Livingston et al. v. Woodworth et al.

equity. In the instructions to the master it will be seen, that he is ordered "to ascertain and report the amount of profits which may have been, or with due diligence and prudence might have been, realized, by the defendants for the work done by them or by their servants by means of the machines described in the complainant's bill, computing the same upon the principles set forth in the opinion of the court, and that the account of such profits commence from the date of the letters-patent issued with the amended specification." The master, in this report made in pursuance of the instructions just adverted to, admits that the account is not constructed upon the basis of actual gains and profits acquired by the defendants by the use of the inhibited machine, but upon the theory of awarding damages to the complainants for an infringement of their monopoly. He admits, too, that the rate of profits assumed by him was conjectural and not governed by the evidence; but he attempts to vindicate the rule he had acted upon by the declaration, that he was not aware that he had "infused into the case any element too unfavorable to the defendants. That by the decision of the court they were trespasers and wrongdoers, in the legal sense of these words, and consequently in a position to be mulcted in damages greater than the profits they have actually received: the rule being not what benefit they have received, but what injury the plaintiffs have sustained." To what rule the master has reference in thus stating the grounds on which his calculations have been based, we do not know. We are aware of no rule which converts a court of equity into an instrument for the punishment of simple torts; but upon this principle of chastisement the master admits that he has been led, in contravention of his original view of the testimony, and upon conjecture as to the realty of the facts, and not upon facts themselves, to double the amount which he had stated to be a compensation to the plaintiffs below, and the compensation prayed for by them, and the Circuit Court has, by its decree, pushed this principle to the extreme by adding to this amount the penalty of interest thereon from the time of filing the bill to the date of the final decree.

We think that the second report of the master, and the final decree of the Circuit Court, are warranted neither by the prayer of the bill, by the justice of this case, nor by the well-established rules of equity jurisprudence.

If the appellees, the plaintiffs below, had sustained an injury to their legal rights, the courts of law were open to them for redress, and in those courts they might, according to a practice, which however doubtful in point of essential right, is now too inveterate to be called in question, have claimed not compensation merely, but vengeance, for such injury as they could show that they had sustained. But before a tribunal which refuses

Livingston et al. v. Woodworth et al.

to listen even to any, save those whose acts and motives are perfectly fair and liberal, they cannot be permitted to contravene the highest and most benignant principle of the being and constitution of that tribunal.

There they will be allowed to claim that which, ex æquo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this.

In the present case it would be peculiarly harsh and oppressive, were it consistent with equity practice, to visit upon the appellants any consequences in the nature of a penalty. It is clearly shown that the appellants, in working their machine, were proceeding under an authority equal to that (the same indeed) which bestowed on Woodworth and his assignees the right to their monopoly. The appellants were using a machine patented by the United States to Hutchinson, and might well have supposed that the right derived to them from such a source was regular and legitimate. They were, then, in no correct sense, wanton infringers upon the rights of Woodworth, or of those claiming under him. So soon as the originality and priority of the Woodworth patent was ascertained by law, the appellants consented to be perpetually enjoined from the use of their machine, (the Hutchinson machine,) and to account for whatever gains and profits they had received from its use. der these circumstances, were the infliction of damages, by way of penalty, ever consistent with the practice of courts of equity, there can be perceived in this case no ground whatever for the exercise of such a power.

Un

On the contrary, those circumstances exhibit, in a clearer light, the propriety of restricting the account, in accordance with the prayer of the bill, to the actual gains and profits of the appellants, (the defendants below,) during the time their machine was in operation and during no other period. We are therefore of the opinion, that the decree of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and should be, as it is hereby, reversed, with costs; and that this cause be remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to proceed therein in conformity with the principles ruled in this opinion.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this court.

INDEX

OF THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

APPEAL.

1. Where the respondent in a chancery suit in the Circuit Court took two grounds
of defence, and the judge, in giving his reasons for a decree dismissing the
bill, upon one of the two grounds, expressed his opinion that the respondent
had not established the other ground, he cannot appeal from this as a part of
the decree. Corning et al. v. The Troy Iron and Nail Factory, 451.

2. The decree was in the respondent's favor, dismissing the bill with costs, and no
appeal lies from an opinion expressed by the judge upon the facts of the case,
not affecting the decree. Ibid.

3. Moreover, the decree complained of has already been argued before this court
upon the appeal of the other party, and both grounds of defence decided to be
insufficient, and the decree reversed. There is, therefore, no such decree as

that appealed from. Ibid.

4. Besides, the court below has not acted upon the mandate and entered a final
decree; therefore there is no final decree to appeal from. Ibid.

ARKANSAS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. In June, 1844, Congress passed an act, by virtue of which the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Arkansas, was vested with power to
try offences committed within the Indian country. United States v. Dawson,
467.

2. In July, 1844, it was alleged that a murder was committed in that country.
Ibid.

3. In April, 1845, an indictment was found by a grand jury, in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Arkansas, against a person charged
with committing the murder. Ibid.

4. In March, 1851, Congress passed an act erecting nine of the Western counties
and the Indian country into a new judicial district, directing the judge to
hold two terms there, and giving him jurisdiction of all causes, civil or crimi-
nal, except appeals and writs of error, which are cognizable before a Circuit
Court of the United States. Ibid.

5. The residue of the State remained a judicial district to be styled the Eastern
District of Arkansas. Ibid.

6. This act of Congress did not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District to try the indictment
pending. Ibid.

ATTORNEY.

1. Where a contract was made with an attorney for the prosecution of a claim
against Mexico for a stipulated proportion of the amount recovered, and ser-
vices were rendered, the death of the owner of the claim did not dissolve the
contract, but the compensation remained a lien upon the money when recovered.
Wylie v. Coxe, 415.

2. A court of equity can exercise jurisdiction over the case if a more adequate
remedy can be thus obtained than in a court of law. Ibid.

AWARD.

1. In the settlement of complicated partnership accounts by means of an arbitra-
tor, Bispham was charged with one half of certain custom-house bonds, which
Archer, the other partner, was liable to pay, and which obligations had been in-
curred on partnership account. Bispham v. Price, 162.

AWARD (Continued.)

2. There was a reservation in the settlement as to certain liabilities, but this one
was not included. Ibid.

3. Archer's estate was afterwards exonerated from the payment of these bonds by
a decision of this court, reported in 9 Howard, 83. Ibid.

4. A bill cannot be brought by Bispham against Árcher's executor, to refund one
half of the amount of the bonds, upon the ground that Archer had never paid
it. Ibid.

5. The reference to an arbitrator was lawful, and his award included many items
which were the subject of estimates. It was accepted as perfectly satisfactory,
and acquiesced in as such until long after the death of Archer. Ibid.

6. No fraud or mistake is charged in the bill; and if an error of judgment occur-
red, by which the chance was overrated, that the custom-house bonds would be
enforced against Archer, this does not constitute a ground for the interference
of a court of equity. Ibid.

7. The statute of limitations, also, is a bar to the claim. Ibid.

1. In order to make a bill of exceptions valid, it must appear by the transcript not
only that the instructions were given or refused at the trial, but also that the
party who complains of them excepted to them while the jury were at the bar.
Phelps v. Moyer, 160.

2. The bill of exceptions need not be drawn out in form and signed before the jury
retire; but it must be taken in open court, and must appear by the certificate
of the judge who authenticates it, to have been so taken. Ibid.

3. Hence, when the verdict was rendered on the 13th December, and on the next
day the plaintiff came into court and filed his exception, it is not properly be-
fore this court. And no error being assigned or appearing in the other pro-
ceedings, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, with costs.
Ibid.

BONDS.

1. When the bonds of collectors of the customs begin to be effective, see Broome
v. United States, 143.

2. Where a clerk of a court was sued upon his official bond, and the breach al-
leged was, that he had surrendered certain goods without taking a bond with
good and sufficient securities, and the plea was, that the bond which had been
taken was assigned to the plaintiffs, who had brought suit, and received large
sums of money in discharge of the bond, this plea was sufficient, and a de-
murrer to it was properly overruled. Bevins v. Ramsey, 179.

CHANCERY.

-

1. Where a widow filed a bill in chancery, complaining that, immediately upon
the death of her husband, the son of that husband, together with another per-
son, had imposed upon her by false representations, and induced her to part
with all her right in her husband's estate for an inadequate price, the evidence
in the case did not sustain the allegation. Eyre et al. v. Potter et al. 42.
2. It is not alleged to be a case of constructive fraud, arising out of the relative po-
sition of the parties towards each other, but of actual fraud. Ibid.

3. The answers deny the fraud, and are made more emphatic by the complainants
having put interrogatories to be answered by the defendants, and the evidence
sustains the answers. Ibid.

4. It will not do to set up mere inadequacy of price as a cause for annulling a
contract made by persons competent and willing to contract; and, besides,
there were other considerations acting upon the widow to induce her to make
the contract. Ibid.

5. The testimony offered to prove the mental imbecility of the widow, should be
received with great caution, and is not sufficient. Ibid.

6. In the settlement of complicated partnership accounts by means of an arbitra-
tor, Bispham was charged with one half of certain custom-house bonds, which
Archer, the other partner, was liable to pay, and which obligations had been in-
curred on partnership account. Bispham v. Price, 162.

7. There was a reservation in the settlement as to certain liabilities, but this one
was not included. Ibid.

CHANCERY (Continued.)

8. Archer's estate was afterwards exonerated from the payment of these bonds by
a decision of this court, reported in 9 Howard, 83. Ibid.

9. A bill cannot be brought by Bispham against Archer's executor, to refund one
half of the amount of the bonds, upon the ground that Archer had never paid
it. Ibid.

10. The reference to an arbitrator was lawful, and his award included many items
which were the subject of estimates. It was accepted as perfectly satisfactory,
and acquiesced in as such until long after the death of Archer. Ibid.

11. No fraud or mistake is charged in the bill; and if an error of judgment occur-
red, by which the chance was overrated that the custom-house bonds would be
enforced against Archer, this does not constitute a ground for the interference
of a court of equity. Ibid.

12. The statute of limitations, also, is a bar to the claim. Ibid.

13. The Michigan Central Railroad Company, established in Michigan, made an
agreement with the New Albany and Salem Railroad Company, established in
Indiana, that the former would build and work a road in Indiana, under the
charter of the latter. Northern Indiana Railroad Company v. Michigan Central
Railroad Company, 233.

14. Another company, also established in Indiana, called the Northern Indiana Rail-
road Company, claiming an exclusive right to that part of Indiana, filed a bill
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan, against
the Michigan Company, praying an injunction to prevent the construction of
the road under the above agreement. Ibid.

15. The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction over such a case. Ibid.

16. The subject-matter of the controversy lies beyond the limits of the district, and
where the process of the court cannot reach the locus in quo. Ibid.

17. Moreover, the rights of the New Albany Company are seriously involved in the
controversy, and they are not made parties to the suit. The act of Congress,
providing for the non-joinder of parties who are not inhabitants of the district,
does not apply to such a case as the present. Ibid.

18. Black, as agent for the owners, contracted to sell a large quantity of land in
Maine, which contract was assigned by the vendee, until it came, through
mesne assignments, into the hands of Miller and others. Garrow v. Davis, 272.
19. Payments were made from time to time on account; but at length, in conse-
quence of a failure to make the payments stipulated in the contract, and by
virtue of a clause contained in it, the contract became void. Ibid.

20. In this state of things, Miller employed one Paulk to ascertain from Black the
lowest price that he would take for the land, and then to sell to others for the
highest price that he could get. Ibid.

21. Paulk sold and assigned the contract to Davis for $1,050. Ibid.

22. Upon the theory that Paulk and Davis entered into a fraudulent combination,
still, Miller and others are not entitled to demand that a court of equity should
consider Davis as a trustee of the lands for their use. They had no interest
in them, legal or equitable, nor any thing but a good will, which alone was the
subject-matter of the fraud, if there was any. Ibid.

23. But the evidence shows that this good will did not exist; for Black was not
willing to sell to Miller and others for a less price than to any other person.
Ibid.

24. Although Paulk represented himself to be acting for Miller and others, when in
reality he was representing Davis, yet he did not obtain the land at a reduced
price thereby; but, on the contrary, at its fair market value. Ibid.

25. The charges of fraud in the bill are denied in the answers, and the evidence is
not sufficient to sustain the allegations. Ibid.

26. Where the respondent in a chancery suit in the Circuit Court took two grounds
of defence, and the judge, in giving his reasons for a decree dismissing the
bill, upon one of the two grounds, expressed his opinion that the respondent had
not established the other ground, he cannot appeal from this as a part of the
decree. Corning v. Troy Iron and Nail Factory, 451.

27. The decree was in the respondent's favor, dismissing the bill with costs, and no
appeal lies from an opinion expressed by the judge upon the facts of the case,
not affecting the decree. Ibid.

28. Moreover, the decree complained of has already been argued before this court
upon the appeal of the other party, and both grounds of defence decided to
be insufficient, and the decree reversed. There is, therefore, no such decree as
that appealed from. Ibid.