unburied corpse of the husband and the father for a partition of his property, be thought to exhibit a proceeding revolting to decorum, and one, therefore, which a court of equity, equally with a court of morals, would be cautious in sustaining, or be inclined to condemn; yet, upon testing this proceeding by any principle of decency, as well as of law or equity, it is manifest that it could not be disturbed without benefit to the chief offender against such a test; for the evidence incontestably shows, that whatever in the conduct of the parties was inconsistent with the highest and most sacred relations in life—whatever may be thought to have offended against the solemnity and decorum of the occasion,-was commenced and pressed to its consummation by the plaintiff in this case. Tried, then, by this standard, she should be left precisely where she has placed herself.

To avoid the consequences flowing from the acts of the complainant touching the matters of this controversy, the testimony of several witnesses, taken in the city of Philadelphia, has been introduced, to prove the mental as well as physical incompetence of the complainant. With respect to the character and purposes of this testimony, it may be remarked, that a position in a court of justice founded upon what is in effect the stultification of the person who assumes that position, is one to be considered with much diffidence, as it admits in general the factum which it seeks to invalidate; and if the averments on which such position rests be true, the person occupying that position should be in court by guardian or committee. But in truth this testimony establishes no such position, either directly or inferentially, in reference to the complainant. In the first place, all these witnesses resided in a different State, and at the distance of many hundreds of miles from the complainant; and not one of them appears to have had any intercourse with her or to have seen her even for a series of years preceding the contract which it is essayed to vacate; nor to have had any knowledge of the existence of that contract until after its completion; nor of the state of mind or of the health of the complainant at the period at which that contract was found. addition to this ignorance of these witnesses, of the transaction under review, and of all the circumstances surrounding it, there is no fact stated by one of them which amounts to proof of incapacity on the part of the complainant to comprehend the character of her acts, and of the legal consequences incident to

VOL. XV.

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In

O'Reilly et al. v. Morse et al.

them; and much less do they establish, as to her, such an aberration or imbecility of mind as would justify a presumption, and much less a legal conclusion, against the validity of any and every act she might perform. To such a conclusion only could the general expressions of opinion and belief of these witnesses apply, and such a conclusion they come very far short of establishing.

We are therefore of opinion, that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs.

HENRY O'REILLY, EUGENE L. WHITMAN, AND W. F. B. HASTINGS, APPELLANTS, V. SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, ALFRED Vail, AND FRANCIS O. J. SMITH.

Morse was the first and original inventor of the electro-magnetic telegraph, for which a patent was issued to him in 1840, and reissued in 1848. His invention was prior to that of Steinhiel of Munich, or Wheatstone or Davy of England.

Their respective dates compared.

But even if one of these European inventors had preceded him for a short time, this circumstance would not have invalidated his patent. A previous discovery in a foreign country does not render a patent void, unless such discovery or some substantial part of it had been before patented or described in a printed publication. And these inventions are not shown to have been so.

Besides, there is a substantial and essential difference between Morse's and theirs; that of Morse being decidedly superior.

An inventor does not lose his right to a patent because he has made inquiries or sought information from other persons. If a combination of different elements be used, the inventors may confer with men as well as consult books to obtain this various knowledge.

There is nothing in the additional specifications in the reissued patent of 1848, inconsistent with those of the patent of 1840.

The first seven inventions, set forth in the specifications of his claims, are not subject to exception. The eighth is too broad and covers too much ground. It is this. "I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer."

The case of Neilson and others v. Harford and others, in the English Exchequer Re

O'Reilly et al. v. Morse et al.

ports, examined; and also the American decisions. The acts of Congress do not justify a claim so extensive. But although the patent is illegal and void so far as respects the eighth claim, yet the patentee is within the act of Congress, which gives him a right to disclaim, and thus save the portion to which he is entitled. No disclaimer having been entered before the institution of this suit, the patentee is not entitled to costs.

In 1846 Morse obtained a second patent for the local circuits, which was reissued in 1848. It is no objection to this patent that it was embraced in the eighth claim of the former one, because that eighth claim was void. Nor is it an objection to it, that it was an improvement upon the former patent, because a patentee has a right to improve his own invention.

This new patent and its reissue were properly issued. The improvement was new and not embraced in the former specification.

These two patents of 1848, being good with the exception of the eighth claim, are substantially infringed upon by O'Reilly's telegraph, which uses the same means both upon the main line, and upon the local circuits.

(Mr. Justice Curtis) having been of counsel, did not sit in this

cause.

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, sitting as a Court of Equity. It is difficult to make a fair report of this case without writing a book. The arguments of counsel would fill a volume by themselves.

The history of the case was drawn up by the learned Judge, who presides over the District Court of the United States in Kentucky, and whose decree was under review. Permission has been given by Judge Monroe that the reporter may use his statement as preliminary to this report, and he avails himself with pleasure of this kindness; because, although the narrative is occasionally interpersed with the opinions which induced the judge to decree an injunction in favor of Morse yet the history is given with great precision and clearness.

The following statement is extracted from the opinion of Judge Monroe:

The complainants, in their bill, allege that Samuel F. B. Morse, one of them, was the true and original inventor of the Electro-Magnetic Telegraph, worked by the motive power of electro-magnetism, and of the several improvements thereon, by which intelligence which is in one place is transmitted to other distant places, and that by the letters-patent of the United States, duly issued to him, Samuel F. B. Morse, and by his partial assignments to F. O. J. Smith and Alfred Vail, the other complainants, they together are lawfully invested with the exclusive right of constructing and employing such telegraph for such purpose, throughout the United States, for the terms in the letters-patent mentioned, and which have not yet expiredand they exhibit the letters-patent.

They show that the practicability and great utility of the in